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Chapter 6
From the Formation of the Ad Hoc Com:mi ttee on Irish Affairs to
the Atkins Initiative. 1977-1979.
The increasing success of constitutional nationalists put
a severe strain on the activities of republican groups in
America. Noraid lead.ers today accept that the st. Patrick's
Day statement by the Four Horsemen was a set-back to their
efforts to win Irish-American support.

The Irish National

Caucus was similarly alarmed by the carter statement.
showed

that constitutional

influence

the

President.

nationalists

had the

compared

this

to

It

power to

significant

breakthrough, the small successes of the I.N.C. on Capitol
Hill

seemed

singularly

unimpressive.

Republican

groups,

therefore, began exploring new methods by which they could
make their influence more effective.
Father Sean McManus and I.N.C. officials felt that the
best way to counteract the Four Horsemen was to establish a
formal group of supporters in Congress. Noraid leaders backed
this plan because they hoped such an association would be more
effective in raising Irish human rights issues in Washington.
They believed a tightly organized group of Congressmen could
influence the government to issue American visas
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for top

274
r.R.A.

person~el

and to convene formal Congressional Hearings

on Northern Ireland. 1
The

initial

moves

towards

establishing

this

new

congressional group were taken by the leaders of the I.N.C.
and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. A joint delegation from
,

these two organizations approached Congressmen who had worked
for the republican cause and gauged their enthusiasm for the
proposed initiative. Jack Keane, the outgoing President of the
A.O.H. and also a chairman of the.I.N.C., played a key role in
this process.

He contacted Mario Biaggi and asked him to

establish the new group. Biaggi responded enthusiastically and
on September 27, 1977, he announced the formation of the Ad
Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs.
The American republican groups immediately hailed the
formation of the Ad Hoc Committee as a major breakthrough.
Irish-American newspapers reported on the group's activities,
printing full lists of members as new congressmen joined.

~

Irish People, in particular, praised the new group as "the
Congressional

voice

of

the

suffering people

in British-

occupied Ireland" and asked Irish-Americans to urge their
political representatives to join:
Let us each call our Congressman and ask him
to join the Irish Congressional Committee.
Tell him of the suffering and horror of
British occupation. Ring him again and again.
Make an appointment to talk to him personally.
Remind him that it is the same army which
burned the Capitol and the city of Washington
- the same army which is torturing the noble ·
people of Ireland . • • Hurry up! Tomorrow may
be too late. Who knows how many Irish children

I'.I

!:t
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will die tonight at the hands of these British
murderers . 2
Mario Biaggi became chairman of the new Congressional
committee.

He

had

many

personal

characteristics

which

attracted support from Irish republicans in America. During
his

23-year service with the New York Police Department,

Biaggi

was

highly

decorated.

He

developed

a

strongly

conservative attitude to law and order, epitomized by a
in

which

he

shot

fifteen

people

and

killed

~areer

two.

The

Congressman maintained that it was during his police service
that he developed an interest in Ireland. He recalls that one
of his colleagues, an Irish-American cop named Pat McMahon,
had passed on an encyclopedic knowledge of Irish history. The
two

would

discuss

Irish

affairs

while

on

their

"beat"

together. It was this background that pushed Biaggi to make
statements in Congress on the Ulster problem and to strongly
criticiz British policy over internment and the Bloody Sunday
killings. He soon forged strong links with the Irish-American
republican organizations.
From his first associations with the Ulster conflict,
Biaggi's critics accused him of merely playing for the IrishAmerican vote. The Italian-American Congressman was always
angered by this suggestion and continually stated that his
interest lay in the desire to see human rights in Northern
Ireland. He asked:
Why does nobody ever question why Ted Kennedy
is in this? Last time I looked, he was Irish,
Catholic,
white,
but be's involved with
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blacks,
Jews
and
Puerto
Ricans.
My
constituency is only 6% Irish but I say, human
rights for all human beings. 3
Biaggi

emphasized

that

his

constituency

was

mainly

Italian-American and that he was continually re-elected with
large majorities. He said that this proved he was concerned
with Ulster not merely as a ploy to win Irish-American votes.
The Congressman's opponents could, however, point out that he
had aspirations towards a seat in the Senate. In 1973 Biaggi
also ran for Mayor of New York.- Irish-American votes could
greatly help these ambitions.'
Whatever the motivations behind Biaggi's involvement in
the

Ulster

conflict,

he

did

prove

very

successful

in

recruiting congressmen to the Ad Hoc Committee. There were
seventy

members

by

the

end

of

October

1977.

Membership

increased steadily to a peak of one-hundred and thirty by
1979.

Constitutional nationalists have always claimed that

these numbers were misleading and that the Ad Hoc Committee
was basically a "paper organization" -- many congressmen who
joined

took

no

active

part

in

its

activities,

it

met

infrequently, and achieved very little. Critics of the group,
such

as

Garret

FitzGerald,

further

claimed

that

new

Congressmen were "joiners" and signed up as members partly to
oblige a

colleague and partly to create an impression of

involvement in a wide variety of issues. 5
Members of the Ad Hoc Committee encompassed the entire
ideological

spectrum

of

American

politics.

However,

the
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majority

were

democratic

constituencies,

particularly

representatives
New

York.

from

The

eastern

core

of

the

committee consisted of Mario Biaggi, Hamilton Fish (R.,N.Y.),
Benjamin Rosenthall (D. ,N. Y.), Lester Wolff (D.N. Y.), Benjamin
Gilman

(R. ,N. Y.)

Norman Lent

(R. ,N. Y.)

and Joshua Eilberg

(D.,PA). The fact that none of this activist core were IrishAmerican invited constitutional nationalist accusations that
the Ad Hoc Committee was merely a vehicle for Italian and
Jewish Congressmen to win some Irish votes. 5
Prominent

members

of

the

Ad

Hoc

Committee

began

sponsoring bills on Northern Ireland and publicizing alleged
violations of human rights.

Mario Biaggi,

in response to

President Carter's promise of financial aid in the event of a
political

solution,

introduced

assistance to Ulster.

a

bill

granting

economic

The proposed legislation stipulated,

however, that U.S. assistance should only be granted after a
British withdrawal. Most of these bills received very little
backing and usually "died" after the initial attempts to lobby
support.
Ad Hoc committee members had more success in working for
individuals

accused

of

republican

activities

in

Northern

Ireland. Joshua Eilberg began supporting Pearse Kerr, a 17year old Philadelphian who had moved to Belfast in 1972. Kerr
was arrested by the R.u.c. in August 1977 and charged with
membership of the junior I.R.A. and possession of a firearm.
American republican groups claimed the youth was tortured in
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Castlereagh

interrogation

center

and

forced

to

sign

a

confession to these charges. 7
Joshua Eilberg, with the support of the Ad Hoc Committee
members in Congress, began pressing the British Embassy in
Washington for an explanation of why Kerr was being held
without bail.

He accused the British of inflicting "inhuman

treatment" and demanded Kerr's immediate release.
Eventually

British

authorities

dropped

the

charges

against Kerr. He was freed on November 23, 1977. Eilberg and
the

Ad

Hoc

Committee

immediately

claimed

it

was

their

influence which secured the victory, while British officials
maintained they lacked sufficient evidence for a successful
conviction.

The

Ad

Hoc

Committee

exploited

the

issue,

achieving a publicity coup when they organized a large welcome
home ceremony for Pearse Kerr in Philadelphia. A pipe band and
hundreds

of

republicans

greeted

Kerr

as

he

got

off

the

airplane and he was formally received by Mayor Frank Rizzo.a
The Ad Hoc Committee also worked on the case of Damian
Eastwood, a Californian lecturing at the Ulster Polytechnic in
Jordanstown. on December 21, 1977, Eastwood and an accomplice,
Linda Quigley, were arrested after a police patrol found a
bomb in their automobile. Eastwood cooperated with the R.U.C.
and told them that two gunmen were holding his wife and
children hostage and forced him to drive the bomb to the
Culloden Hotel in Hollywood. When police arrived at Eastwood's
;

;
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house

there

was

no

trace

of

the

gunmen

but

his

wife

corroborated the story.
Eastwood was held in Crumlin Road Jail before his trial
and immediately the Ad Hoc committee began publicizing his
case in Washington. Mario Biaggi joined with congressmen from
California and charged the F.B.I. of complicity in Eastwood's
detention. They accused the bureau of supplying the R.U.C.
with

files

on

Eastwood

and

of

carrying

out

wide

scale

harassment of Irish-Americans in.California. 9
In September 1978, Damian Eastwood was tried before Lord
Chief Justice Sir Robert Lowry in Belfast. Lowry concluded
that the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Eastwood had not acted under duress. All charges against
the defendant were dropped. The Ad Hoc Committee claimed, as
in the Kerr case,

that their· activities in Washington had

forced the British to accept standard legal procedures and
adhere to the rule of law. 10
In conjunction with work on behalf of
arrested

in

Ulster,

the

Ad Hoc

Committee

u. s.
also

citizens
increased

efforts to win American visas for Irish republicans. In August
1978, Joshua Eilberg and Hamilton Fish traveled to Britain and
Ireland to
visit,

investigate

the

issue.

During their week-long

they met with United States Consular officials

in

London and Belfast. The two Congressmen also interviewed a
delegation of leading republicans who had been refused entry
into America.
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When

they

returned

to

Washington,

Fish

and

Eilberg

compiled an officiaL report and presented it to the Committee
on the Judiciary. They concluded that the state Department was
acting "unfairly and unjustifiably in denying or revoking
visas"

and

that

officials

"dealt

with

applicants

in

an

unsympathetic and high-handed manner. " The two Congressmen
also urged the State Department to reevaluate all the cases in
which it had denied visas to republicans. 11
While they were in Ireland,

Fish and Eilberg held a

series of press conferences for the purpose of attacking what
they saw as the denial of human rights in Ulster. Upon their
return to the United States, they delivered a much publicized
letter to President Jimmy Carter which stated:
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act of
1973 and its various subsequent amendments
enacted by the British parliament have greatly
eroded the basic common law principle of due
process. The people of Northern Ireland are
being subjected to warrantless searches and
arrests, prolonged detention without charges,
harsh interrogation methods, and non-jury
trials in which a single judge sits alone
imposing long-term sentences. Frankly, Mr.
President,
we
were
appalled
at
these
conditions and by the armed camp atmosphere we
encountered. 12
Although

the

carter

administration

ignored

Fish

and

Eilberg's report, the two politicians did create a substantial
amount of publicity for the human rights. and visa issues.
Their

criticisms

Department

were

of

the

given

British
extensive

government
media

and

coverage

embarrassed officials in London and Washington.

State
that
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The Irish National Caucus encouraged and financed similar
"fact finding"

trips by American politicians to Ireland.

caucus leaders also conducted similar "investigative" trips
themselves. In 1979, a Caucus delegation led by Father Sean
McManus, Fred Burns O'Brien, and Rita Mu!len toured Northern
Ireland.

During

the

visit,

McManus

infuriated

unionist

politicians and the Northern Ireland Office by his accusations
that the R. u. c.

was being used as a

training force

for

loyalist paramilitaries . 13
While in Ireland, McManus held extensive discussions with
Sean McBride,

a

founder

of Amnesty

International

and

a

recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize as well as the Lenin Peace
Prize. McBride agreed to become chairman of a new group called
the Irish National Caucus of America Liaison (I.N.C.A.L.),
which would be based in Dublin." The I.N.C.A.L.'s function was
to provide information on Ulster to the caucus and Ad Hoc
Committee. It would also publicize the activities of American
republican groups to the Irish public.
Prominent members of the I .N .C.A.L. included former Irish
cabinet minister Kevin Boland, and Michael Mullen, General
Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Worker's Union.
Neil Blaney T.D. was also associated with the group and in
December 1979 conducted a tour of America to promote the
Caucus and Ad Hoc committee.
The formation of the I.N.C.A.L. and the support given by
these prominent Irish politicians gave added publicity and
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prestige to republicans working in Washington. It increased
the I.N.C.'s ability to receive information on Ireland and
created a trans-Atlantic link through which alleged British
human rights violations could be exposed.
Undoubtedly, the most ambitious and optimistic initiative
taken by the Ad Hoc Committee and the I.N.C. was the attempt
to form a "peace forum" for Northern Ireland. In October 1978,
a

delegation composed of caucus officials and leaders of

Irish-American

societies

met

with

suggested he could mastermind a

Mario

Biaggi.

They

peace forum on Ulster by

calling on all the participants to come together and discuss
their differences. The concept of this peace forum originated
from

Father

Sean

envisioned Biaggi

McManus

and

Fred

performing the

Burns

role

of

O'Brien.

They

"honest broker"

between unionist and nationalist representatives.
Biaggi was convinced the scheme could be successful. He
agreed to lead the initiative and began exploring ways to
bring Ulster's contending factions together. The congressman
insisted

that

his

motivation

for

taking

on

the

role

of

mediator came from a humanitarian desire to try any scheme
which

might

achieve

peace

in

Northern

Ireland.

Some

of

Biaggi 's critics, however, contend he was swept up by the idea
of emulating President Carter's recent success at the Camp
David agreement between Egypt and Israel. They alleged his
primary motivation was the prestige and political recognition
a successful peace mission in Ulster could bring. 14
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one of the main sources of hope that a peace forum could
succeed was the growing politicization of Ulster loyalist
groups, particularly the Ulster Defence Association. In the
mid-1970s, loyalists began supporting the establishment of an
independent Ulster. They envisaged an important role for the
United States in this new political formula. Consequently,
their traditional attitudes towards American involvement in
the Ulster conflict changed radically.
In the early 1970s, Ulster

l~yalist

groups had condemned

American politicians and Irish-American groups who were active
in supporting the nationalist cause. Both the Ulster Volunteer
Force and U.D.A. 's newspapers attacked Irish-Americans as
anti-Protestant bigots who were financing a war of genocide
against them. They reserved particularly scorn for Senator
Edward

Kennedy

and

Paul

O'Dwyer

who

were

generally

characterized as carrying a deep malicious hatred for Ulster
loyalists.
These
physical

verbal

threats.

criticisms
When

sometimes

'
Congressman

carried

Lester

over

Wolff

into

visited

Northern Ireland in 1972 he reported that a group of loyalists
told him they would kill Ted Kennedy if he ever came to
Belfast. 15 The
they

u. v. F.

produced

lists

also held news conferences at which
of

Noraid

members

and

warned

the

individuals concerned that they were legitimate targets for
assassination. 16
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Partly

as

an

attempt

to

counteract

Irish-American

republican groups, loyalist organizations began establishing
a

support

network

across

the

Atlantic.

They

naturally

concentrated on Canada where significant numbers of Ulster
Protestants had emigrated in the 1950s and 1960s. In Toronto
and nearby Hamilton, there were a number of Orange Lodges and
social groups composed of Ulster exiles. The area became the
center of the loyalist network in North America. A group
called the Canadian Ulster Loyalist Association formed in 1971
and

began

raising

funds

for

the

families

of

U.V.F.

prisoners. 17 A Canadian branch of the U.D.A. also emerged and
by 1975 had sent

$30, ooo

to the groups headquarters

in

Belfast.
The U.V.F. and u.o.A. also organized gun-running networks
based in Canada. The first evidence of this came in 1975 when
British agents intercepted a cache of rifles and explosives on
board a freighter which had sailed out of Nova Scotia. A
leading official in the Canadian U.D.A. was later jailed for
masterminding the scheme which was intended to provide his
comrades

in

Belfast

with

continuous

supplies

of

modern

weapons. 18
Although Ulster loyalists concentrated on building their
overseas support network in Canada, they did establish a chain
of contacts in the United States. In 1972, the u.o.A. command
issued a statement alleging that American loyalists who .had
fought in Vietnam were in Belfast training volunteers in
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guerilla warfare. 1.9 This sparked of a series of exaggerated
rumors that reached a peak when some Irish-American groups
claimed members of the U.D.A. had undergone training by the Ku
Klux Klan and survivalist groups

in the southern United

states . 20
The most industrious loyalist supporter in the U.S. was
Harold Alexander.

He

was

born

in

Belfast

in

1930,

but

emigrated to Philadelphia and became an American citizen in
1969. In 1976, he founded an organization called the Alexander
International Development Consultants aimed at promoting the
loyalist cause in America. The group registered under the
F.A.R.A. as the U.S. arm of the U.D.A •• Alexander also listed
over

ten

other

loyalist

and

unionist

groups

as

his

associates. 2 i
Alexander and his wife were the only registered members
of the group, yet from 1976 onwards they conducted a wide
range of activities in support of Ulster loyalism. He appeared
on television and radio to oppose Noraid spokesmen and .made
contacts

with

Washington.

politicians

Alexander

also

and

government

arranged

officials

American

tours

in
for

prominent loyalists and made frequent visits to Northern
Ireland to meet with U.D.A. and U.V.F. commanders. 22 The most
important function he performed was publicizing the loyalist
ideal of an independent Ulster.
The concept of Ulster independence had its origins in the
mid-1970s when the U.D.A. formed a "think tank'' to formulate
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political

policy.

The group called itself

the New Ulster

Political Research Group (N.U.P.R.G.) and gradually proposed
that Ulster should be an independent state.

One of the major

problems of independence was how the new state could survive
economically. In an attempt to solve this problem, members of
the N.U.P.R.G. went to Libya in 1974 in order to secure the
promise of financial aid from Colonel Ghaddafi.
This attempt to get Libyan financial assistance failed
and,

from

1975

onwards,

the

N.U.P.R.G.

increasingly

concentrated on the possibility of American aid. As the group
developed the practical means for independence they emphasized
an

important

role

for

the

United

States.

The

loyalists

suggested that the political institutions of an independent
Ulster should be modeled on America, with a President, a Bill
of Rights, and a Congressional style committee system drawn
from an elected legislature.

Some even suggested that the

United states could provide external defense and that the
administration of justice could be supervised by a Supreme
Court Judge. The N.U.P.R.G. felt that this provision would
instill

confidence

in

the

legal

system

from

both

communities. 23
From the key role proposed for the United States in their
political

scheme,

the

N.U.P.R.G.

began

to

dilute

traditional aversion to the Irish-American dimension.

their
Some

felt that if contacts were made with Irish-American groups,
such as the Irish National Caucus, they could win support in
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congress for Ulster independence. Fortunately for the loyalist
plan, the I.N.c. were concurrently contemplating the peace
forum at which all sides in the Ulster conflict could come
together to discuss their differences. The Caucus was thus
receptive to the possibility of talks with the loyalists.
After initial contacts were made, a group from the Ulster
Independence Association, led by George Allport, met with Fred
Burns O'Brien in Washington. The loyalists were enthusiastic
about O'Brien's suggestion of a peace forum and both agreed it
could

be

used

to

explore

the

conditions

under

which

independence would be acceptable to nationalists. Later in the
spring of 1978, Andy Tyrie, leader of the u.o.A., publicly
supported the idea of a peace forum. In a complete reversal of
earlier attitudes, he suggested Edward Kennedy would be a good
mediator, because;
we believe that Senator Kennedy is the one man
who would be acceptable to both communities.
He is a catholic, but the Protestant community
believes in his integrity and credibility. 2 •
Ted Kennedy declined the off er to mediate and said that
negotiations were better left to the conflicting parties
themselves. The cross-Atlantic contacts continued, however,
and when Hamilton Fish and Joshua Eilberg were on their tour
of Ireland in August 1978, they met leaders of the N.U.P.R.G.
in Belfast. At this meeting u.o.A. commanders Andy Tyrie and
John McMichael, along with Glen Barr, told the congressmen
that

they

were

tired

of

bein<:f manipulated

by

unionist

politicians such as Ian Paisley. They outlined their proposal
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for Ulster independence and said they were ready to sever the
link with Britain. 25
Throughout these discussions, Glen Barr, the N. U. P.R. G. 's
most articulate spokesman, adopted a conciliatory tone. He
attacked sectarian violence and continually emphasized that
catholic rights would be guaranteed in an independent state.
He also told the Congressmen his organization would welcome
the opportunity to participate in a peace forum organized from
America. 26
Hamilton Fish and Joshua Eilberg were greatly impressed
by the loyalist delegation and concluded that their proposal
was "a most significant change and the best possibility of
progress there has been for some time." The two politicians
met with Mario Biaggi in Washington and convinced him that the
N.U.P.R.G.s attitude;
demonstrated
clearly
that
the
loyalist
paramilitaries were disenchanted by continued
British domination and were actually seeking a
political solution by negotiation with the
republican groups, independent of Britain. 27
Encouraged by these reports, Biaggi decided to tr.ave! to
Ireland and test support for a peace mission. In November
1978, he and congressman Ben Gilman met with over twenty-five
different groups. They were encouraged by the enthusiasm of
the loyalist paramilitaries and received qualified support
from Sinn Fein.

When Biaggi returned to the United States he

announced that the peace forum would convene in Washington on
May 14, 1979.
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Irish-American republican groups were divided in their
attitude

to

the

loyalist

political

program.

Most of

the

leading figures in Noraid refused to accept negotiations with
people

they

Others,

regarded

principally

as

bigots

members

of

and

sectarian

the

I.N.C.,

murderers.
were

very

enthusiastic and wanted to explore the possibility of an
independent Ulster.
loyalist

They were especially attracted by the

willingness

to

cut

their

ties

with

Britain.

Consequently, support grew for a·1oyalist tour of America so
that the N.U.P.R.G. could discuss their political views and
give impetus to Biaggi's peace forum.
In December 1978, the Minnesota Irish National Caucus
invited the N.U.P.R.G. to come to the United States. The group
accepted,

and on January 18,

1979,

a

loyalist delegation

embarked on a two-week tour. The most prominent members of the
group again included Glen Barr, Andy Tyrie, as well as Tommy
Little and Harry Chicken. Harold Alexander organized their
itinerary which consisted of a series of public lectures,
discussions with political groups, and media appearances. 2 •
The tour was one of the most unusual

events of the

current troubles. The loyalists, noted for their traditional
militancy and association with sectarian killings, impressed
nearly everyone they met with their willingness to accommodate
the aspirations of the nationalist community. The group held
discussions about the status of Catholics in an independent
Ulster with Archbishop Roche, Vice Chairman of the American
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Catholic

International

Conference

clergymen

praised

the

political

ideals.

They

.11 .... ~11 ...... 1.01 ......,, ..... ,., ...... ~ ......

N.U.P.R.G.
were
tiHHll;f,.

Center.
for

their

similarly
HHt1t1•1 .... 111

Afterwards

both

progressive

acclaimed

"1tttl

I

after
,.~~~ ......

11 ... •·ltl114t

ot •rip O'Neill <tm1 J•!dwttrd Kennedy.n

One of the most unexpected supporters of the loyalist
tour was Paul O'Dwyer. He and Liam Murphy of the A.O.H. hosted
a~leantion

the N.U.P.R.G.

in New York and

th~v

nll became

was so impressed by the loyalists that he provided them with
free legal service to draft a constitution for an independent
Ulster. The loyalist group published this constitution in a
pamphlet entitled, Beyond the Religious Divide. It contained

'NlduJ.y

JH.t1 l.tH::!l1

l1y

poJ LL.lcul

11nttlytJtH

rtti

d

ti.lncere

and

thoughtful attempt to break the logjam of Ulster politics. 31
The success of the loyalist tour, however, did not help
the rising problems faced by the peace forum. Mario Biaggi had
hoped to fund the forum with cash contributions from U.S.
corporations

and

peace

foundations.

This

money

never

materialized and Biaggi could not afford to bring the various
Ulster groups to Washington. The peace initiative was also
scuttled by the refusal of all constitutional parties to
participate. British and Irish government officials plus the
nationalist and unionist constitutional parties flatly refused
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to get involved in discussions with "terrorists." Biaggi was
therefore forced to postpone the initial meeting date of the
peace conference.
In the summer of 1979, Biaggi tried to get the American
government involved, hoping that this would give the peace
conference more legitimacy and thus attract the main unionist
and nationalist parties. On August 7, he met with Jimmy Carter
and

tried

to

persuade

him

to

take

over

the

position

of

mediator. carter flatly refused·to get involved, realizing
that such a move would contradict the wishes of both the
British and Irish governments.
Following Carter's negative reaction, Biaggi, in a last
desperate attempt to save the peace initiative, decided to go
to Northern Ireland and bring the conflicting groups together.
He arrived in Belfast with a group of I.N.C. officials and
immediately sent out invitations for all political factions to
attend a conference in the Europa Hotel. The N.U.P.R.G. were
the only loyalist group to attend, and continued to believe
the meeting might further plans for Ulster independence. 32
Although

republicans

initiative,
Gerry Adams,

Sinn

were

Fein

Oaithi

extremely

agreed

O'Connaill,

to
and

skeptical

participate

of
and

the
sent

Ruairi O'Bradaigh

as

representatives.
When the two delegations arrived at the Europa Hotel,
they

occupied

separate

conference

rooms.

Mario

Bi~ggi

attempted "shuttle diplomacy" between the groups and tried to
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persuade them to call a ceasefire. Jack Holland contended that
aiaggi was no Henry Kissinger. Despite four hours of moving
between the republican and loyalist delegations, he achieved
no aqreements • 33
Apparently, the loyalists were quite flexible during the
talks, but the republican delegation remained intransigent.
Gerry Adams in particular was uninterested in constructive
dialogue and completely refused Biaggi 's suggestion of an
I.R.A. truce. The conference eventually disintegrated and hope
for a Camp-David style settlement in Northern Ireland ended.
The failure of Biaggi's peace forum was a serious blow

.

.

for the N.U.P.R.G. It represented the end of American interest
in their scheme for Ulster independence. Apart from this the
group's ideals never received significant support within the
unionist community. The vast majority there believed that an
independent Ulster would be economically inviable and that
breaking the link with Britain would only lead to eventual
absorption by the Republic of Ireland. Independence remains a
political option which attracts only minimal support.
The collapse of peace negotiations also had detrimental
consequences for Irish-American nationalism by exacerbating a
conflict which had been festering between the I.N.C.

and

Noraid. When the Caucus formed in 1974, Father Sean McManus
made clear that the group endorsed the "armed struggle" of the
I.R.A •. He soon realized, however, that congressmen did not
want to be associated with an organization which supported
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violence in Ireland. Consequently, McManus began to deny that
the Caucus had links with the I.R.A., refused to send funds to
Ireland, and adopted the dove of peace as its emblem. In 1977,
he told reporters:
The I.N.C. has no connection whatsoever with.
the I.R.A. or indeed with any other group in
Ireland. We are an exclusively American based
organization dedicated to the non-violent
pursuit of human rights, justice and peace.
The I.N.C.
is logically and necessarily
opposed to British policy in Ireland because
the
British
government
historically,
currently, and par exc~llence uses violence to
achieve political objectives. But the caucus
is opposed to all forms of violence whether it
be British or Irish, state or civilian. The
Caucus believes totally in the philosophy of
non-violence. 34
Noraid was incensed by this shift within the Caucus. The
group accused the I.N.C. of hypocrisy because it was making
money by appealing to Irish-American sympathy for the for
Ulster Catholics yet was sending no money to alleviate their
suffering. Personal animosities also grew between McManus and
Michael Flannery who was incensed by what he called I.N.C.
attempts to encroach on Noraid fund-raising.

In 1978,

just

before the annual Noraid dinner, McManus organized his own
function and began soliciting republican supporters for $25
donations. Flannery strongly condemned this action, believing
it

reduced

potential

donations

which

Noraid

would

have

collected.~

Noraid leaders also condemned the Caucus for maintaining
dialogue with Ulster loyalists. After Fred Burns O'Brien met
leaders

of

the

Ulster

Independence

Association

in

1977,
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Michael

Flannery

accused

him

of

being

an

agent

for

the

American government. The Noraid chief conveyed this suspicion
to Provisional

Sinn

Fein

in Belfast which then

issued a

statement accusing Burns O'Brien of scheming with the C.I.A.
to undermine Irish-American groups. They declared him persona
non grata with the republican movement and warned to keep out
of Ireland. 36
Fred Burns O'Brien immediately denied the accusations
against him. He was supported by Fr. Sean McManus, who issued
a

statement

condemning

the

Sinn

Fein

allegations.

This

conflict with the leadership of the republican movement in
Ireland alarmed some members of the caucus who had opposed
McManus's more moderate line. Irish National Caucus chapters
in

New

Jersey,

Illinois,

Connecticut

and

Pennsylvania

condemned the central leadership in Washington. These chapters
attacked the discussions

with Ulster

loyalist groups

and

eventually broke away to form independent organizations. 37
The

feud

between

Sinn

Fein,

Noraid

and

the

Caucus

increased after the failure of the "peace forum" conference at
the Europa Hotel in 1979.
delegation of

The I.N.C. accused the republican

inflexibility and issued an article in ~

Andersonstown News attacking Sinn Fein for wrecking "a great
opportunity for political progress. 113 •
Sinn Fein quickly responded by accusing the Caucus of
furthering the aims of British propaganda. Gerry Adams stated
that

because

the

peace

forum

did

not

include

British

295
officials, it gave credence to the perception that the Ulster
was

conflict

purely

sectarian.

An

article

in

fhoblacht/Republican News outlined this view and concluded:
The British government for the last decade has
justified its presence in the six counties as
one of security forces keeping religious
communities apart. For republicans to sit down
and talk with loyalists (in a peace forum
which by def ini ti on means a meeting of the
antagonists) positively helps the British in
projecting their role as a peace keeping force
instead of an occupation force. 39
·
Noraid fully supported Sinn.Fein and intensified its own
condemnations of the caucus.
articles

ap~eared

in

The

In October 1979, a series of

Irish

People

which

personally

attacked Fr. Sean McManus and accused the caucus of fomenting
divisions within the republican
network in America.'0
J
Journalists~reporting

on the conflict between Noraid and

the Caucus concluded the

feud had detrimental

affects on

American republicanism. Bernard Weinraub produced an extensive
analysis of the split in which he supported the contentions of
Irish government officials that fund-raising for republican
groups

had

been

seriously

impaired.

Republican

publicity

efforts also declined as Noraid and the caucus devoted their
energies to mutual criticism. Weintraub concluded that despite
the

formation

America

was

of
in

the
total

Ad

Hoc

Committee,

disarray

by

the

republicanism
beginning

of

in
the

1980s. 41
Apart from the adverse effects of internal squabbling,
American

republicanism

also continued to

suffer

from the
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actions of the I .R.A .. Between 1977 and 1978, the Provisionals
began a series of fire bomb attacks. Some analysts alleged
that this campaign was launched because of the decline in
Irish-American funding. The I.R.A. could not afford to buy
large amounts of explosives so they switched to incendiary
devices. These only required a small amount of explosives
attached to a can of petrol. When the device exploded, it sent
a ball of fire bursting into the target.
In February 1978, the I.R.A. detonated a fire bomb such
as this at the La Mon House Hotel near Comber, County Down.
The bar was packed with people who were engulfed in a sheet of
blazing petrol.

The explosion killed twelve people while

twenty-three received appalling burns. The incident produced
front

page

reports

in

the

main American

newspapers

and

editorials describing the I.R.A. as "savage monsters." N.B.C.
television news broadcast pictures of the charred remains of
victims and implied this was the consequence of money donated
to Noraid. 42
In 1979, republicans also launched a series of attacks on
British politicians and members of the "establishment." In
March, an I.R.A. team assassinated Sir Richard Sykes, the
British ambassador to Holland. Eight days later, the I.N.L.A.
planted a bomb which killed Airey Neave, Conservative Party
spokesman on Northern Ireland, as he drove out of the House of
Commons

parking

criticisms of

lot.

These

killings

Irish republicanism,

increased

American

but the condemnations

297
reached

unprecedented

levels

after

attack

the

on

Lord Louis Mountbatten.
On August

27,

1979,

the

I .R.A.

detonated

a

bomb on

Mountbatten's fishing boat off the west coast of Ireland. The
explosion killed Mountbatten,
local

boat

boy.

The

elderly

his grandson Nicholas and a
dowager

Lady

Bradbourne,

a

passenger on the boat, died of her injuries the next day while
Lord and Lady Bradbourne were both seriously injured. 43•
The killing of Lord Mountbatten created an.international
wave of revulsion against the I.R.A •• The attack was seen as
particularly

callous

against

a

figure

whose

long

and

distinguished military career had never brought him near
Ireland. During the Second World War, many American troops had
served under Mountbatten and he had earned the admiration and
respect of many.
became

the

Throughout · the United States,

primary news

item

and

hundreds

of

the attack
editorials

described the I .R.A. as everything from "fanatical terrorists"
to "psychopathic murderers."'' Typical of the response in the
United States media was the commentary given by The Atlanta
Constitution:
It is tempting to de.scribe the
I .R.A.
terrorists who killed Lord Mountbatten as
animals, but that's demeaning to animals. It
would be more accurate to describe them as
savages, but at least savages can be excused
because of ignorance • • • It is a terrible
shame that a
man of such talents and
achievements can be killed by cowards so low.
They are truly the dregs of humanity. 45
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Irish-American republicans responded to this universal
condemnation of the I.R.A. in the media by issuing statements
justifying the attack. They said the killing was justified
because Mountbatten was a member of the British ruling class.
Typical of these was the reaction of Noraid spokesman Tom
Duffy:
The I.R.A. is waging a war on behalf of the
Irish nation. All members of the enemy are
legitimate targets . . • I think the killing not the murder - was just part of the war that
is going on. He should not be more immune than
anyone else. We wonder why the sympathy and
tears are so selective. They worry about a 79year old man, but they haven't said a word
about all the young Irish people that have
been killed over the years.' 6
These

statements

by

republicans

did

not

change

the

American media perception of the Mountbatten killing. On the
contrary, a number of newspapers attacked Noraid's "callous
view"

of the killing and issued editorials urging Irish-

Americans not to fund the group. Many newspapers also appealed
to

the

Carter

administration

to

clamp

down

on

I.R.A.

gunrunning. 47
Perhaps

the

greatest

challenge

to

Irish-American

republican groups in this period, apart from the extremely
adverse

publicity

in

the

media

and

their

own

internal

conflicts, was their continued harassment by constitutional
nationalists. The Four Horsemen continued their work against
Noraid and the I. N. c.

These politicians further increased

their prestige by persuading the British to launch new policy
initiatives in Ulster.

299
In Ireland, constitutional nationalists also maintained
their attacks on Irish-American republicanism. Following the
formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Irish government and
s.o.L.P. condemned Mario Biaggi and accused him of giving
encouragement to the I .R.A .• In February 1978, Irish Taoiseach
Jack Lynch sent a much publicized open letter to Biaggi.
Lynch attacked the Congressman for his "public identification
with supporters of violence in Ireland" and strongly condemned
the Irish National Caucus. This letter was sent to every
member of Congress in the hope that it would discourage
membership of the Ad Hoc Committee. Lynch also wanted to
embarrass Biaggi in the American media. Jack Holland claimed
that this objective was particularly successful and concluded:
Edi tori al after editorial poured scorn and
derision on the Bronx politician for thinking
he knew anything about Northern Ireland. He
was generally held up to ridicule as a dupe of
clever pro-I.R.A. manipulators or abused as a
cynical politician playing for Irish-American
votes. 48
The Lynch administration launched similar attacks on the
republican network in America from 1978 onwards. The Irish
Foreign Minister, Michael O'Kennedy, persistently attacked
Noraid while members of the Irish diplomatic corps worked to
isolate the Ad Hoc Committee in Congress. Irish officials also
kept

linki~g

the I.N.C. with support for violence, despite the

group's continued claims to the contrary. 49
The Irish government further strengthened its links with
constitutional nationalists in America. It assisted the Four
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Horsemen in their condemnations of republican groups. Irish
diplomats encouraged these leading Irish-American politicians
to pressure the British government into political change.
Eventually this activity produced results which enhanced the
prestige and influence of the "Big Four" and eclipsed the
relatively unsuccessful attempts of republicans to influence
political events in Ulster.
After their 1977 St. Patrick's Day statement, the Four
Horsemen had fully expected the British government to launch
a new political initiative in Northern Ireland. They believed
they had made a bold and imaginative move in attacking the
republican network in America and felt they deserved a reward.
What they wanted was a renewed effort by the British to
construct

a

political

framework

which

would

give

the

nationalist community real power. 50
Although the British government warmly welcomed the 1977
St. Patrick's Day statement, it did not want to take any new
political initiatives in Ulster. The dismal failure of the
constitutional convention in 1976 had convinced the Callaghan
administration that the best way to govern the province was to
continue direct rule for an indefinite period. The British had
also

introduced

the

twin

policies

of

Ulsterization

and

Criminalization and believed their success depended on a long
period of political stability. 51 They therefore opposed new
political

initiatives

which would be

conflict and tension in Ulster.

likely to

increase
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British Secretary of State Roy Mason, therefore, made no
further attempts to reach a political agreement in Northern
Ireland.

In contrast,

the Four Horsemen felt that a new

political initiative was the minimum reward they deserved for
attacking American republicanism. When the "Big Four" realized
that the British were not going to make any major move in
Ulster, they became increasingly critical of the Callaghan
administration.

Their

growing

anger

and

frustration

was

compounded by a series of official reports in 1978 which
confirmed the British had committed a series of human rights
violations in the province.
The origins of these official reports dated back to
December 1971, when the Irish government had filed complaints
with the European commission on Human Rights. The complaints
alleged

that

interrogation

British
techniques

troops
on

had

used

internees.

The

five
five

illegal
methods

consisted of a series of sensory deprivation techniques, which
included exposing suspects to continuous "white noise" and
covering their heads with black hoods for extended periods of
time. In September 1977, the European Court on Human Rights
found Britain guilty. The judges concluded that the five
techniques, while not constituting torture, were "inhuman and
degrading."
The leaders of constitutional nationalism in America
responded to the verdict of the European court and the lack of
political

activity

in Ulster by sharply criticizing the
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British in their 1978 St. Patrick's Day statement. Fourteen
major politicians including Senators Joe Biden, Gary Hart,
George McGovern and Congressman Tom Foley, joined the Four
Horsemen in their condemnation. The joint statement continued
to criticize Irish-Americans who supported the I.R.A., but
also

attacked

the

British

government

and

unionists

for

blocking political progress. 52
The criticisms of British political inactivity in Ulster
increased throughout 1978. Tip O'Neill, speaking at an Ireland
Fund

dinner

in

May,

alleged

that

the

Callaghan

administration's lack of commitment to a political settlement
was contributing to the continued death and destruction in
Northern Ireland. 53 Senator Edward Kennedy concentrated on
the abuse of human rights and on June 11 called for the
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations
of

brutality

by

the

R. U. C. 54

Hugh Carey

showed

his

displeasure at British policy by refusing to attend a dinner
honoring Prime Minister Callaghan in New York. 55
In December 1978, Senator Daniel Moynihan traveled to
London in an attempt to assess the effects of this increased
criticism on British officials. He met with Roy Mason and
Foreign Secretary David owen. The Senator told them that the
campaign of constitutional nationalists against republican
groups

in America would be ineffective unless there was

political progress in Ulster. Mason and owen explained that a
new political initiative, in a situation in which there was no
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basis for consent,

would only make the problem worse and

intensify violence. This casual attitude infuriated Moynihan
who told reporters:
I came away absolutely dazed; he (Mason) had
no intention of doing anything about Northern
Ireland except keeping British troops there.
The question of Northern Ireland never ever
came up at conferences of the two leading
British political parties.
There
is
no
political will to settle. 56
When Moynihan returned to the United States, he gave
details

of

the

London

meeting

to

his

constitutional

nationalist colleagues. They were similarly outraged at the
British attitude and determined to increase their efforts for
a political initiative in 1979. Their resolve was further
heightened by the continued evidence exposing misconduct by
Ulster's security

forces.~

In the summer of 1978, Amnesty International conducted an
inquiry

into

interrogation

allegations
of

of

terrorist

provided strong evidence

police

brutality

suspects.

The

during

Amnesty

of seventy-eight cases

the

report

in which

suspects suffered serious physical injury while being held at
Castlereagh Interrogation Center.
The British government responded to these findings by
calling

an

independent

inquiry

to

examine

interrogation

procedures. Harry Bennett, an English crown Court Judge, led
the investigation in early March 1979. The subsequent Bennett
Report

confirme~ ~nat

R.U.C. detectives physically mistreated

terrorist susp~.ct:s during questioning and recommended the
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installation

of

closed-circuit

televisions

to

monitor

interrogations. The report also called for regular physical
examinations to be carried out on suspects in order to detect
physical abuse.
The

Bennett

Report's

findings

of

R.U.C.

misconduct

contributed to the severity of criticisms contained within the
1979 St. Patrick's Day statement by the Four Horsemen. The
message accused the British government of "negligence" and
"acquiescence" in the face of ,,gross violations of human
rights" and called for a more extensive investigation into the
ill-treatment of suspects. It renewed the demand for a fresh
political initiative in Ulster and received full endorsement
from Irish Foreign Minister Michael O'Kennedy. 58
John Hume encouraged the Four Horsemen to increase their
pressure on the British government and suggested to Tip
O'Neill that he could lead a political delegation to Ireland.
Hume felt that such a trip, timed to coincide with the British
general

elections

in

April,

could

convince

both

the

Conservative and Labour parties to give more consideration to
a political solution .in Northern Ireland. 59
Tip O'Neill,

convinced by Hume's

suggestion,

led a

delegation of fourteen leading Democrats and Republicans to
Ireland in the Spring of 1979. O'Neill held discussions with
leaders of the s. D. L. P. , and also with Harry West of the
Official Unionists and Ian Paisley. He was reportedly very
impressed by the sincerity of the two Unionist leaders and the
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talks increased his optimism about the success of new attempts
to establish political dialogue.
O'Neill also traveled to London to meet leaders of the
main political parties.

Al though Prime Minister Callaghan

suggested there might be

a

new Ulster

initiative if

the

political climate changed, O'Neill felt there was no real
intent

for

such a

move.

He was

further

infuriated by a

political deal Callaghan had reached with the Unionist M.P.s
at

Westminster.

The

Prime

Min-ister,

leading

a

minority

government, had agreed to increase Unionist representation in
exchange for continued support of Labour policies in the House
of Commons.
O'Neill condemned the Labor/Unionist deal and accused
both

British

parties

of

using

Ulster

as

a

"political

football." On April 20, ·he issued his strongest attack on
British policy and stated:
I have been deeply concerned by the lack of
political progress in Northern Ireland over
the last few years ..• together with all sides
in Ireland we insist that Britain bears a
heavy responsibility for the failures of
recent years on the political front. We have
been concerned that the problem has been
treated as a political football in London or
has otherwise been given a low priority ••• we
insist on an early, realistic and fresh
initiative on the part of the incoming British
government, so as to get negotiations moving
quickly. 60
This statement caused an immediate political controversy
in Britain. Shirley Williams, the Education Secretary, and
former Prime Minister Harold Wilson attacked Irish-Americans
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for their ignorance of the Ulster conflict. Margaret Thatcher
these

re-emphasized

criticisms

condescendingly observed,
sounds

than

ignorant

"There

while
are

Irish-American

few

Robert
more

Adley

nauseating

politicians

visiting

Dublin and grubbing around for votes in the United States by
venting their spleen on Britain." 61
British
remarks

as

television
the

lead

and

newspapers

story on April

carried

20,

1979.

O'Neill's
The major

tabloids ran banner headlines advising the House Speaker to
"Keep Your Nose out of British Affairs!" The "quality press"
issued

editorials

which

were

equally

abrupt.

The

Daily

Telegraph commented:
Mr. O'Neill's observations were both brief and
confused, and probably intended primarily for
the Irish electorate in America, but Americans
would
be
best . advised
to
do
their
electioneering at home
What makes Mr.
O'Neill's speech a scandal rather than a
trivial impertinence is the effect which it is
likely to produce in Ulster itself. There it
will both encourage the I.R.A. in its new
campaign of murder and harden Protestant
militancy. 62
This critical reaction from British politicians and the
media was strongly condemned by constitutional nationalists in
Ireland.

Both the

Irish government

and s.D.L.P.

defended

O'Neill. Garret FitzGerald sent a widely publicized letter to
The Daily Telegraph describing him as;
a man of outstanding political courage
and statesmanship. A man who has shown
that his only concern with our affairs is
to work for peace, regardless of what it
may cost him in votes from Irish-American
extremists. 63
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On April 22, Vice-President Walter Mondale met with Irish
Foreign

Minister

O'Kennedy

in

Washington.

After

hearing

O'Kennedy's views, Mondale defended Tip O'Neill and said the
House Speaker had acted out of a genuine concern felt at the
highest levels of the United States government about what was
happening in Northern Ireland. Michael O'Kennedy implied that
Jimmy Carter fully supported O'Neill's remarks. One day ;later,
however, White House aides distanced the President from the
controversy and said the House Speaker's remarks did not
necessarily reflect the views of the Carter administration. 6 '
Hugh

Carey

delivered

the

strongest

reaction

to

the

British attacks on Tip O'Neill. The New York governor issued
a joint article with Dr. Kevin Cahill, his adviser on Northern
Ireland. The article appeared in major newspapers throughout
America and defended O'Neill's remarks. It re-emphasized the
call for a new political initiative and proposed that if
Britain refused to act it should be made an "international
outcast"

and

the

United

States

should

impose

economic

sanctions:
If political encouragement and financial
incentives do not succeed in strengthening
Britain's
willingness
to
initiate
moves
towards peace, then the American congress
should seriously consider applying the same
economic sanctions that are employed against
Rhodesia, Russia,
and other nations for
violations of human rights. 65
Despite
government,

this
now

American
headed

by

pressure,
Margaret

the

new

Thatcher,

British
gave

no
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indications that it would change the Ulster policy that had
been followed by the Callaghan administration. Constitutional
nationalists,

therefore,

re-doubled their efforts.

In May

1979, Taoiseach Jack Lynch met Margaret Thatcher in London and
expressed his strong desire for a fresh political move. In
America, Senator Kennedy qave an extensive interview to

~

Belfast Telegraph in which he re-emphasized that the American
government would give extensive financial aid to support an
agreed political framework in Northern Ireland. He also warned
that if a new political initiative was not taken, this would
strengthen republican groups in America and undermine the
ability of the Four Horsemen to block funding for the I.R.A ••
He said that the lack of political progress in Ulster;
makes it more difficult for the moderate
forces and voices that have spoken and
condemned the kind of support that Noraid has
provided in search of a more violent solution.
It makes our job more difficult. The Speaker
is representing the moderates, and we are
having difficulty in holding a consensus. I
personally feel extremely strong about the
need to condemn violence and terror. But our
ability to influence and convince people that
there is a better way would be diminished if
nothing happens. 66
Daniel Moynihan re-emphasized Kennedy's argument in an
interview with B.B.C. television on June 2, 1979. He denounced
the

I .R.A.

as

"a

band of

sadistic

murderers"

but

told

reporters that the U.S. wanted a united Ireland and would not
be "endlessly patient" in waiting for this. He also accused
the British government of abusing the successful efforts of
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the Four Horsemen against I.R.A. fund-raising in America, by
adopting a complacent attitude to the Ulster problem. 67
The

Thatcher

government

reacted

to

these

renewed

criticisms with the traditional off-hand dismissals of IrishAmerican ignorance about Ulster.

surprisingly,

Dr.

Conn9r

cruise o' Brien supported the British response. The former
Irish cabinet minister wrote an open letter to Daniel Moynihan
which appeared in the American press. o' Brien stated that
Irish-American pressure would achieve nothing except make
Unionists more intransigent and encourage the I .R.A..

He

further issued a strong personal attack on Moynihan's lack of
knowledge about Ulster and accused him of being motivated by
an "ethnic anglophobia:"
When you and I last talked about Ireland, it
struck me that you knew little about the
subject. But iri your manner, as we talked of
Ireland, there was something odd: a vague,
muffled stubborn certainty ••• Where does that
certainty come from? Not from study, nor from
personal experience. But it comes easily from
the level of the mind which is dominated by
the confident intuitions of ethnic tradition
.•• (Which has) taken over your own thinking
process. And even more unfortunately, your
speaking process. 68
This letter led to an exchange of critic isms between
O'Brien and the Four Horsemen in the press and in periodical
journals. The conflict grew so intense that Tip O'Neill was
reported as describing the former minister as "a silly son of
a bitch. 1169 Although members of the

Irish government and

S.O.L.P. did not articulate similar opinions in public, they
made

it

clear

that

they

fully

welcomed

Irish-American
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political support. John Hume published an article in Foreign
Affairs in which he criticized O'Brien's views and pointed
out:
The support for violence from the United
States has been contained and has in fact
dropped. That this should have been maintained
during the past years of political vacuum in
Northern
Ireland
is
an
extraordinary
achievement. There are many men, women and
children who are alive today, I am convinced,
because of the political courage and concer~
of these men (Four Horsemen) . 70
Constitutional nationalists qrew increasingly frustrated
by the lack of British response to their calls for political
change. The Four Horsemen eventually concluded that the only
way their appeals would be given serious consideration was to
take

punitive measures.

The opportunity for

such action

presented itself in the summer of 1979.
Since the early 1970s, the Royal Ulster Constabulary had
purchased a significant number of weapons from American arms
manufacturers. In 1979, the R.U.c. placed an order for 3,000
.357 Magnum handguns and 500 rifles with the Connecticut arms
manufacturers, Sturm, Ruger and Company. Following previous
government policy, the United States State Department had
permitted the sale of arms to the police in Northern Ireland.
The Irish National caucus received information about this
arms shipment and Fr. Sean McManus pushed Mario Biagqi to
reverse State Department policy. Biaggi attacked the arms sale
on two grounds. He contended that by permittinq the sale of
United States weapons to the R.U.C., the state Department was
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supporting one particular faction in Northern Ireland and
could not claim its policy was neutral and impartial. The
Bronx

Congressman

also

pointed

out

that

both

Amnesty

International and the European Court had found the R.u.c.
guilty of human rights abuses. He contended that it would be
a massive contradiction for the Carter administration to claim
its foreign policy was guided by a desire to protect "human
rights, " yet supply weapons to a proven violator.

Biaggi

announced that when the annual Appropriations Bill for the
Department of State came through Congress in July, he would
sponsor an amendment designed to halt further weapons sales to
the Ulster police. 71
In June, Tip O'Neill issued a statement in which he
supported the ban on sale of arms to the R.U.c •. He hoped that
the threat of his support for such an amendment would persuade
the Thatcher government to take the call for a new political
initiative seriously. Instead, the new Secretary of State for
Northern

Ireland,

Humphrey

Atkins,

condemned

O'Neill

as

irresponsible in criticizing the sale of weapons which the
R.U.c. would use "to defend the community and themselves from
attacks by mindless assassins." In Washington, deputy British
Ambassador Peter Jay,
government's

regret

met with O'Neill and conveyed his
and

displeasure

at

the

Speaker's

remarks. 72
When the state Department Appropriations Bill came before
Congress on July 12, 1979, Biaggi proposed his amendment.
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After a short debate, the House voted in support of Biaggi and
in early August, the State Department announced it would
suspend its license for arms sales to the R.U.C., pending a
review of policy. Tip O'Neill played a vital role in this
.decision. He could have easily blocked Biaggi's amendment. As
speaker of the House, he controlled the flow of legislation on
the floor of Congress.

But on this occasion, he did not

intervene. Instead he chose to let the amendment carry as an
indication to the British government of the kinds of problems
it could expect if calls for a fresh move on Northern Ireland
continued to be met with derision and ignored.
The State Department had supported the sale of guns to
the R.U.C. and traditionally maintained a pro-British policy.
Because

the

Carter

administration

was

facing

internal

criticism at home and from Congress, Tip O'Neill's power was
elevated.

Carter relied on the Speaker's support to get

legislation through Congress and he could not afford to
criticize such a powerful and essential ally. Considering
these factors, the administration felt the need to maintain
good relations with O'Neill was more important than the risk
of offending the British. Therefore, the R.U.C. arms sales
were suspended. 73
In

America,

Irish-American

weekly

newspapers

from

New York to San Francisco all hailed the arms suspension as a
great victory and editorial comments in the metropolitan and
national newspapers was generally favorable.

The New York
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'.times

criticized the suspension while The Washington Post

gave .it tacit support.

The Chicago Tribune

issued strong

praise for the decision:
When
Tip
O'Neill
criticized
the
State
Department for licensing sales of weapons to
the police in Northern Ireland he was exactly
right. The sales should be stopped immediately
If the R. u. c. really needs the weapons
[and we question the wisdom of introducing
3,000 handguns and 500 automatic rifles to an
already over-armed environment] there ar~
plenty of other countries that can provide
them [other than America]. 74
In Northern Ireland,

the reaction from Unionists was

swift and hostile. On August 2, Ian Paisley delivered a strong
protest to the American Ambassador in London,

while Alan

wright, Chairman of the Northern Ireland Police Federation,
accused

the

Carter

administration

of

"tacitly

supporting

terrorism in Northern Ireland. 11711 The Belfast NewsLetter ran
an editorial which attacked the conduct of United States
police forces and described the R. U. c.

as one of the most

professional in the world. It claimed the state Department not
only "denied arms to the force that keeps this country in some
semblance of order, but also gave an almighty boost to the
killers. A powerful propaganda weapon has been placed in their
hands. 1176
In Britain, these attacks were echoed by an assortment of
Conservative M.P.s, including Mrs. Jill Knight and Mr. John
Stokes. Among government ministers and those directly involved
With
t
t

l

Northern

Ireland,

however,

reaction

was

uncharacteristicly muted. The arms sale suspension came as a
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profound shock and brought home the power of the IrishAmerican lobby. Humphrey Atkins refrained from the customary
attacks on the Four Horsemen and down played the arms ban. He
said that the R.U.C. had no pressing need for new weapons and
in the future they could be obtained from other countries.
British Defense Minister Francis Pym, a former Northern
Ireland Secretary, supported Atkins' restrained reaction. He
said that the efforts of Irish-American politicians had been
misinterpreted in Britain and their concern for Ireland was
positive and genuine.

Merlyn Rees,

another former Ulster

Secretary, supported Pym and praised the Four Horsemen for
their work against the I .R.A. network in America. Almost
immediately,

the

British

press

interpreted

this

changed

attitude as indicative that the government had yielded to
Irish-American

intimidation

and

was

about

to

make

new

political moves in Ulster. The Daily Telegraph warned:
The government should realize, before it is
too late, that any proposal for Ulster bearing
the marks of American sponsorship, would be
foredoomed to failure, the price of which
might well be counted in the lives of U. K.
soldiers and civilians."
A further indication of the shift in British policy came
just five days after the R.U.C. arms ban. Hugh Carey, on his
way back from vacation in Europe, met with Humphrey Atkins in
London. There were reports that Carey was accompanied by a
State Department official at this meeting and they discussed
the possibility of holding a peace conference in New York.
Atkins said he would consider the proposal but maintained that
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Ulster's political future could not be negotiated. When Carey
returned to New York, he announced he would host talks between
Atkins and Irish Foreign Minister O'Kennedy in September and
said he had received strong indications that the Thatcher
government would make significant policy changes in Ulster. 7 •
In

Britain,

while

some

newspapers

and

political

commentators dismissed the "Carey initiative", others reacted
quite positively. The Guardian, for example, ran an editorial
which concluded:
Humphrey Atkins should follow his first
thought and accept Hugh Carey's invitation to
take part in informal talks, in New York, on
the future of Northern Ireland. He should not
be deterred by the mist of diplomatic protocol
and Anglo-Irish suspicion which have swiftly
enveloped the Governor's suggestion. 79
Throughout August, press speculation about the proposed
"Carey initiative" increased as Edward Kennedy, Tip O'Neill
and the Irish government gave their support. On August 21, A.
Mcilroy,

New York correspondent for The Daily Telegraph,

reported that "an authoritive American diplomatic source" told
him that there were extensive unofficial consultations between
Whitehall and Dublin over the agenda of the New York talks.
Mcilroy claimed the main elements of the discussions would be
the prospect for political progress in Ulster; an exchange of
views on cross-border economic cooperation; and joint measures
to combat the I.R.A. 80
It appears,
British

and

however,

Irish

that these discussions

officials

collapsed

because

between
of

the
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opposition of Margaret Thatcher. She discussed the feasibility
of the Carey initiative with Humphrey Atkins, but remained
unconvinced the exercise could produce significant benefits.
consequently, Atkins wrote to Carey on August 23, and said he
would not be attending the proposed discussions.
careful , however,

He was

to praise the Governor for his actions

against I .R.A. fund-raising and wrote that he found their
meeting in London,

"invaluable and enjoyable

and

looked

forward to seeing him again. 11111
The fact that the British government was even prepared to
contemplate talks in New York is indicative of the changed
perception

of

Irish-American

involvement

in

the

Ulster

question. Many political analysts agree that the R.U.C. arms
ban brought home to the Thatcher administration the power of
the Four Horsemen and indicated the potential trouble they
could cause in Washington. British officials also feared that
if they did not respond to the Irish-American lobby, they
would exploit the Ulster issue in the upcoming presidential
race. 82
Constitutional

nationalists

did

not

attack

Atkins'

refusal to go to New York because they felt the British were
on the verge of making a major political initiative in Ulster.
Their expectations were realized on October 25, 1979, when
Atkins announced he would convene discussions aimed at finding
consent among Ulster's political parties. Most significantly,
the Northern Ireland secretary chose to disclose details of
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the

new

initiative

before

the

Association

of

American

correspondents in London.
At this press conference, Atkins lavished high praise on
President Carter and the Four Horsemen for steering the flow
of Irish-American money away from the I .R.A.. He appealed
directly to the Irish-American leaders for more understanding
of the British position and asked for their assistance in
encouraging political dialogue in Ulster:
I hope that as a result of speaking to this
audience
today more awareness will be
forthcoming in the United States and that will
in turn temper the attitudes and utterances of
some people and groups there who in their
profound ignorance of the situation only play
into the hands of an outcast terrorist
organization whose aim is to destroy the
democratic structure of government in Ireland
and replace it with a distinctively Marxist
oriented regime. 83
In New York,

the British Information Service quickly

issued copies of the Atkins address to the media. On November
12, Margaret Thatcher gave an extensive interview to The New
York

Times

in

which

she

further

elaborated

on

the

new

political initiative. Sean Cronin reported that the U.S. State
Department was very enthusiastic about the change in British
policy and said it would be most pleased if the discussions
produced an agreement. 84
In late October, the British issued a White Paper on the
new initiative. It excluded from consideration either the
Stormont system or the sunningdale formula. Discussion of the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland was also ruled out.

318
Within these parameters, the main political parties were free
to consider any arrangements for the devolution of power from
Westminster.
conference

The White
as

being

Paper described

"to

establish

the

the

task

highest

of

the

level

of

agreement."
Ironically, in view of the role played by John Hume in
working for the initiative, there was initial confusion about
whether the S.D.L.P. would participate in it. Internal party
divisions led to the resignation-of Gerry_Fitt as leader. He
was

succeeded

by

John

Hume

and

in

December

the

party

eventually agreed to take part in the conference. Atkins also
persuaded the D. U. P.

and Alliance parties to attend,

but

failed to secure the cooperation of the Official Unionists.
The first session of the Atkins conference took place on
January 7, 1980, and the ·last on April 18. By the end of
January, it was clear that very little basis for agreement
existed among the parties. The Four Horsemen were somewhat
disappointed that the British did not force the Unionists into
some form of cooperation. This disappointment, however, did
not quench their conviction that they had succeeded in forcing
the British to do something in Ulster. 85
Analysts of the Atkins initiative almost universally
agree that American pressure was the key element finally
pushing

the

British

into

action.

One

of

the

strongest

proponents of this view is Adrian Guelke who concluded:
While the evidence of the role of the American
connection is largely circumstantial, no other
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factor loomed as large in analysis of the
initiative and it seems reasonable to conclude
that American pressure was the main reason for
the initiative. 86
Despite the eventual failure of the Atkins conference,
the Four Horsemen saw their campaign as a major success. They
fully

believed

that

for

the

first

time

in

the

present

"troubles," Irish-American political pressure had actually
been instrumental in changing British policy. The Big Four
could

now give

a

concrete

example

of

the

influence

of

constitutional agi ta ti on and persuade Irish-Americans that
theirs was the only way to achieve real political change in
Ireland.
In the summer of 1980, the leaders of constitutional
nationalism in America were again able to demonstrate their
power and ability to influence Irish politics. On July 8, an
article in The Washington Star reported that the new Irish
government of Charles Haughey was planning to remove Sean
Donlon as the Ambassador in America. Political analysts in
Ireland suggested the move was part of a change in policy by
the Taoiseach designed to win support among the militant
nationalist elements in Fianna Fail.
Haughey especially wanted to cement an alliance with Neil
Blaney T. D. . In 19 7 9, Blaney had toured the United States
Under the sponsorship of the Irish National Caucus. During the
trip, he launched a series of attacks on Sean Donlon because
of his constant attempts to undermine the Ad Hoc committee.
Donlon,

since his appointment as Ambassador in 1978, had
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continued to lead a sustained campaign against republican
groups in America. When Blaney returned to Ireland he began
pushing Haughey for Donlon's removal. 87
Reports of this deal between Haughey and Blaney initiated
a series of criticisms from Irish politicians. John Hume and
Garret Fi tzGerald both called the move a classic piece of
political

opportunism

nationalism
Haughey's
praising

which

in America.
proposed

Donlon

When

action,

for

would

his

weaken

constitutional

the

Four

Horsemen heard

they

each

issued

invaluable

work

of

statements

in

promoting

constitutional nationalism in America.
Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy contacted John Hume and
William Shannon,

the American Ambassador to Ireland.

They

instructed both men to convey their extreme displeasure to
Haughey. 811
Taoiseach

Later,
and

administration

O'Neill

said
if

they

Donlon

and

Kennedy

would
was

not

removed

telephoned

cooperate
from

the

with

his

Washington.• 9

Haughey, faced with this intense pressure from America, backed
down. On July 9, he met with his cabinet and announced Donlon
would remain as the Irish Ambassador.

Brian Lenihan,

the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, further stated that there would
be

no

major

changes

in

the

government's

policy

towards

Northern Ireland. 90
Reports immediately circulated that the Four Horsemen had
reversed

Haughey's

decision

to

remove

Donlon,

and

their

intervention received praise in the American press. O'Neill
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and

Kennedy,

however,

wanted

Haughey

to

make

a

public

condemnation of Irish-American republican groups. John Hume
conveyed their feelings in an appeal which stated:
In order that all shreds of suspicion be
removed and this unfortunate affair closed, it
is necessary that it be made clear that the
activities of congressman Mario Biaggi and the
organizations with which he is associated
enjoy no support whatsoever among any section
of Irish opinion.n
Haughey again acquiesced to this pressure and on July 27,
made a major policy speech at a Fianna Fail conference in
Cork. He strongly attacked Irish-American republicanism and
told his audience there was "clear and conclusive evidence
available to the government that Noraid has provided support
for the campaign of violence and direct assistance for its
pursuit."

The

Taoiseach also

attacked the

Irish National

Caucus and accused it of prolonging the violence in Ulster.•2
The

Donlon

affair

was

yet

influence of the

Four Horsemen.

affect

developments

prestige

political
of

constitutional

another

example

of

the

Their obvious ability to
in

Ireland

nationalism

in

increased

the

America.

The

increasing political successes of Kennedy, Moynihan, O'Neill,
Carey and their supporters stood in sharp contrast to the
failures of the Ad Hoc committee. While Noraid and the Irish
National Caucus were engaged in mutual antagonisms and Mario
Biaggi was still suffering from the failure of his peace
initiative, constitutional nationalism was going from strength
to

strength.

As

both

nationalist

factions

entered

the
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eighties,

it

seemed certain

that

consti tutionalism would

consolidate its ascendancy and republicanism would remain
marginal with little influence in America.
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1. Some republicans also hoped that the establishment of
a formal group might succeed in attracting the Four Horsemen
back into the traditional nationalist fold. caucus leaders
admitted privately that having the Irish issue presented in
congress by representatives with names like Rosenthall,
Biaggi, and Eilberg, implied that Irish-American politicians
were suspicious of the I.N.C. They hoped that if the
congressional group could exploit the abuse of human rights in
Northern Ireland, the Big Four would eventually adopt a more
militant, pro-republican position.
·
2. The Irish People, 1 October 1977.
3. David McKittrick, "The Irish Connection," World Press
Review 26 (November, 1979).
4. In October 1973 Biaggi ran for mayor of New York
against Abraham Beame. His campaign collapsed after he was
questioned by a grand jury investigating sponsorship of
private immigration bills in Congress in 1971. Newspapers
reported some politicians were taking bribes and hinted Biaggi
had links with the Mafia. During the grand jury investigation,
the press reported that Biaggi took the Fifth Amendment and
refused to answer questions about his finances. In the mayoral
race, Biaggi categorically denied this accusation. When the
federal judge released details of the investigation, however,
it showed the congressman had in fact taken the "Fifth". This
revelation wrecked Biaggi 's campaign and he was forced to
withdraw and issue a public announcement he had "made a
mistake".

s. Dr. Garret
December 1990.

FitzGerald,

interview

by

author,

19

6. Because Congressmen have to fight for re-election
every two years, this makes them particularly susceptible to
the influence of political groups which promise to deliver
votes. Some political analysts believe that the Ulster issue
has been important to political success in New York. Roger
Williams, for example, contends that Peter Peyser(R. ,N. Y.) and
Lester Wolff(D. ,N.Y.) won their congressional seats in 1972
because of their support for the Fort Worth Five. Father Sean
McManus continually supports this assertion and claims that
I.N .c. electioneering has successfully blocked attempts by
congressmen who are allied with constitutional nationalists to
win seats in the Senate. See Paul Artherton, "Irish-American
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1985, 13.
After the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, a number of
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Ulster issue. One of the most vocal was Peter King, the
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aspect of British rule in Ulster. See Frank Lynn, "King
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America. see Warren Hinckle, "Bay Area Man's Plight in an
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for possession of an explosive device.
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A Role For The United States? Report before the House
Committee on the Judiciary. (August/September 1978): 219.
12. Letter from Hamil ton Fish and Joshua Eilberg to
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Representatives, 96th. Cong., 1st sess., 14 September 1979.
14. see Linda Charlton, "Biaggi, a Bronx Power, Has a
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7 May 1978.
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Bef9re Subcommittee on European Affair§. 18 July 1972, 23.
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Ireland (London: MacMillan, 1987), 237.

325
17. See u. v .F.

journal Combat for information on the

c. u .L.A. June 1975. James Heaney recalled receiving continuous

abusive phone calls from Toronto every time he appeared on the
radio or television in Buffalo.

18. "Arms smuggling is said to aid Protestants Less than
I.R.A.," The New York Times, 5 February 1976. British
detectives received an anonymous tip that these weapons were
hidden on board the Dart America. When they uncovered the
weapons the British authorities also arrested Tom Thompson in
Liverpool. Thompson was the "supreme commander" of the U.D.A.
in Britain and received a ten year prison sentence for his
involvement in the gunrunning scheme.
19. This claim was first reported in The Belfast
NewsLetter and later in The Los Angeles Times and The New York
Times, October 16, 1972. A 1981 trial in Glasgow revealed an
attempt by the U.V.F. to establish an arms pipeline from the
united states. Six men were found guilty of buying Ingram
machine-guns in Atlanta and shipping them to the loyalist
paramilitary group in Belfast. See The Washington Post, 30
July 1981. In 1986 police in Toronto smashed a major
gunrunning network which had been organized by U.V.F. leader
John Binghan and Canadian loyalists. One of the key figures in
the conspiracy was William Taylor who bought weapons in the
U.S. and transported them back into Canada in a dummy fuel
tank in his truck. The weapons were then sent to the U.V.F.
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"Loyalist
Death Squads,"
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in
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states and met with small groups of their supporters. In 1975
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Ken Gibson, Hugh Smith, and William Mitchell of the U.V.F.
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at the University of Massachusetts. Following this, in
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21. Information from F.A.R.A. file number 2706 on
Alexander International Development Consultants, 12 July 1976
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22. Information from F.A.R.A. file for 12 January 1979.
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Ulster because there was qold and coal in the Mourne
mountains.
3 o . Ed Maloney, "The U. D. A. Roadshow Returns Home, "
Hibernia Magazine (February 22, 1979). Harold Alexander also
arranged for the N.U.P.R.G. to meet loyalists in America. In
Ardmore Pennsylvania they attended an Ulster heritaqe dinner
which was attended by top officials from the American Oranqe
Lodqe and other loyalist supporters. Information from F.A.R.A.
documents 12 July 1979.
31. Sean Cronin, "O'Dwyer Plays Host to Top Loyalists,"
The Irish Times, 19 February 1979. Also Jack Holland, "An
Ulster Twilight in New York," Hibernia Magazine (February 15,
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on the I.R.A. in 1977 had cost him substantial Irish-American
support. Consequently, Carey made a series of statements
attacking the abuse of human rights in Northern Ireland and
called for Congressional Hearings on the matter. Carey also
met with Mario Biaggi and in return for assistance in his reelection campaign, the incumbent Governor endorsed the
objectives of the Ad Hoc Committee. See Jack Holland, "Hugh

329

carey's Problems in New York Elections," The Irish People, 4
November 1978.
56. "Irish-Americans Switch, Chide U. K. , " The New York
I,i.mes, 8 April 1979.
57. Senator Edward Kennedy, correspondence with author,
17 April 1988.
58. The New York Times, 17 March 1979.
59. John Hume, interview by author.
60. The Irish Times, 20 April 1979.
61. The Daily Telegraph, 21 April 1979. The only major
British politician to back O'Nei~l was John Pardoe, Liberal
Party spokesman on Northern Ireland.

62. The Daily Telegraph, "More Than Impertinent," 21
April 1979.
63. "Tip O'Neill on Northern Ireland," letter from Garret
FitzGerald to The paily Telegraph, 23 April 1979.

64. "Mondale Backs O'Neill," The Daily Telegraph, 23
April 1979.
65. Hugh Carey and Kevin Cahill, "A Life Before Death for
Northern Ireland," The New York Daily News, 22 April 1979. The
President of the International Longshoremen' s Union, Teddy
Gleason, promised his workers would impose an embargo on all
British goods if a new political initiative was not
forthcoming.

66. "Edward Kennedy, His Views, His Life," interview with
Barry White in The Belfast Telegraph, 9 May 1979.
6 7 . "U. s. Wants Ireland United,
Chicago Tribune, 4 June 1979.

Says Moynihan, "

~

68. Connor Cruise O'Brien, "An Irishman's Open letter to
Senator Moynihan," The Christian Science Monitor, 18 July
1979.
69. The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1979. O'Brien had
elaborated his attacks in articles entitled "Hands Off,"
Foreign Policy (Winter 1979/80) and "The Four Horsemen,"
Harper's Magazin~ 263 (December, 1981).

330
70. John Hume, "The Irish Question : A British Problem,"
Foreign Affairs (Winter, 1979/80), 312. See also "U.S.
Politicians Role in the search for Ulster Peace," letter from
Hume to The New York Times, 24 October 1979.
71. For details see Adrian Guelke, The International
Dimension (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1988), 140.
72. "Tip O'Neill
Telegraph, 2 June 1979.

in

Fresh

Ulster

Row,"

The

Daily

73. Lawrence Halley, Ancient Affections (New York:
Prager, 1985) , 166. The British government has tried to
reverse the ban on a number of occasions, but so far.their
efforts have proved unsuccessful.
74. The Chicago Tribune, "A-Senseless Irish Arms Sale,"
7 June 1979, and The Washington Post, "Guns For Ulster," 5
June 1979.
75. The Belfast NewsLetter, 2 August 1979.
76. "A Shocking Decision," The Belfast NewsLetter, 3
August 1979. In August Unionist M.P. Rev. Robert Bradford flew
to America to tell State Department officials of the disgust
felt by Ulster citizens at the decision. He was joined by
William Best, the former Grand Master of the American orange
Order, who claimed he personally contacted President Carter to
convey his outrage. There were also a number of Unionist
protests outside the American consulate in Belfast while the
office received a number of threatening phone calls.
Information from telegram between U. s. consul General in
Belfast and state Department dated 1 June 1980.
77. The Daily Telegraph, 7 August 1979.
78. The Irish News, 8 August 1979.
79. The Guardian, 8 August 1979. Although the majority
opinion within the British press had been critical of the
Irish-American intervention in the Ulster crisis, there was a
growing body of opinion which adopted a different perspective.
The Economist, for example, did not attack Tip O'Neill's
"political football" speech and actually ran an editorial
describing the "Four Horsemen" as, "Candid Friends" (March 24,
1979). Mary Holland also wrote a series of articles in The New
Statesman describing how the Irish-American leaders were
motivated by a genuine desire to help Ireland and that it
would be a grave error for the British government to ignore
their pleas. Holland's thesis was further supported ·by an
article by Bernard crick which described the profound changes
among Irish-American politicians which had produced a high

331
degree of sophistication in their views on Northern Ireland.
see Mary Holland, "Kennedy's New Irish Policy," and Bernard
crick, "The Pale ·Green Internationalists," both in The New
statesman 11 May and 7 December 1979.
80. A. Mcilroy, "Agenda Ready For Ulster Summit in New
York," The Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1979.
81. "U.S. Summit on Ulster Vetoed," The Daily Telegraph,
24 August 1979.
82. British government officials felt that Jimmy Carter,
because of his increasing unpopularity, could be persuaded to
appeal to Irish-American support by adopting a militant
position on the Ulster conflict. See Michael Leapman, "How the
Presidential Race Could Prolong Ulster's Agony, " The Times
(London), 16 January 1980. Tom_ Collins, The Irish Hunger
Strike (Dublin: White Island Books, 1986), 321, specifically
contends the Atkins initiative was taken, "to forestall Ted
Kennedy talking about British political failure in Northern
Ireland during the 1980 American Presidential Race."
83. "Northern Ireland : Secretary of State's Address to
U.S. Correspondents," British Information Service, 29 October
1979.
84. Sean Cronin, Washington's Irish Policy (Dublin: Anvil
Books, 1987), 316.
85. Senator Edward Kennedy, correspondence with author.
86. Adrian Guelke, "The American Connection to the
Northern Ireland Conflict," Irish Studies in International
Affairs 1 no.4 (Summer 1984): 36. Other supporters include
Paul Arthur and Kieth Jeffrey, Northern Ireland Since 1968
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), and Liam Clarke, Broadening
the Battlefield (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1987).
87. See Mary McGrory, "Irish Envoy's Firing Stirs Up
Irish Trouble," The Washington star, 8 July 1980, and Sean
Cronin, "Donlon to be Replaced as Washington Envoy," The Irish
Times, 8 July 1980. Noraid had continually criticized Donlon
and editorials in The Irish People referred to his leadership
as the "Vichy Erin" regime in Washington, collaborating at
every opportunity with the British.
88. Elizabeth Shannon, Up in the Park : The Diary of the
Wife of the U.S. AD1bassador to Ireland (New York: Atheneum,
1983) I 278 •
89. Garret FitzGerald, interview by author, 19 December
1990. See also Sean Cronin, op.cit., 319.

332
90. The Irish Times, 15 July 1980.
91. Statement by John hume in Tbe Irish Press, 13 July
1980. Hume maintains that the Four Horsemen supported Donlorl
because they felt he was competent and not simply because he
opposed the I.R.A.
92. "Northern Ireland : A Positive Role for IrishAmericans," Address by Charles Haughey to the Fianna Fail
Organization, Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, 27 July 1980.

Chapter 7
From the Blanket Protest to the Hunger Strikes. 1979-1981

Support for the I .R.A. among Irish-American activists
decreased

in

the

mid-seventies

because

success of

constitutional

nationalists.

taken

Four

weakened

the

Horsemen

the

of

the

continued

Political

actions

effectiveness

of

republican publicity campaigns and undermined their fundraising.

Noraid

tried

to

counteract

this

pressure

by

highlighting British human rights violations and exploiting
the draconian legal system in Ulster. They concentrated on
publicizing

a

series

of

prison

protests

undertaken

republicans against the British penal system.

by

Mos.t Irish-

Americans remained apathetic and showed little interest in
these republican maneuvers.
The lack of Irish-American activist concern for I.R.A.
prisoners changed dramatically,

however,

when the inmates

launched a hunger strike campaign in 1980-81.
American

republican

groups

with

a

series

It provided
of

publicity

victories which enabled them to regain much of the ground lost
to constitutional nationalists. The deaths of ten prisoners
rejuvenated the republican network and won levels of Irish-
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American support far in excess of that induced by Bloody
Sunday.
The key issue in the republican prison protests concerned
the inmate's classification within the penal system. Convicted
Irish republicans have traditionally fought to be acknowledged
as prisoners of war instead of common criminals. Recognition
of I.R.A. prisoners as "political" gave them the same standing
as

captured

liberation.

soldiers
It

was

in

only

a

legitimate

natural

when

war

of

national

republicans

were

convicted or interned in the early seventies that they would
fight within the jail for "prisoner of war" status.
The first protests began in Belfast's Crumlin Road Jail.
On May 8, 1972, republican prisoners refused penal labor and
eventually rioted to demand treatment as political prisoners.
William

Whitelaw,

the

Secretary

of

State,

denied

the

legitimacy of the prisoner's demand and announced there would
be no change in prison conditions. Provisional I.R.A. leaders
in Crumlin Road then issued a statement which declared they
would go on hunger strike if Whitelaw did not reverse his
position.

On May 15, after having received no concessions

from the British, the Provisional prisoners carried out their
threat and began refusing food. 1
Five republicans, led by Billy McKee, initiated the fast
and warned authorities that "We will hunger strike until our
demands to be recognized as political prisoners are met and
our

protest

will

last

until

death

if

necessary. 112

Each
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consecutive week,

five more republicans joined the hunger

strike. Eventually the protest spread to Armagh Women's Prison
and to the internees in Long Kesh. At the peak of the strike,
over sixty prisoners were refusing food.
William Whitelaw ignored the hunger strike and seemed
unconcerned about growing public demonstrations supporting the
prisoners. Even after May 20, when Billy McKee's physical
condition

rapidly

unresponsive.
contacts

with

In

deteriorated,
June,

Provo

however,
leaders

the

government

British

outside

remained

officials

the

jails.

began
These

discussions eventually led to the short-lived truce between
June and July of 1972.
As part of the pre-conditions to talks, the Provisionals
asked Whitelaw to accept the demands of the hunger strikers.
The Secretary of State· was so anxious to commence dialogue
that he immediately announced a change in the prison regime
and introduced a "Special Category status." Republican and
loyalist prisoners were granted the right to wear their own
clothes; to abstain from penal labor; to associate freely; to
participate in recreational and educational activities; and to
have full remission of sentence restored.
These concessions,

al though denied

initially by the

government, amounted to de-facto recognition of republicans as
prisoners of war. The hunger strike, therefore, ended. On July
7, the delegation of top Provo leaders met Whitelaw in London
and agreed upon a truce.

336

Although the British achieved nothing from the truce,
they had acknowledged republicans were political prisoners.
Worse than this for Westminster, the new prisbn regime became
a "training ground" for the I .R.A. and was christened "The
Republican University." Inside Long Kesh, the prisoners ran
their own affairs and organized themselves along military
lines. Provo leaders conducted weapons training using wooden
rifles,

gave

lectures

on

the

use

of

continually planned schemes for escape.

explosives,

and

Living conditions

were among the most favorable in the entire European penal
system. It was not long before the prisoners constructed a
poteen still, had free access to educational and recreational
facilities, and received frequent parcels from relatives. For
many, the experience in prison encouraged their commitment to
republicanism and increased their military prowess. 3
This situation grew increasingly repugnant to the British
government and made it determined to reform the prison regime
in Northern Ireland.

In 197 4, Merlyn Rees commissioned an

independent inquiry into anti-terrorist legislation in Ulster.
Headed by Lord Gardiner, the inquiry commission published its
report in January 1975. It concluded that granting of special
category status was a mistake and recommended all prisoners be
treated

equally.

Rees

hesitated

to

implement

these

recommendations because of ceasefire with the Provisionals in
1975. When he realized that continued contact with the I.R.A.
was fruitless, he closed the "incident centers" in October
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1975 and announced that after March 1, 1976, special category
status would no longer apply to new prisoners.
Republicans immediately grasped the significance of this
change. Not only would it eliminate their comfortable lifestyle within the prisons, but it denied their claim to be
captured soldiers and different from common criminals. I.R.A.
inmates naturally prepared to resist the new prison reform.
One of the first measures announced by the British was
that prisoners would no longer be allowed to wear their own
clothes and would have to wear regulation uniforms. The first
republican to be subjected to this new regime was Ciaran
Neugent,
warders

a

long time

brought prison

I .R.A.

activist

clothes

to

from

his

cell

Belfast.

When

in the

newly

constructed H-Block compounds at the Maze Prison,

Neugent

refused to wear them. He remained naked in his cell for one
day until the authorities brought him a

blanket.

He told

warders that the only way they could get him to wear prison
ciothes was to nail them to his back. He remained in his cell
wrapped only in the blanket. This "blanket protest," as it
became known,

grew as each new republican came under the

reformed prison regime.
In April
Relatives

1976,

Action

supporters of the prisoners formed a

Committee.

It

publicized

the

prisoners'

condition and organized demonstrations. The I.R.A. also began
a campaign of attacks against prison officers. By the end of
1976,

they had assassinated seven warders and that figure
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eventually rose to eighteen by the time the protest ended.
This I .R.A. campaign led to an intense hatred between the
prison officers and the protesting prisoners and made the
British government even more determined to resist the "blanket
protest."
In 1977, while the I.R.A. attacked prison officers, the
Relatives

Action

Committee

organized

series

a

of

demonstrations. But they were not well attended and the prison
protest failed to raise universal anger within the nationalist
community.

Republicans trying to publicize the protest in

America faced similar problems. Despite sustained efforts to
get media attention, the "blanket protest" received little
coverage

in

the

u. s.

press

and

television.

Nora id

demonstrations attracted only handfuls of supporters.

The

situation was so bad that The Irish People launched a series
of

attacks

on

the

apathy

of

Irish-Americans.

One

such

editorial commented:
As we go to press, Irishmen -- naked but for a
blanket -- have been beaten, humiliated and
tortured for twelve months in H-Block. I give
you these details because it seems to me that so
many Irish people don't want to know about it -they're too busy having a good old time for
themselves .•• and that is why there is a Long
Kesh and torture chambers called H-Blocks. The
Irish don't care! The Irish don't want to know!
The Irish are selfish! And, the selfishness of
the Irish has left them divided, because, the
wily enemy caters to our selfishness and keeps
us in bondage. 4
The

prisoners

in H-Block escalated

their

protest

in

response to the apathetic public response. In April 1978, they
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refused to empty their chamber pots and neither shaved or
bathed. Warders would not clean the prisoners' cells and soon
some 300 republicans began smearing the walls with excrement.
Initially,

this new "dirty protest"

was

slow to win

support and publicity. Public demonstrations continued to be
poorly attended and media coverage was limited. Many IrishAmericans were revolted by the unorthodox prison protest.
Public

demonstrations

consisted

outside British consulates.

of

small

groups

chanting

The Irish People continued to

attack Irish-Americans for their lack of concern while the
limited number of reports in the American media tended to
support the British position. Tim Pat Coogan commented on the
"dirty protest:"
Its bizarre and repellant nature, the fact that
the marches almost inevitably ended in stone
throwing and violence, and the public view that
the
whole
thing
was
only
a
Provisional
propaganda
stunt,
all
militated
against
widespread public support. 5
In the
succeeded

summer of

in

making

1978,
some

however,
headway

republicans
in

their

finally

campaign.

Republicans exploited a series of investigations into British
torture, culminating in the Bennett Report, to justify the
political status claim. The prisoners had always maintained
they were convicted under "special" legislation in "special"
non-jury Diplock Courts. Under this system, the emphasis was
on

confessions,

which

prisoners

claimed

were

routinely

obtained through torture. The Bennett Report confirmed ill
treatment of republican prisoners while academic works such as
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peter

Taylor's

Beating

the

Terrorists?

provided

further

evidence of physical abuse during interrogation.
Supporters of the prisoners claimed that the

justice

system created a "conveyor belt" in which republicans were
charged under "special" emergency legislation, in "special"
non-jury courts,

and convicted

on

the

basis

of

evidence

obtained by "special" procedure. They argued that this unique
treatment proved the prisoners were not ordinary but were
political, and deserved a "special" status.
The Relatives Action Committee employed this logic in
their publicity efforts and,

in August 1978,

achieved an

important success. The catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Tomas
O'Fiaich,

visited

condemnation of

the

the

H-Blocks

prison

and

authorities.

issued

a

strong

After seeing the

appalling conditions in which the prisoners were living he
lamented:
One would hardly allow an animal to remain in
such conditions, let alone a human being ••• The
nearest approach to it that I have seen was the
spectacle of hundreds of homeless people living
in sewer-pipes in the slums of Calcutta. The
stench and filth in some of the cells, with the
remains of rotten food and human excrement
scattered
around
all
walls,
was
almost
unbearable. In two of them I was unable to speak
for fear of vomiting.
O'Fiaich then went on to give support to the prisoners
demand for political status:
The authorities refuse to admit that these
prisoners are in a different category from the
ordinary, yet everything about their trials and
family background indicates that they are
different. They were sentenced by special courts
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without juries. The vast majority were convicted
on allegedly voluntary confessions obtained in
circumstances which are now placed under grave
suspicion. Many are very youthful and came from
families which had never been in trouble with
the law, though they lived in areas which
suffered discrimination in housing and jobs.
How can one explain the jump in the prison
population of Northern Ireland from 500 to 3,000
unless a new type of prisoner has emerged? 6
O'Fiaich's statement generated extensive publicity in the
media

and was

quoted

in the American press.

Major U.S.

newspapers began to run the first major articles on the prison
protest, encouraging supporters of the prisoners to increase
their appeals to Irish-Americans.
In October 1978, Fr. Raymond Murray, a longtime activist
for the prisoner's cause, went on a publicity tour of the
United States. The tour was financed by the Irish National
caucus. Murray met with top American politicians and media
executives to explain the protest. He distributed copies of a
pamphlet entitled The Castlereagh File, outlining extensive
cases of alleged police brutality at the R.u.c. interrogation
center.
Murray was so enthusiastic about his reception in America
that he and Fr. Dennis Faul produced a new booklet entitled
The Sleeping Giant.
concentrate

their

It called upon H-Block activists to

efforts

on

a

trans-Atlantic

publicity

campaign. The clergymen claimed that this was the best way to
force the British into concessions in the prisons. 7
In the autumn of 1978, republican supporters organized
American tours for family and friends of the prisoners. The
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inmate's wives spoke at Irish-American gatherings and held
press conferences to outline the extent of British brutality
in the H-Blocks. They gave first-hand accounts of the horror
both they and their husbands were experiencing. The American
media covered these visits and occasionally the relatives
succeeded

in

winning

newspaper

columnists

over

to

the

prisoner's cause. After meeting with four of the women, Chuck
stone, a reporter for The Philadelphia Daily News, wrote an
article

supporting the

described

as

"the

H-Block protest.

stomach-wrenching

After what stone

rottenest

of

British

atrocities which would make Idi Amin proud" he concluded that,
"the

real

heroes

in

this

dirty and endless war

are

the

prisoners in the H-Blocks. 111
The

prisoners'

relatives

also

won

support

from

journalists Pete Hamill and Jimmy Breslin in The New York
Daily News but received the greatest publicity from Jack
Anderson, a leading columnist with The Washington Post. In
1978, the Irish National Caucus persuaded Anderson to write
about Northern Ireland. He met with prisoner's relatives in
October and afterwards wrote a scathing attack on the British
policy.

In an article which was syndicated to over nine-

hundred newspapers,

he compared the H-Blocks to the tiger

cages in Vietnam and concluded:
It is estimated that perhaps 70% of the
political prisoners in Long Kesh have been
convicted by uncorroborated statements or forced
confessions made in Stalin-like kangaroo court
procedures. Human rights violations have put
Northern Ireland on an unenviable par with some
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of the most barbarious regimes of communist
commissars or tinhorn Latin American dictators.
The British are trampling on the rights of Irish
citizens in a manner reminiscent of Oliver
Cromwell's iron fisted rule more than three
centuries ago. 9
This article created substantial publicity in America. It
was strongly condemned, however, by the British government.
Tim Pat Coogan in On the Blanket, humorously reported that
Anderson's

views,

Washington

like

a

"went

down

in

Long

Kesh

turd

the

British

in

the

Embassy

salad

in

bowl. 1110

Ambassador Peter Jay attacked the article and described HBlock prisoners as "bloody murders." He further argued their
conditions were self-inflicted. 11
Peter Jay's reply was given prominence in a number of
American newspapers, but British officials in Belfast felt
that a more determined campaign would have to be conducted
against H-Block publicity. In February 1979, "two of the bestinformed and most persuasive of the government's team of
policy advisors in Belfast" traveled to the United States.
These

two

top

ranking

civil

servants

met

with

British

diplomats in New York and Washington and advised them on ways
to present their case more persuasively.
officials

to

conduct

a

more

They told B. I. S.

sustained media

campaign

to

counteract the effects of the H-Block relatives' tours. 12
Determined to achieve this result, British authorities
allowed American

reporters,

photographers,

and

television

cameramen to tour the H-Blocks on March 15, 1979. They hoped
this concession would help to bring the "reality" of the
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conditions

in

the

Maze

to

Irish-Americans

and

stifle

republican propaganda. The correspondents were not allowed to
interview the protesting prisoners. Despite this restriction,
however, reports of the tour in the American press tended to
sympathize with the men. Some British officials consequently
believed their exercise had backfired. 13
In October

1979,

encouraged

by the

increasing media

reports, various prisoner support groups in Ireland merged
into the National ff-Block/Armagh Committee. This new group
revitalized the publicity battle and increased support within
the nationalist community by stressing that endorsement of the
H-Block protest did not necessarily mean acceptance of the
armed

struggle.

The

committee

established

an

information

bureau which kept Irish-Americans up-to-date with every new
development

in

the

prisons

and

shipped large

amounts

of

literature across the Atlantic.
American republican groups quickly became more successful
at

increasing

awareness

of

the

H-Block

issue.

Noraid

supporters drew widespread attention when they symbolically
wore blankets during the 1979 st. Patrick's Day parade in New
York. They also organized demonstrations against Royal Navy
ships docking in U.S. ports. Actress Jane Fonda attended one
such protest in San Francisco as a show of solidarity with the
prison protest . 14
Republicans
symbolism

in

also

order

to

began
win

to
the

exploit
support

Roman
of

Catholic

devout

Irish-
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Americans. Noraid handouts carried drawings of bearded, long
haired, prisoners clad in blankets and clasping rosary beads.
The

comparison

intentional.

with

Christ

Editorials

in

suffering
The

Irish

was

obvious

People

and

constantly

employed this imagery and told readers how the prisoners were
suffering

religious

persecution.

One

of

these

editorials

presented the allegation in the following manner:
In the H-Block concentration camp, a young Irish
republican -- naked but for a blanket -- faces a
trio of British soldiers. One hand holds his
blanket around his shoulders and the other
grasps the crucifix of his rosary. His rosary
beads have been a great source of comfort to him
all these long, cold, and dreary nights as he
recited decade after decade for his parents,
family, friends, and especially for his fallen
comrades.
Now these foreign mercenaries make fun
of his religion and his dedication to the
Mother of God. They use four letter words
as they grasp at his neck. The rosary
beads snap in broken pieces. A part falls
to the floor and one of the soldiers
laughs raucously as he stamps his boot
on it. 15
Irish-American republicans continued to use this kind of
emotive imagery throughout the prison campaign.

They also

sponsored U.S. tours by ex-blanketmen designed to give IrishAmericans a personal account of the "horrors" in H-Block. In
August 1980,

Ciaran Neugent illegally entered America and

conducted a hectic information tour in which he addressed
crowds of Irish-American activists.

He met with newspaper

columnists, conducted radio talk shows, and appeared on the
McNeil-Lehner Newshour. 16
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The publicity generated by Neugent's tour prompted the
British to send Cyril Grey, a key official in the Northern
Ireland Office, to the embassy in Washington. Although the
Thatcher

administration described

the

move

as

a

"routine

deployment," it was specifically designed to strengthen antirepublican
seriously
widespread

activities
Neugent's
moral

in

America.

claims

and

that

financial

British
his

diplomats

took

tour

was

winning

for

the

H-Block

support

issue . 17
On August 28, Neugent led a demonstration outside the
British Consulate in New York. Wearing only a blanket, he read
a statement to reporters attacking British barbarity against
republican prisoners. When Neugent finished, eight immigration
officials seized him and he was later deported.
Despite

Neugent's

arrest,

publicity

for

the

H-Block

campaign in America continued due to a visit of U.S. churchmen
to Northern Ireland on August 24, 1980. The delegation was
sponsored by the H-Block committee. Relatives of the prisoners
hoped the clerics would be allowed to visit the Maze prison
and report on conditions themselves.
The leader of the group was Fr. Daniel Berrigan S.J., a
committed civil right activist. When he asked for permission
to visit the H-Blocks, British officials refused fearing a
republican propaganda exercise. Berrigan reacted furiously and
condemned

the

Maze

concentration camps.

compounds

as

comparable

to

Nazi
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Berrigan further elaborated on these criticisms in an
extensive article printed in The New York Times. He blamed the
British government for the "disgraceful" conditions in H-Block
and supported republican claims to be political prisoners. 1 •
The article initiated a prolonged propaganda battle. Michael
Allison, the British Minister of State in Northern Ireland,
and Patrick Nixon of the B.I.S. both wrote scathing letters to
the editor specifically attacking each issue Berrigan had
raised.

The priest was in turn defended in letters from Paul

O'Dwyer and Fr. Sean McManus.
The publicity surrounding Berrigan' s
Noraid

to

continued

financing

trips

protesters to the United States.

by

tour encouraged
former

blanket

In September 1980, Liam

Carlin and Fra Mccann entered the country illegally and gave
lectures on their experiences in prison. They conducted a
nationwide

publicity

campaign

while

evading

immigration

officers from New York to Los Angeles.
British officials condemned the apparent ease with which
the two men were able to escape arrest and the political
support they attracted. 19 In Boston, Fra Mccann was awarded
a citation from the Massachusetts State legislature which
commended "his heroic stand in suffering over three years of
torture and degradation." After a private meeting with Edward
King, the then-Governor of Massachusetts, the Boston City
Council extended its best wishes to Mccann and wished him
success in "educating the American people in the struggle to
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achieve justice." Liam Carlin received similar citations from
State

legislatures

in

California

and

Michigan.

He

also

succeeded in persuading a number of City councils throughout
the

U.S.

to

support

political

status

for

republican

prisoners. 20
Despite the increasing publicity for, and support of, the
prisoners' cause in Ireland and America, by September 1980
they felt that they would have to intensify their campaign to
extract concessions

from the British.

Rumors of a

hunger

strike circulated, and British officials began looking for
ways to compromise on the politi'Cal status issue.
The Thatcher government was conscious that news of a
hunger strike would be exploited in the United States and add
to the adverse publicity which had been generated by the tours
of former blanketmen. On October 23, 1980, Humphrey Atkins
announced that protesting prisoners would not be required to
wear prison clothing.

To avoid giving the appearance of a

special status, he said the new clothing rules would apply to
all

male

prisoners

common

criminals

as

well

as

"terrorists. 1121 Leaders of the H-Block prisoners discussed
this new proposal but rejected it as a failure to recognize
their claim to political status. On the morning of October 27,
seven prisoners, led by Brendan Hughes, began refusing food.
In

Ireland,

the

H-Block

Committee

organized

inevitable demonstrations in support of the prisoners.

the
It

again was careful to emphasize that participation in protests
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was not a

show of support for

the I .R.A. 's campaign of

violence. This had some effect. Following a demonstration in
west Belfast on October 26, 1980, protest marches throughout
the province attracted substantial support.
In America, all the major newspapers reported on the
outbreak of the hunger strike and the television networks ran
footage of large protest demonstrations. The Irish-American
press was saturated in coverage of the latest developments and
American

republicans

organized

weekly

protest

marches

nationwide.
On October 29, Brendan Hughes called for an escalation of
protests

outside the

prisons.

He

particularly asked

for

greater efforts from the Irish-American groups and emphasized
that demonstrations in New York, Boston, and Chicago would
bring most pressure on the British government. After Hughes'
statement, The Irish People issued the following editorial
linking the hunger strikes directly to the heroes of the War
of Independence and encouraging Irish-Americans to become
active:
Irish lives and Irish public opinion do not
greatly trouble the British. Public opinion in
America does. sixty years ago Terence Macswiney
died on a hunger strike. His death, however,
helped force the British to the treaty table.
Irish-American interest made his suffering front
page news. Longshoremen refused to unload
British ships. The mood throughout the u.s. was
one of indignation. His death cost the British
more than the concessions necessary to save his
life ... Let the present hunger strike be wielded
mightily by Irish republican supporters in the
U.S. Let the hunger strike become known to every
American and through it reveal the brutality of
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British colonial rule in Ireland. The publicity
tour by Neugent, Mccann, and Carlin has laid the
groundwork but an intelligent campaign is an
absolute necessity. Only then will the Brits
concede. Only then can Irish lives be saved. 22
The hunger strike widened after December 1, when three
female prisoners in Armagh Jail announced they would join the
protest. The participation of women added a new dimension to
the

campaign.

Demonstrations

Sympathy
attracted

for

the

significantly

protest
larger

increased.
numbers

and

media coverage expanded. In analyzing this development, Kevin
Kelley concluded:
It seems that the starvation of three young
girls in a British jail was more objectionable
and horrifying a protest to some on-lookers than
was the specter of seven-hundred grown men in
the Maze. In a society in which women are
assigned
a
protected
and
condescendingly
reversed position, a hunger strike by three
lasses was considered an unspeakable tragedy. 23
In this increasingly urgent situation,

Irish-American

republicans tried to increase political pressure on Britain.
The

Irish National

Caucus

lobbied members

of the Ad Hoc

Committee and encouraged them to support the prisoners. Mario
Biaggi tried unsuccessfully to get Donald McHenry, Chief U.S.
delegate at the United Nations, to mediate with the British.
Caucus activities achieved greater success when Fr. Sean
McManus convinced Senator Alfonse D'Amato ( R. , N. Y. ) to conduct
a fact-finding tour of Ulster beginning December 8,
D'Amato was accompanied by Dennis Dillon,

1980.

a Nassau County

District Attorney, and Long Island councilmen Peter King. The
Senator attended an ff-Block rally in Belfast. When a reporter
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suggested there were two sides to the prison dispute, D'Amato
replied, "yes, there are two sides, a right one and a wrong
one." Dennis Dillon was asked about the purpose of their visit
and replied it was because, "American news organizations are
distorting the problem by presenting it in a balanced way as
if the English had some right to be here. 1124
These statements were criticized by the Northern Ireland
Office in Belfast. In America, John Oakes, a former senior
editor of The New York Times, attacked D'Amato's association
with the Irish National Caucus and commented:
In his haste to ingratiate himself with one
segment of his local constituency, D'Amato took
a reckless step into the dangerous minefield of
foreign
affairs. • •
His
visit to Northern
Ireland, at the moment of explosive sectarian
tension,
demonstrated a
kind
of
careless
irresponsibility to which obscure politicians
suddenly elevated to seats of unaccustomed power
occasionally succumb. 25
Such publicity kept the hunger strike a major news item
in the U.S. media. The vast majority of American newspapers
however, did not support the I.R.A. prisoners and denied the
legitimacy of political status. The Washington Post captured
the general opinion in an editorial which stated:
The strike is bound to start looming large in
the American consciousness as Christmas nears.
Calls will come from troubled Irish-Americans,
I.R.A. sympathizers, and humanitarians to have
the British do something. Americans as a whole
need to understand, however, as a good number of
Irish-Americans
already do,
that what
is
involved is an assault on the very tissue of
authority
by
which
any
government
is
sustained. 26
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While accepting that the British were right to hold out
against granting political status, other papers suggested that
Margaret Thatcher employ some flexibility in the dispute.
New York Times,

for example,

~

suggested there was room for

compromise over the issue of prison clothing:
Right though they are on principle, the British
have otherwise played into the hands the H-Block
prisoners. They seemed recently to have granted
a lesser demand that the prisoners be allowed to
wear civilian clothes. But they had to be
prison-issue
civilian
clothes,
which
the
prisoners deemed just as offensive as uniforms.
The inflexibility of the British on such
bureaucratic fine print has only gained sympathy
for the hunger-strikers among moderates. By
contrast,
jailed terrorists
in
the
Irish
Republic are free to wear what they wish, which
is surely a better policy than letting clothes
make the martyr. 27
In

response

to

the

largely

pro-British

editorials,

American republican groups began bombarding the major U.S.
newspapers with protest letters. While this campaign failed to
produce major editorial reversals, some syndicated columnists
did support the hunger strike demands. In The Chicago Tribune,
Coleman Mccarthy wrote two articles calling for political
status and the complete withdrawal of British forces from
Ulster. 28
The British government, hoping to prevent the American
media

from

strikes,

adopting a

began

its

own

more

favorable

series

of

view of

publicity

the hunger
initiatives.

Michael Allison held a number of formal lunches with American
correspondents in London to ensure adequate coverage was given
of the British viewpoint. On November 24, Conservative M.P.s
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John Biggs-Davison and Brian Mawhinney were sent to Washington
to coordinate B.I.s. publicity against the prisoner's demands.
They distributed a new glossy brochure entitled H-Block : The
Facts, which described conditions in the Maze prison as "on
par with the best in Western Europe" and reemphasized that the
prisoners suffering was self-imposed. 29
Ironically,

Republicans

claimed

that

the

publicity

efforts of Mawhinney and Biggs-Davison actually helped their
cause by increasing exposure to the issues involved. Some
British newspapers also reported the two M.P.s made little
impact. Demand for their appearance on television and press
conferences was "embarrassingly small. 1130
The event which did help the British position was the
meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey on
December 8, in Dublin. It was part of a series of Anglo-Irish
Summits which had begun in May 1979. When the talks concluded,
Charles Haughey claimed an "historic breakthrough" in AngloIrish affairs and that a new formalized relationship between
Britain

and

Ireland

would

emerge.

As

a

result

of

the

discussions, there was also speculation that a solution to the
hunger strike was near. Margaret Thatcher did not repudiate
any of Haughey's claims or the press speculation. 31
Haughey's claims of a breakthrough in the crisis were
greatly exaggerated. Political analysts claim the Taoiseach's
statements were designed to deflect attention away from the
country's disastrous economic position.

They also believe
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Haughey was trying to maintain support from the republican
wing of Fianna Fail. Margaret Thatcher did not immediately
dismiss his statements because of their political usefulness.
in

The

Uncivil

Wars,

Padraig

O'Malley

alleged

she

used

Haughey's exaggerated claims to blunt Irish-American criticism
of

her

handling

of

the

hunger

strike.

Suggestions

of

a

positive change in Anglo-Irish relations would dilute the
expected outcry if any of the prisoners should die:
Thatcher allowed Haughey a certain leeway to
exaggerate the outcome because it tied him all
the more firmly to her in the event that the
hunger
strikers
died
and
she
faced
an
international political backlash. 32
The American press interpreted the Haughey statement as
an indication that the British were working hard to find a
solution, not only to the hunger strike, but to the whole
Northern Ireland problem. Articles contained suggestions that
Thatcher would be giving Dublin a direct political role to
play in the future of the province. A flurry of editorials
praised the progress in Anglo-Irish affairs and attention was
deflected from Thatcher's handling of the hunger strike.
Washington Post commented:
It is encouraging to find these two strongwilled leaders accepting a common commitment to
explore a new arrangement.
The terror in
Northern Ireland will go on, at some level, a
hunger strike is but a form of it. But terror
cannot be allowed to dominate Irish-British
dialogue. The politicians must show they believe
in a political alternative. From the sidelines,
Americans can quietly cheer Mrs.Thatcher and Mr.
Haughey on. 33

~
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The meeting between Thatcher and Haughey also helped the
position of constitutional nationalists in the United States.
The

Four

Horsemen

had

been

noticeably

subdued

in

their

reaction during the hunger strike. They were alarmed at the
publicity American republicans were generating and they were
subjected to a

series of critic isms

for doing nothing to

resolve the dispute. Haughey's exaggerated claims after the
meeting with Thatcher allowed them to show how political
dialogue was making progress. They all praised the results of
the Anglo-Irish summit and resisted calls to support the
hunger strikers demands.
The hunger strike reached its crisis point on December
16, 1980, while these political developments occurred. Sean
McKenna, one of the original protestors, was nearly blind and
had

received

the

last

rites.

Within

the

prison,

frantic

negotiations were conducted between Brendan Hughes and British
officials.

Eventually the prison authorities presented the

hunger strikers with a thirty-four page document which hinted
that concessions could be given if the fast was ended. After
an

extensive

debate

among

the

prisoners

and

their

representatives, it was decided the document opened the way
for significant changes in the prison regim.e. On December 18
1980,

the

prisoners

ended

their

fast

in

anticipation

of

negotiations with British officials.
Republicans claimed the prisoners had won a major victory
while the British maintained that no concessions had been
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granted. In America the media presented the end of the hunger
strike as "an important victory for Thatcher and an indication
of the unyielding stand that she took throughout. 1134 When
leaders of the prisoners tried to negotiate concessions, the
British were much more inflexible. Kevin Kelly concluded it
was the general impression that;
It seemed to most observers that the Provos had
surrendered in the face of Thatcher's unbending
policy and out of fear that they would actually
have to make good on their threat to fast until
death. . • The Provos had been badly out
maneuvered by the British in the propaganda war.
Many people in Ireland and around the world were
left, rightly or wrongly, with the impression
that Britain had won and the I.R.A. had lost on
this key battleground. 35
The British failure to make substantial concessions after
the ending of the hunger strike caused extreme bitterness
among the prisoners. While some leaders wanted to continue
negotiations in the hope of making a breakthrough agreement,
the vast majority of republicans in the H-Blocks braced for
another hunger strike.
There was considerable resistance when support groups on
the outside heard of the prisoners attitude. Sections within
the H-Block Committee believed the prisoners' cause had been
dealt a serious blow by the ending of the first hunger strike.
They believed it would be impossible to build up national and
international support for another fast. Leaders of Sinn Fein
urged Bobby Sands, the commander of republican prisoners in
the Maze, to negotiate. Irish-American republicans, ·believing
they could not afford to tie up resources in another protest
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which might end in failure, were likewise exhausted after the
first

hunger

strike

campaign

and

expressed

similar

reservations about another protest.
The H-Block prisoners responded to the hesitancy of
republican groups on the outside by testing the government's
flexibility. On January 20, 1981, some went off the dirty
protest and washed for the first time in three years. They
asked for clothes to be brought from their families. When
these arrived, the prison authorities refused to pass them on
to

the

prisoners.

This

led

to

a

riot

in

the

prison.

Republicans concluded the only course of action was another
hunger strike.
Despite their initial apprehension, H-Block activists
gave their full support when the second fast began. The hunger
strike started on March 1, 1981, when Bobby Sands refused
food. Other ·strikers joined him at fortnightly intervals. The
strategy was to allow these prisoners a reasonable time period
for negotiations if Sands died. Kevin Kelly pointed out that
this staggered system:
meant that there would be a time-lag of about a
week or two between the death of one prisoner
and the imminent demise of whoever was next in
line. In this way, the pressure on the
authorities would be relentless. 36
In the first weeks of the hunger strikes the initial
fears

of the

H-Block Committee seemed confirmed.

Public

demonstrations in Ireland were poorly attended and publicity
was minimal. The perceived failure of the first hunger strike
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had also weakened Irish-American republicanism. In February,
Margaret

Thatcher

honorary

law

traveled

degree

from

to

Washington

Georgetown

to

receive

University.

an

Despite

strenuous attempts to organiz'e a protest, only a handful of
demonstrators appeared at the ceremony. 37
To

add

to

the

problem

of

poor

attendance

at

demonstrations, American republican groups also suffered from
the

continued

During

the

activities

first

hunger

of

constitutional

strike,

the

Four

nationalists.
Horsemen- were

criticized for not using their political influence to resolve
the dispute. Republicans attacked Tip O'Neill, in particular,
claiming he was callous and uncaring. They tried to convince
Irish-Americans that;
A few words uttered by any of the four might
have had great effect upon the British and
prevented much of the suffering endured by the
hunger strikes. Yet, the four were silent and
did nothing... They are shallow, self-serving
politicians unworthy of our support. 38
In response to this attack,

the Four Horsemen began

considering ways to re-establish their image and leadership
among Irish-Americans. In February 1981, Senator Chris Dodd,
Congressman Tom Foley, and Carey Parker, chief aide to Edward
Kennedy,

held a meeting with John Hume.

They agreed that

efforts to counteract republican groups in America would be
greatly

enhanced

by

the

formation

of · a

formal

group

in

Congress. Consequently, twenty-four of the most influential
Senators, Congressmen and Governors formed "The Friends of
Ireland" on St. Patrick's Day 1981. They announced the group
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would champion the goals of constitutional nationalism and
attack Irish-American support for violence. 39
constitutional nationalists achieved a further success
when they persuaded President Ronald Reagan to endorse the new
group. Sean Donlon had successfully established good relations
with the new President since his inauguration. He convinced
Reagan to take the unprecedented step of visiting the Irish
Embassy for lunch on st. Patrick's Day. The President welcomed
the formation of the Friends of Ireland and issued a statement
obviously aimed at Noraid:
We will continue to condemn all acts of
terrorism and violence, for these cannot solve
Ireland's problems. I call on all Americans to
question closely any appeal for financial or
other aid from groups involved in this conflict
to ensure that contributions do not end up in
the hands of those who perpetuate violence. 40
Formation of the · Friends of Ireland and the Reagan
statement

compounded

the

problems

faced

by

American

republicans in winning support for the H-Block prisoners. The
hunger strike campaign in Ireland also seemed to suffer when
Frank Maguire, M.P. for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, died suddenly
in early March 1981. Maguire had been an outspoken supporter
of the hunger strike and had created substantial publicity by
his militant speeches.
Although Maguire's death was a setback, the situation it
ultimately created produced an unparalleled publicity coup for
the prisoners. Sinn Fein, despite the fear of rejection at the
polls, eventually nominated Bobby Sands as a candidate for
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Maguire's

vacant

seat.

After

a

series

of

political

maneuverings, Sands was left as the sole nationalist candidate
running against Harry West of the Unionist Party. 41
During the election campaign,
successfully

presented

their

the H-Block Committee

case

to

the

nationalist

electorate. They convinced many that a vote for Sands was not
necessarily an endorsement of the I.R.A., but a means to save
a prisoner's life. As the election day neared, media coverage
in Britain reached unprecedented

levels.

When Sands was

elected on April 9, journalists and newsmen flocked to Belfast
in the greatest build up of the international press that
Northern Ireland had ever witnessed. The battle of wills
between

a

starving M.P.

and

the

"Iron

Lady,"

Margaret

Thatcher, presented an irresistible media event. Journalist
Gerry Foley caught the essence of the situation when he
observed:
The election victory brought an altogether new
dimension to the hunger strike. Now, overnight,
the British were dealing with not just a
"convicted terrorist," but an elected M.P. The
issue was now front page news throughout the
world. 42
Media coverage of the hunger strike reached saturation
levels as Sands' condition deteriorated in late April. Twentythree nations sent television crews to Belfast while over
four-hundred international journalists reported on the event.
When Sands died on May s, 1981, there were over three-hundred
photographers at his funeral to provide the world's press with
front page pictures.
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Perhaps
American

most

for

groups

like

Noraid,

journalists composed the largest segment of the

international
networks

significantly

newsmen.

sent sixteen

The

three

major

camera crews

U.S.

to the

television

province

and

provided the American public with daily news footage of the
deepening crisis.u
Republicans and some media analysts claim that this build
up of journalists had a profound effect on the nature of news
coverage from Ulster. Noraid had continually attacked the
mainstream U.S. media coverage of the conflict as pro-British.
They alleged that most American reporters never went to
Belfast and wrote all their reports from the comfort of
London. They further claimed these journalists took their
information

from

British

sources

and

therefore

produced

reports which were highly critical of Irish republicanism.
American republicans were particularly critical of The New
York Times, transforming the popular catch phrase and accusing
it of containing, "All the News That's Brit to Print."''
These republican criticisms of the U.S. media have been
supported by journalists who worked in Ulster. Jo Thomas, who
covered the province for two years with The New York Times,
recalls how easy it was to remain in London -- with its fine
restaurants and excellent entertainment -- and compose reports
from the weekly press briefing issued by the British Foreign
Office. She maintains that;
Because of the way assignments in London are
generally structured, with large territories to
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cover -- sometimes all of Europe and the Middle
East
American journalists cover Northern
Ireland infrequently, in short trips sandwiched
between other assignments, if they go there at
all. Many stories are simply written from
London, with no on the ground reporting. If they
go to Northern Ireland, they seldom leave
Belfast. Sometimes the press officers at the
Northern Ireland Office will do something as
blatant
as
arranging
the
visiting
correspondents' entire itinerary. 45
Republicans claim that it was the large build-up of
journalists in Belfast between April and May of 1981 that
marked a change in the nature

o~

American media coverage of

Ulster. Reporters scoured the province to report on the daily
violence and talked directly to the groups involved.

Liz

Curtis and Roger Faligot contended that for the first time in
years, U.S.

journalists provided information stemming from

other than British sources. 46 Consequently,
greater criticism of
strike.

Lamenting

the

this

there was much

British position on the hunger

change,

The

London

Sunday

Times

concluded:
The hunger strikers have rekindled a flagging
interest in Ulster and its problems; as a
result, world opinion has begun to shift away
from the British government and in favor of the
I. R. A. The image of the gunman has actually
improved. And the general opinion is emerging
that the time has come for Mrs. Thatcher to
begin negotiations with Dublin leading to
eventual union with the south. 47
In America, no other event in the Ulster conflict had
received as much media coverage as the hunger strikes.
became the lead item of network television news,

It

and the

column inches previously devoted to Northern Ireland in the
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press ran into miles. With Sands' impending death, editorial
comment generally attacked the hunger strike and the I.R.A ••
Some encouraged the British to take a tougher stand against
the prisoners. The Chicago Tribune, for example, asked, "If
forced feeding could deny Irish nationalists the incendiary
martyrdom they seek, why has the British government not used
it?" ..
Almost all the major American newspapers denied the
legitimacy

of

political

statusfor

I.R.A.

and

I.N.L.A.

prisoners. They backed the British government's claim that
concession to this principle would only encourage terrorism.
The Detr9it News typified editorial opinion on the issue when
it commented:
Margaret Thatcher was right to refuse political
status to Bobby sands, the I.R.A. man who died
on a hunger strike at Maze Prison. Mr. sands
belonged to a terrorists organization, and no
government can afford to concede that repugnant
acts of violence are somehow sanctified by
political aspirations.~
The American press maintained its lack of support for
political status throughout the hunger strike but, as more
prisoners died, they launched equally strong attacks against
the British government. Many newspapers attacked the legal
system and the process whereby most of the prisoners ended up
in the H-Blocks. The Boston Globe commented, "The British
prison system in Northern Ireland is defective because the
system of justice is a sham." 50 The New York Times supported
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this contention and renewed its earlier calls for Britain to
allow the prisoners to wear their own clothes. 51
In July 1981, after a series of independent negotiating
teams failed to secure a compromise between prison authorities
and the hunger strikers, the American press issued strong
attacks

against

Margaret

Thatcher.

They

attacked

her

"haughtiness, " "starchy tone," and "monumental inflexibility. "
The Baltimore Sun condemned Thatcher's "misplaced resolve" and
urged President Reagan to "convince her that stubbornness, not
flexibility, is the great evil to be avoided. " 52 The Chicago
Tribune, in assessing the violence after Bobby Sands' death,
concluded:
Much of the blame for this can be laid on Mrs.
Thatcher and her obstinate refusal to work for
reform ... It must be abundantly clear to her now
that her policy of complacency and inactivity
has failed miserably. Now that she has won her
point, she should qi ve some consideration to
relaxing prison rules to accommodate some of the
inmates demands. 1153
Newspaper columnists also produced innumerable articles
on the hunger strike. Many extended the editorial attacks on
Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising stand and urged her to talk
directly with the prisoners.

In The Wall Street Journal,

Alexander Cockburn castigated "The Bankrupt British Policy in
Northern Ireland," while Dennis Shanahan, in The Chicago SunTimes, described Bobby sands as an "extraordinary individual"
in dying for a principle which "subsumes life and sets fire to
the soul. 115' Coleman McCarthy in The Washington Post· ,again
gave strong support to the prisoners and told his readers:

365

The prisoners' demands -- involving changes in
political status, work rules, and privileges
are modest. The men are not seeking to be
released from prison for reduced terms, even
though their arrests and convictions were
suspect and their sentences -- such as fourteen
years merely for being found in a car that had
an unloaded gun in i t--were extreme. " 55
American
background

television

reports

on

stations

the

broadcast

hunger

a

series

of

strike which tended

to

romanticize Irish republicanism. On April 27, 1981, "C.B.S.
Morning News" presented a

very complimentary biography of

Bobby Sands and his republican ideals.

It told viewers of

Sands' poetry and political writings and how "he memorized the
entire contents of Trinity by Leon Uris, translated them into
Irish, and then tapped them out in code to his co-prisoners in
other cells." 56

on May 3,

C.B.s.

ran an extensive report

describing the New York Irish-American reaction to the hunger
strike

in

New

background,

York.

those

With

republican

interviewed

cursed

songs

playing

Margaret

as

a

Thatcher,

praised Bobby Sands, and expressed their own willingness to
die for Ireland."
Many
similar

local

reports

republicans.

television
and

Michael

and

radio

interviewed
Flannery

stations

prominent

and

Martin

broadcast

Irish-American
Galvin,

Noraid

Publicity Director, appeared frequently as commentators on New
York's W.N.B.c. television station. They typically accused the
British of being "murderers" who only responded to "violent
resistance. " 58
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The British government was extremely concerned about the
American media presentation of the hunger strike. Officials at
the B.I.S. feared that unfavorable reactions to British policy
could

lead

to

overflowing

Noraid

collection

boxes.

The

Thatcher administration also dreaded the prospect of increased
militancy

from

possibility

Tip

they

O'Neill

would

~ry

and
to

Edward
get

Kennedy

u.s.

the

and

the

government

involved.
These fears increased as American media reports of the
hunger strike grew more critical of Britain. The English press
carried reports of how Britain was losing the propaganda war
and occasionally condemned

specific views

in the United

States. For example, The London Times attacked The New York
Times' suggestion that the hunger strikers be allowed their
own clothing. It called American media reports "prejudiced and
inaccurate" and concluded:
Advice such as that in The New York Tj,mes is
well meaning no doubt, as well as apparently
being a salve to the liberal conscience and
popular in certain Irish constituencies in the
u. s. . But is very dangerous none the less! 59
Britain's Daily Mail focused on a report by Michael
Daley, a correspondent with The New York Daily News, and
accused it of being "a malevolent piece of lying propaganda"
which was designed "to persuade American politicians to take
an

increasingly

anti-British

line. 1160

Daley's

article

recounted the story of a British army patrol firing on a
teenage boy. He told the story through the eyes of "gunner
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Christopher Spell," one of the British soldiers. After the
allegations

from

The

Daily

Mail,

Daley

admitted

that

Christopher Spell was a pseudonym. He said the rest of his
story was true but,

in order to spare his newspaper any

further "embarrassment," he resigned on May

a, 1981. 111

British government officials also criticized American
network news reports on the hunger strike. They generally
adhered to a view expressed later by R.J. Raymond, "Covering
the Ulster conflict is a task far which American television
reporters are unprepared. They have neither the sources in
Northern

Ireland

nor

the

necessary

knowledge

of

Irish

history. 11 • 2
Officials

at

the

British

Information

Service

were

particularly incensed at some of the reports on American local
television and radio. They attacked specific programs which
they considered pro-republican. The British press joined these
condemnations and one weekly journal concluded:
In cities with big Irish-American populations,
local newscasts have been appalling. Highly
popular, they are not so much journalism as
news-as-show business. Presenters picked for
their pretty faces and ethnic mix, have been let
loose on the complexities of Ulster. 63
The Thatcher administration began sending delegations to
America
Senior

to counteract republican publicity in the media.
officials

from

the

Northern

Ireland

Office

and

prominent M.P.s assisted the B.I.S. in trying to influence
editorial boards and television executives.

These efforts

produced few noticeable results. One official lamented:
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I'm very much aware that opinion in the U.S. is
severely against us. We haven't enough resources
to counter this very skillful campaign. And,
American opinion is very important to us. If the
U.S. government was persuaded that our actions
in Northern Ireland are wrong, or that human
rights are being violated, it would effect
overall policy toward Britain. But, there is no
real interest in our side of the story in the
U.S.!64
The failure of British officials to adequately counteract
Irish republicanism in America produced continual
from

unionist

politicians.

They

accused

the

cri~icism

Thatcher

administration of incompetence and lack of commitment to the
publicity battle. These criticisms were endorsed by a number
of British newspapers, which in turn, called on the government
to employ private publicists and lobbyists in its campaign.
There was also a demand for the appointment of a top official
from the N. I. o to head .the British Information Service.

~

Economist characterized the government's efforts as follows:
The intermittent salesmanship by such Northern
Ireland ministers· as Humphrey Atkins and Adam
Butler has been embarrassingly patrician and
inept. It is an axiom of public relations that
the best publicity cannot sell a bad product.
But in America no publicity is conspicuously not
selling a good one--especially when a worse
product is being sold by one of the world's most
effective techniques; ethnic loyalty backed by
terrorists ready to die for the cause. 65
The unprecedented media coverage of the hunger strike in
the U.S. greatly increased Irish-American concern for events
in Ulster. News reports in Tbe Irish Echo, Irish Voice and
Irish Advocate were almost completely devoted to the latest
developments in the H-Blocks. They unanimously supported the
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prisoners'

"five just demands," printed information about

protest demonstrations, pleaded with Irish-Americans to get
involved in the publicity campaign,

and published severe

condemnations of the Thatcher government. The Irish People
surpassed all of these newspapers in its violent attacks and
threats against the British. It also tried to humanize the
hunger strike by printing extensive weekly biographies of the
prisoners, describing their typical Irish Catholic background,
their endearing personal characteristics,

and emphasizing

their idealistic devotion to the centuries old cause of Irish
freedom. 11615
Noraid and other groups capitalized on the increased
Irish-American concern for the hunger strikes. They built
support by publicizing the intense suffering endured by the
prisoners as their bodies grew weaker from lack of food. They
emphasized the prisoners' extreme courage and nobility in
being willing to die for the eternal cause of Irish unity. The
Irish National Caucus, in particular, re-emphasized Catholic
symbolism in their publicity materials and continually drew an
analogy between the prisoners and Christ's suffering on the
cross.
Through

these

appeals,

republicans

succeeded

in

attracting previously uninterested Irish-Americans. As the
hunger strike continued, they organized the largest and most
prolonged public demonstrations in the current troubles. The
biggest of these took place in New York City outside the

370

British Consulate on Fifth Avenue. Republicans held daily
protests throughout May 1981. They peaked in the week after
Sands'

death,

protested

when an average of several thousand people

daily.~

Initially these demonstrations were orderly, typically
consisting of protesters marching up and down Fifth Avenue,
led by pipers playing Irish laments, chanting pro-republican
slogans. As the hunger strike reached a climax the protests
became

more

militant.

Irish-American

republicans

burned

effigies of Margaret Thatcher and there were a series of
attacks on the British consulate. Demonstrators forced British
officials

to

remove

the

Union

Jack

from

outside

their

consulate and the flag had to be removed from businesses
throughout the city. 68
on July 6, 1981, seven protesters, including Fr. Daniel
Berrigan, broke into the British Consulate and held a three
hour sit-in. Consular staff claimed they broke furniture and
destroyed documents in the library. 69 On August 4, an I.R.A.
sympathizer entered the British mission at the United Nations.
He said he had a bomb strapped to his body and demanded to
talk to Margaret Thatcher about the hunger strike. 70
Demonstrators dressed in I.R.A. uniforms maintained all
night vigils outside the British Consulate throughout the
hunger strike.

They cursed and

jeered at consular staff

entering or leaving the building. The British

Emb~ssy

was

forced to ask for greater police protection for its staff in
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New York and had to increase security at its consulates
throughout the United States. One British diplomat told

~

London Times, "When I go to work I am called a bastard, a
murderer, a butcher, and a liar--and I suffer the same all
over again when I leave. 1171
Irish-American republicans demonstrators were given an
added bonus when Prince Charles visited the United States in
mid-June 1981. Noraid ran a spontaneous campaign to disrupt
his public engagements. As the Prince toured New York harbor
in the yacht Highlander,

a small flotilla of protesters,

waving anti-British placards, followed and chanted republican
slogans.
Later, when the Prince attended a ballet performance at
the Lincoln center, he was greeted by thousands of jeering
demonstrators. Inside, at regular intervals, protestors arose
from their seats and ran down the aisle shouting "obscenities"
at the Royal box. The Chicago Tribune reported:
A middle aged man with a thick Irish accent,
rose from a $200 seat at the back of the
auditorium and ran down the aisle screaming
insults at a
"royal whose country is
committing human rights violations. 72
Following

these

protests,

The

New

York

Daily

Post

published an article which criticized the timing of the royal
visit and complained at the cost to the city of providing
security to Prince Charles. Mayor Ed Koch and Mario Cuomo,
Lieutenant-Governor of

New York,

joined the

co~troversy,

issuing statements which attacked "the centuries-old British
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policy

of

denying

basic

civil

rights

in

Ireland"

and

supporting the withdrawal of British troops from Ulster. 73
As a result of the demonstrations against Prince Charles,
British officials

advised Princess Margaret to cancel

a

proposed trip to Washington in July 1981. The Princess had
raised the fury of Irish-Americans in 1979. During a dinner
party in Chicago, she reportedly ref erred to the Irish as
"pigs."

British

Information

Office

agents

convinced

the

Princess that her presence in the U.S. would only act as a
"royal rag to the Irish-American bull. 1174
In light of this information, Princess Margaret canceled
the trip. Princess Anne and Captain Mark Phillips followed her
lead and declined an invitation to visit Pennsylvania in
August for a horse show. Irish republicans gloated at these
successes and determined to escalate the H-Block publicity
campaign. 75
Noraid continued to enhance its publicity efforts with
tours of former "blanket men" Noel Cassidy, Charles Crumley,
and Seamus Delaney, all ex-Maze inmates, conducted illegal
lectures and press conferences in the U.S. during late spring
1981. These former prisoners were later joined by a group of
relatives of the hunger strikers, including Sean Sands, the
brother of Bobby, and Oliver Hughes, brother of Francis who
died on 11 May. They visited twenty-six cities on a three week
tour and conducted innumerable press interviews, television
appearances and public lectures.
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The

relatives

enraged

Irish-American

personal accounts of British brutality.
sister of I.N.L.A.

audiences

with

Elizabeth O'Hara,

hunger striker Patsy O'Hara,

told how

prison officers had tortured her brother before he died by
leaving hot meals beside his bed. On July 8, Oliver Hughes
told a crowd in New York that during his brother's funeral,
"British thugs stopped the hearse and bashed the funeral
director senseless. I heard one of them say "'get the casket,
we' 11 burn the body.
These

11176

personal

publicity

and

accounts

further

greatly

infuriated

assisted
British

Noraid's
officials.

Republicans allege that the Thatcher government eventually
persuaded

u.s.

officials to curtail the relatives' tours. The

Irish National Caucus,

for example,

claimed that American

immigration officers harassed Alice Mcilwee, mother of hunger
striker

Tom

Mcilwee.

citizenship, the

u.s.

Despite

the

fact

she

had

American

consulate in Belfast questioned Mcilwee

about her intended public appearances and never issued her a
visa. She only managed to get to the U.S. by obtaining an
Irish passport and visa at the American Embassy in Dublin. 77
Despite these allegations of harassment, Jack Holland
contends

that

the

relatives'

tours

greatly

increased

republican fund-raising and publicity in America. He says they
were, "one of the most successful tours ever on the IrishAmerican circuit" and claims they raised over a quarter of a
million dollars. This was achieved despite strained relations
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between

Noraid

and

Elizabeth

O'Hara,

who

insisted

on

emphasizing that her brother Patsy was a member of the
"Marxist" Irish National Liberation Army. 78
One of the most significant aspects of the hunger strike
was the amount of political support the prisoners received.
After Bobby Sands died, his campaign agent, owen Carron, was
elected to the vacant seat in Fermanagh/South Tyrone. During
the June 1981 elections in the Irish republic, hunger striker
Kieran Doherty was elected to the Dail. Because of these
electoral victories, the British could no longer claim that
the prisoners were a small group of fanatics without public
support. Republicans in America continually emphasized the
victories

at

the

polls

and

tried

to

win

support

from

politicians, labor leaders, and the Catholic church. They
achieved some notable and widely publicized successes.
Two days after Bobby Sands died,

the 135, 000 member

International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.) imposed a
twenty-four hour boycott of British ships. The action affected
vessels from Maine to Texas and was masterminded by Teddy
Gleason, President of the I. L.A. Later, an Irish-American
Labor

Coalition

activities

in

was

formed

support

of

to
the

coordinate
hunger

trade

strike.

The

union
new

organization ran boycotts against British goods and organized
a mass demonstration to qreet the Queen Elizabeth II when it
sailed into New York on May 9, 1981. 79
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On April 27, 1981, Cardinal Terence Cooke of New York
sent a message to Mrs. Thatcher which urged her to change
prison regulations in the H-Blocks. A number of other bishops
and high ranking clerics supported Cooke. Although the church
did

not

officially

support

political

status

for

H-Block

prisoners, it continued to press the British for concessions.
As

each

successive

prisoner

died,

there

were

large

commemoration services at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York
and in churches all over America;'0
The Irish National caucus played a leading role in the
American campaign to publicize the prison conflict. Father
Sean

McManus

had

shown

solidarity

with

Bobby

Sands

by

undertaking a twelve day hunger strike outside the British
Embassy in Washington. 11 After this,

McManus tried to get

members of the Ad Hoc Committee to support the prisoners. He
contacted Hamilton Fish, Jr.

(R.,N.Y.) in the hope that the

Congressman's close friendship with Vice-President Bush would
have

some

influence.

Fish

tried

to

get

the

Reagan

administration to mediate in the hunger strike but he was
later contacted by the state Department and told there would
be no such action.
Undeterred by this State Department response, McManus
then encouraged Mario Biaggi to lead a hectic drive within
Congress to rally support for the hunger strikers. Biaggi
succeeded in getting members of

the Ad Hoc Committee to

endorse a series of statements which sharply criticized the
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Thatcher administration.· In April
organized a trip by former
Clarke,

and Fr.

1981,

the

Caucus also

u. s. Attorney General, Ramsay

Daniel Berrigan to the H-Blocks. British

authorities refused to let the two men meet with Bobby Sands
and

they

Thatcher.

reacted
During

with
a

bitter

news

condemnations

conference

in

of

Belfast,

Margaret
Clarke

commented:
The fact is that Margaret Thatcher -- who had
the power to keep Sands alive, to wear his own
clothes, and to receive a letter a day in prison
-- permitted him to die ••• She has destroyed any
claim she may have had of moral leadership by
this outrageous act ••• People around the world
will wonder what· failure of character in the
government there is that permits young men to
die because it will not do a small thing that is
right. 82
Ramsay Clarke's statement infuriated British politicians
and prompted The London Daily Mail to issue a bitter attack on
the former Attorney General. The newspaper accused Clarke of
hypocrisy for failing to acknowledge the murder of R. U.c.
Constable Gary Martin, killed in riots after Sands' death, and
concluded;
Former U.S. Attorney Generals and foreign
prelates do not concern themselves with the
death of a policeman doing his duty. Too
commonplace! Too predictable! ••• When pity apes
the political fashion, truly it can be grotesque
in its selectivity. 83
The hunger strikers received strong support from State
Assemblies and city governments, particularly on the East
Coast. Many issued resolutions calling for political status,
while some city politicians tried to get British diplomats
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evicted from their consulates. The Boston City Council changed
the name of Chestnut Street to "Francis Hughes Avenue," in
honor of the dead hunger striker.

Maire Howe,

assistant

majority leader of the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
led a group of republican demonstrators who dumped British tea
into Boston Harbor in a symbolic protest inspired by the
American colonists in 1773. *" In response to Bobby Sands'
death,

the

Massachusetts

State

legislature

passed

a

resolution;
condemning the government of Prime Minister
Thatcher for its insensitivity to the value of
human life and the real issues of Ireland's
divisive struggle, and wholeheartedly supports
the ultimate objectives of the I.R.A •• •5
While this local political pressure had no impact on
government policy in Washington, it did increase the strains
on constitutional nationalist leaders. The Friends of Ireland
recognized the growing sympathy for the hunger strikers among
Irish-Americans who were concerned with Ulster but they did
not want to be associated with republican groups. In April
1981, they tried to maintain the position adopted during the
first hunger strike -- urging the British government to
compromise on some of the prisoners' demands while refusinq to
support the prison protest.
As the hunqer strike progressed and the crisis deepened,
constitutional nationalists were pushed into a more militant
position

and

their

criticisms

of

Britain

intensified.
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Following Sands'

death,

Senator Edward Kennedy made the

following statement:
I urge the British government, which has clear
responsibility for prison administration in
Ulster, to act on an urgent basis to end its
position of inflexibility, and to implement
reasonable reforms capable of achieving a
humanitarian settlement of the hunger strike.••
on May 6, 1981, the Four Horsemen sent a telegram to
Margaret Thatcher which was made public in the American and
British

press.

"intransigence"

It
and

strongly

urged

her

condemned
to

end

the

Thatcher's
"posture

of

inflexibility that must lead inevitably to more senseless
violence and more needless deaths. 11 • 7
In her public response to this telegram, Thatcher was
careful to acknowledge the contribution the four politicians
had made to cutting Noraid fund-raising. Yet, she refused to
offer

concessions,

claiming that

Britain

had

tried

all

possible ways to end the hunger strike, and bluntly stated:
The responsibility for additional deaths rests
firmly on the shoulders of those who are
ordering these young men to commit suicide in
the
cause
of
subverting
democratic
institutions.••
Thatcher's cool response led constitutional nationalists
to concentrate on securing the involvement of the American
government. Edward Kennedy made initial contacts with the
State Department and encouraged the Irish government to launch
a direct appeal to the President. On July 15, 1981,· Sean
Donlon met with Reagan in the Irish Embassy. He conveyed a
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which described Moynihan, Carey, Kennedy, O'Neill, and Ed Koch
as, "Five Guilty Men." The newspaper claimed that because of
their statements on the hunger strike, all five were "equally
responsible morally" for the bomb attack. 91
The positive effects of the prison protests on American
republicanism can be gauged in the F.A.R.A. statements of
Noraid. For the six month period up to July 1980, Noraid
received $90,056. In January 1981, its collections rose to
$105,124. Due to hunger strike pttblicity the group collected
$15,424

in November,

January.

This marked

$33,395

a

in December,

steady increase

and $21,695 in
from the

$9, 139

collected in October 1981."
In the six month period from January to July 1981,
Nora id's fund-raising
monthly figures
$42,848 in May,

leapt to a total of $250, 511.

rose from · $5, 088 raised in February,

The
to

and $84,894 in June--the period of maximum

publicity for the second hunger strike. Martin Galvin further
stated that in the week after Sands' death, Noraid received
$20,000 directly to its Bronx office alone,

compared to a

previous weekly rate of $3, 500 in donations nationwide. 93
Noraid chapters from Los Angeles to Baltimore all reported
similar increases in weekly funding and in October 1981, the
group claimed it had established twelve new chapters due to
increased membership during the hunger strikes. 9 '
Noraid refused to file a financial statement after July
29,

1981,

so no official documents exist on the amount of
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money raised during the final three months of the hunger
strike. Political analysts allege, however, that the group
continued

to

receive

unprecedented

levels

of

financial

support.
The hunger strike, therefore, rejuvenated Irish-American
republicanism and reversed a downward trend· in support and
effectiveness which had been growing from the mid 1970s. Not
only did Noraid increase its fund-raising, but it used the
prison protest to achieve a significant publicity victory.
This success substantially damaged the work of the British
Information service. Republican activities also eclipsed the
efforts of constitutional nationalists and the Friends of
Ireland.
It was Ulster unionists who were most alarmed by the
American reaction to the hunger strike. They were infuriated
by reports of the large republican demonstrations in New York
and believed increased Noraid fund-raising would directly
enhance the military capacity of the I.R.A •• Leaders of the
Democratic Unionist Party (D.U.P.) and the Official Unionist
Party ( o. u. P. ) , therefore, determined to launch their own
publicity campaign in the U.S. to counteract Irish-American
republicanism.
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Chapter 8
Ulster Unionists arui Tbe Hunger Strikes. 1980-1985
From the beginning of the "troubles," Ulster unionists

constantly condemned

the

Irish-American dimension to the

Senator Edward Kennedy's attacks on Stormont and his support
for

the

N.I.C.R.A ••

Congressional

Resolution

When

Kennedy

calling

for

later

issued

his

British withdrawal,

unionists reacted furiously. Prime Minister Brian Faulkner
described the Senator as an "ignoramus" and accused him of
"playing· American politics with Ulster peoples lives." The
pro-unionist Belfast NewsLetter ran a front page editorial
describing how the
Presidents

and,

Scotch-Irish had provided fourteen U.S.

"carved

out

a

nation

years

before

the

departure of the Kennedys and the Famine Irish from the shores
of Wexford". The editorial then advised Kennedy to straighten
out his own personal affairs, after Chapaquidick, rather than
interfere in Ulster, and concluded:
Of all Senator Kennedy's indescressions -- and they
are too well remembered to recall here -- his dabbling
in the affairs of Ulster is most mischievous and
reprehensible. His lack of knowledge on the situation
might be excused but to presume to advise, indeed to
direct, from that position is to display again the
foolish arrogance for which he has established a
reputation. 1
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There

was

little

noticeable

change

in

this

unionist

attitude, even after Kennedy moderated his views in the midseventies. Despite the fact that the Four Horsemen condemned
Irish-American support for the I.R.A., unionists continued to
regard these politicians with extreme suspicion. Perceiving no
difference between constitutional nationalists and republican
groups in the U.S., they judged every political statement by
Kennedy and his supporters as giving encouragement to the
Provos. 2
Unionists generally viewed the Four Horsemen as deviously
working to win the American government's support for a united
Ireland. They felt these leading Irish-American politicians
would do anything within their power to harm Ulster Unionism.
This attitude intensified after Tip O'Neill played a vital
role in the R.U.C.

"arms ban" of 1979.

Unionists viewed

O'Neill 's action as a clear indication of the treacherous
intentions of the Four Horsemen.
Despite

this

loathing

for

Irish-American

political

leaders, unionists directed their most bitter condemnations
against Noraid. The Democratic Unionist Party (D.U.P.) and
Official Unionist Party (O.U.P.) continually described Noraid
members as "callous cowards," funding the murder of innocent
Protestants from the safety of America. As mentioned earlier,
some loyalist paramilitaries were so enraged by Irish-American
republicanism

that

they

threatened

assassination campaign against Noraid. 3

a

trans-Atlantic
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In the 1970's, unionist politicians generally tried to
counteract

Irish-American

nationalists

by

issuing

condemnations of their "unwanted interference" in the internal
affairs of Ulster. Some more ambitious politicians actually
traveled to the United States and tried to publicize the
unionist political position. These politicians also worked to
establish a support network in America, to counteract the
publicity of the Four Horsemen and Noraid.
Al though a number of unionist groups did emerge, they
remained extremely small. This was principally because, unlike
Irish-Americans, there was no Ulster Protestant ethnic network
which

they

could

draw

upon.

The

major

waves

of

Ulster

Protestant emigration had occurred in the eighteenth century.
Most

had

American

completely
society

and

assimilated
retained

into
no

the

mainstream

attachment

for

of

their

ancestral homeland. There were only a few notable exceptions
to this general trend.'
one of the oldest Ulster Protestant organizations in
America is the Loyal Orange Institution of the United States.
The first Orange Lodge was established in 1820 in New York. By
the 1870s an extensive orange network had grown throughout the
East Coast, supporting Anglo-American nativism and organizing
annual parades on the Twelfth of July. These parades naturally
raised the antagonism of Irish catholic immigrants. A number
of people were killed in sectarian clashes during Twelfth
celebrations in New York in 1871. 5
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The Loyal Orange Institution steadily declined from its
peak in the 1870s. Today there are only twenty-nine lodges
with a few hundred members. 6 Most of these Orangemen are
immigrants from Northern Ireland. Some have tried to promote
Ulster unionism in America. They hold an annual Twelfth of
July parade in Philadelphia at which participants eat orange
ice cream and drink orange dyed beer. Guest speakers try to
outmatch their brethren in Belfast in the ferocity of their
condemnations of the I.R.A •• 7
The Loyal Orange Institution in the United states promotes
Ulster unionism in its quarterly newspaper The Sash. It also
regularly supports publicity tours of America by Official
Unionist M.P. Rev. Martin Smyth, Imperial Grand Master of the
Loyal Orange Lodge. Recently, American Orangemen began making
direct

financial

contributions

to

Unionist

political

campaigns. 8
Ulster unionism has also received support in America from
Scotch-Irish societies. These groups are almost exclusively
centered in Pennsylvania, a region which had been extensively
settled by Ulster immigrants. 9 One of the largest of these
organizations was the Scotch-Irish Foundation of Philadelphia,
founded in 1949 by descendants of Ulster immigrants.

The

Foundation encouraged a greater appreciation of the ScotchIrish contribution to the United States by funding historical
research.
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When the present troubles broke out in Northern Ireland,
the

Scotch-Irish

Foundation

strongly

supported

Ulster

unionism. President John McPherson and General Secretary John
Tuten appeared on local television and radio in Philadelphia
to

challenge

Irish-American

nationalists.

They

conducted

letter writing campaigns claiming there was no discrimination
against Catholics under the Stormont government. McPherson and
Tuten also tried to counteract what they perceived as a "antiunionist bias" in the American media's presentation of the
Ulster conflict.w
While the scotch-Irish societies and the Orange network
had been in existence before 1968, some groups formed in
direct response to the current troubles. In 1971, the Ulster
American Loyalists

(U.A.L.)

began in Los Angeles.

It was

mainly composed of Ulster exiles who had been recruited to
work for West Coast aerospace industries in the 1960s. The
U.A.L. encouraged unionist politicians to travel to California
and

present

conducted

their

views

at

public

information campaigns

meetings.

They

to warn Congress

also

of the

"devious" activities of Irish-American politicians in working
for a united Ireland."
To finance its publicity efforts, the U.A.L. organized a
variety of fund-raising schemes and social functions.

The

largest of these was a yearly Twelfth of July dinner dance in
Los Angeles. Members of the group decorated a function room
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with Ulster flags, wore Orange Sashes, and danced the night
away to recordings of loyalist flute bands. 12
These groups,

however,

were

atypical

of

the

unionist

support network in America. Individuals working on their own
initiative

promoted

the

Ulster

Protestant

cause.

Harold

Alexander, for example, maintained a single-handed publicity
drive in support of the New Ulster Political Research Group.
He also worked for at least ten other organizations ranging
from the Ulster Unionist Council to the Progressive Unionist
Party. 13
Ulster

clergyman

Rev.

Charles

Reynolds

organized

a

unionist publicity group in New York called the Northern
Ireland

Service

Council.

He

hosted

visiting

unionist

politicians and tried to offer an opposing opinion to IrishAmerican

nationalist

Chicago,

Rev.

Virgil

groups
Knight,

in
a

the

New

York

fundamentalist

media • 14

In

Protestant

preacher, collected money among his congregation and delivered
it to

"families of soldiers,

Ulster policemen and others

killed by the I .R.A .• 1115
Throughout the 1970s, this small Unionist support network
tried unsuccessfully to
counteract

the

campaigns

influence
of

the American media

Irish-American

Al though the main unionist political

parties

and

nationalists.
in Northern

Ireland tried to encourage and support the network,

their

efforts were not given strong priority. Both the O.U.P. and
D.U.P. had limited financial resources and used their money
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for political campaigns in Ulster. Unionists tended to leave
the anti-I.R.A.

propaganda war to the British Information

service, which possessed much greater financial resources and
contacts with the media. 16
unionist concern with the Irish-American dimension was
greatly heightened by the R. U.c. "arms ban" in 1979. There was
also increased alarm over media reports on the importance of

u.s.

weapons and Noraid fund-raising to the I.R.A •• It was the

1981 hunger strike, however, which caused the most unionist
anxiety. D.U.P. and O.U.P. leaders reacted bitterly to reports
of how American cities were naming streets after dead hunger
strikers; how republicans had forced the removal of Union
Jacks from all public and commercial buildings in New York;
and

how

the

American

media

was

pushing

the

Thatcher

administration to make concessions to the hunger strikers.
Unionist outrage at the levels of support for the hunger
strikers in America was compounded by their contempt for the
British

Information

Service.

Many

O.U.P.

and

D. U.P.

politicians felt that British efforts to challenge republican
publicity were totally incompetent and inadequate. Unionists
strongly criticized the Thatcher government for doing nothing
to show their political position. 17 The commander of the
Ulster Defence Association, Andy Tyrie, expressed the attitude
of many Ulster Protestants when he commented:
You must talk to the
The I.R.A. does that
It's our own fault
informed. The I.R.A.

people in their own language •.
and the Brits don't know how.
the United States is badly
puts its case in colorful and
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romantic terms. The British are so earnest and so
humorless they can't combat it • 18
Unionists naturally believed that republican publicity
victories in America would increase Noraid fund-raising_and
this money in turn would be used to finance the I. R. A. 's
campaign of violence. In light of this conclusion, and the
perceived ineptness of the B. I. s., unionists began to organize
a

comprehensive

publicity

campaign

of

their

own.

They

determined to present Americans with the unionist perspective
and counteract Irish-American nationalism.
The Belfast NewsLetter and The Belfast Telegra,ph both
called for a major publicity drive aimed at presenting the
Ulster unionist viewpoint to the American public. This call
was

further

supported

in

publications

ranging

from

the

U. V. F. 's Combat to the Free Presbyterian Protestant Telegraph.
One of the strongest endorsements of an American initiative
came from the Orange Order. An editorial in its journal, The
Orange

Standard,

supported

a

campaign

to

strengthen

unionist network in America and stated:
In the past decade the whole running has been made
by the "shanty Irish" in information and propaganda
about Ulster. The Scotch-Irish, an older and more
honorable
influence
on
the
U.S.,
have
been
particularly muted ••• We have not seriously sought
to inform or influence them. The case for Ulster has
not been pleaded in America with any enthusiasm.
Something more permanent must be added to the verbal
and literary pleas for American understanding. There
has to be a bringing together of people, whose
support is for the suffering people of Ulster, in
such a way that they can effectively help our
cause. 19

the
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The leaders of Ulster's Protestant churches were the first
to

challenge

the

growing

support

for

Irish-American

republicanism. In the first weeks of April 1981, Bishop Robin
Eames led a Church of Ireland delegation to the United states.
The group had a

series of discussions with religious and

political leaders in Washington and New York. They held press
conferences at which they condemned I.R.A. violence and tried
to show "that Ulster Protestants were not all

red-necked

backwoodsmen and bigots. 1120 Eames asked his colleagues in the
American Episcopal Church for support and was rewarded when
Bishop John Allin classified the I .R.A.

as terrorists and

called the hunger strike "mass suicide." 8
Like the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in
Ireland had been alarmed by Irish-American support for the
I.R.A. since the late 1970s. In its annual report in 1979, the
church

synod

expressed

"deep

unease"

over

Noraid' s

activities. It also "deplored" the allegations of sectarian
bias

made

against

the

R.U.C.

by

Tip

O'Neill

and

his

. supporters • 22
On May 15, 1981, following the example of the Church of
Ireland, a ten man Presbyterian delegation visited America.
Their objective was to present an alternative view to the
rising republican publicity after the death of Bobby Sands.
The group said it wanted to counteract the American media
presentation of the hunger strike which they claimed was
"clearly inclined towards the nationalist perspective. 1123
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The Presbyterian group, led by Rev. J.A. Weir, were much
more forceful in pushing the unionist perspective than the
Church of Ireland delegation. They not only launched severe
attacks against the hunger strikers, but also tried to defend
the civil rights record of the Stormont government. Spokesmen
for the group emphasized that the N.I.C.R.A. was principally
a nationalist movement and claimed there was extensive antiProtestant discrimination carried on by nationalist dominated
local councils in the 1960s. 24
The efforts taken by the two church groups

inspired

unionist politicians. John Dunlop, O.U.P. Member of Parliament
for Mid-Ulster, began supporting publicity trips to the U.S.
by victims of I.R.A. attacks. Many unionists felt that if
Americans could hear about the horrors of I.R.A. attacks from
the victims, it would greatly discourage financial support for
Noraid. Partly from this premise, a group called the Loyalist
League of Ulsterwomen (L.L.U.) formed in August of 1981.
In October 1981, two members of the L.L.U. undertook a
tour of the United States to tell Irish-Americans about the
"reality of the armed struggle." Ruby Speer and Kathleen
McCurrie both lost their husbands to I.R.A. assassins. They
traveled extensively throughout the East Coast, describing
their

personal

tragedy

to

public

meetings

and

media

executives. The women also lobbied State Department officials
to plead for .the lifting of the R.u.c. "arms ban" and the
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removal of the tax exempt status of the Irish National Caucus
and Ancient Order of Hibernians. 25
Following this trip,

another group of victims called

"Widows Mite" conducted a similar publicity drive in America.
It consisted of Protestant churchmen and individuals such as
Georgina Gordon, whose husband and young daughter were killed
in an I.R.A. booby trap. They distributed 10,000 copies of a
Widow's Mite Brochure, which listed innumerable examples of
I.R.A. atrocities.u
These tours by Protestant church delegations and widows
groups did not achieve much publicity in America and their
efforts went largely unnoticed. Their limited achievements
only served to increase unionist concern over the success of
republican propaganda. The church leaders and widows contacted
Unionist politicians upon their return and told them of the
difficulty they encountered in trying to make a significant
impact in America. 27
The

difficulty of getting the unionist viewpoint across

was further confirmed by individual politicians who travelled
to the United states at the time. When Harold Mccusker of the
O.U.P. toured the East Coast in October 1981, he reported the
total lack of appreciation for the unionist cause to his
colleagues. He was particularly incensed by the weakness of
B.I.S. efforts to counter the I.R.A. and made a series of
bitter complaints to the Thatcher government. 28
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Unionists became increasingly convinced that the only way
to get their views heard in America was to organize a wellf inanced and sophisticated tour by top politicians. They felt

that if a delegation of Unionist leaders crossed the Atlantic
they could attract attention in the u. s.

,

publicize their

position, and thus destroy the influence of Irish-American
nationalism.
Plans for what would become the most ambitious unionist
initiative in America began in the autumn of 1981. One of the
driving forces behind the scheme was Official Unionist M.P.
Rev.

Robert Bradford.

solidarity

would

He realized that a show of unionist

bring

the

greatest

success.

Bradford

therefore brought together a tour party composed of the most
prominent politicians from the D.U.P. and o.u.P .• It included
John

Taylor,

Parliament,

Official
and

Unionist

Peter

Democratic Unionists.

Robinson,

Member
Deputy

The key figure

of

the

Leader

in this

European
of

the

task force,

however, was Rev. Ian Paisley.
Paisley, the most recognized Ulster unionist politician in
America, was the natural leader of the publicity tour. From
the early 1960s he had made numerous visits to the United
States and established a small network of loyal supporters.
These were mainly Protestant fundamentalists

attracted by

Paisely's fierce condemnation of the ecumenical movement, and
staunch conservatives impressed by his fierce anti-qommunist
rhetoric.
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In the 1960s, one of Paisley's principal associates was
Rev.

Carl Mcintire,

Christian
Jersey.

head of the

Churches

(I.C.C.C.)

The I . c. C. c.

International Council of

based

in

Presbyterians

New

was composed of over one-hundred and

forty Protestant fundamentalist groups,
Free

Collingswood,

were

prominent

of which Paisley's

members.

It

vehemently

attacked the ecumenical movement and condemned all aspects of
"papist influence." Paisley and Mcintire developed a close
friendship and conducted

joint protests against the World

Council of Churches and its movement towards closer relations
with Roman
Soon

Catholicism.~

Mcintire

became

a

regular

speaker

at

Paisley's

political demonstrations in Northern Ireland. At rallies in
Belfast he typically alleged that the N.I.C.R.A. was part of
a "godless communist plot to overthrow western civilization."
Mcintire stressed that

Irish civil

rights

activists were

motivated by the same "evil principles" as Black campaigners
in America. 30
Mcintire also tried to aid the unionist cause in America.
In August 1969, he organized counter demonstrations against
Bernadette Devlin while she was in New York.

The protests

received little publicity and so Mcintire contacted Paisley.
He

convinced

the

Ulster

leader

to

come

to

America

and

challenge Devlin. 31
Despite the fact that Devlin left America before Paisley
arrived, his tour caused controversy from the outset and won
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significant publicity. When he flew into Philadelphia a group
of unionist supporters engaged in a brawl with republicans
waiving an Irish tricolor.

In New York, Mayor John Lindsay

refused Paisley's request for a meeting. The Ulster firebrand
responded by accusing the Mayor of "barefaced discrimination"
and

telling

reports

outside

City

Hall

that,

"the

Roman

Catholic Church is getting closer to communism every day. 1132
The second leading figure in Paisley's American support
network was Bob Jones, another anti-communist and anti-papist.
He was President of Bob Jones University in Greenville, South
Carolina.

The

believed

the

University's
Bible

founder,

ordained

Bob

Jones

separation

of

Sr.,

the

had

races.

Consequently, the university had refused to admit AfricanAmerican students from its founding in 1927. In 1971, B.J.U.
was forced to relax its policies and admit married AfricanAmericans. By 1975 it began admitting single African-Americans
but declared that interracial dating would be punished by
expulsion.

These racial policies complemented the strictly

conservative administration of B. J. u. which prohibited all its
students

from

unsupervised

drinking

association

alcohol,
between

smoking,
members

of

dancing,
the

and

opposite

sex. 33
Bob Jones first met Ian Paisley in 1962 at an anti-World
Council

of

Churches

conference

in

Amsterdam.

The

two

established a strong friendship and Jones invited his new
associate to preach at the annual B.J.U. Bible Conference in
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1964. Paisley so impressed the student and faculty body that
he subsequently

~ade

innumerable gospel tours to Greenville,

and today is a prominent trustee of the University. 3 '
Jones, like Carl Mcintire, began supporting the Ulster
unionist cause. He made frequent trips to Northern Ireland in
the late sixties and seventies to attack republicanism and the
"demonic" influence of catholicism in Ireland. In 1966, Jones
awarded Paisley with an honorary Doctorate of Divinity. The
American preacher was also the key speaker at the opening of
Martyrs Memorial Free Presbyterian Church in 1967. 35
To mark the Bicentennial celebrations of the U.S. in 1976,
Jones and Paisley produced a pro-unionist booklet entitled,
America's

Debt

to

Ulster.

In

the

introduction,

Jones

denigrated Catholic Irish-Americans and asserted that the
Ulster Protestant influence was Ireland's key contribution to
America's greatness. He concluded that if "Ulster's enormous
and vital role in the founding of the great American Republic
is re-told," then Americans would no longer be "blinded" by
the lies of Irish

nationalists.~

In Paisley, Ed Maloney and Andy Pollack show that Jones'
extreme conservatism made him a friend of some of America's
most noted racists and right-wing politicians. He was closely
associated with George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, Lester
Maddox, Governor of Georgia, and Senator storm Thurmond of
South Carolina. Jones awarded honorary degrees to all three
men and introduced them to Paisley's political ideals. Jones
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also had contacts with Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority" and
used this connection to get Paisley an invitation to the
Reagan inauguration in January, 1981. 37
Paisley

used

these

American

contacts

to

establish

a

significant network of supporters in the U.S. and eventually
began

founding

branches of

his

Free

Presbyterian Church.

Maloney and Pollack claim that the first of these churches was
established with Bob Jones' assistance in Greenville. In 1977,
a congregation of Protestant fundamentalists in South Carolina
cont?cted Paisley and asked if he could provide them with a
Free Presbyterian minister. Paisely agreed and sent over Rev.
Alan Cairns, one of his strongest allies.
Rev.

Cairns soon established an extension of the Free

Presbyterian Church's Theological Hall
American

ministers.

He

helped

found

and began training
new

churches

in

Philadelphia and Londonderry, New Hampshire. By the mid-1980s,
graduates

of

the

Theological

Hall

were

building

up

congregations in Florida, Georgia, Arizona and California. 31
With

this

chain of

American

supporters

and

his

long

experience in traveling to the U.S., Paisley was the central
figure

in the proposed unionist publicity tour.

He began

contacting his associates across the Atlantic to organize
speaking venues and build up media attention.
As plans were being finalized for the American venture,
the I.R.A. assassinated Rev. Robert Bradford on November 14,
1981. There is no indication this action was taken to destroy
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the unionist publicity tour, but Irish-American republican
groups strongly supported the killing. An editorial in

~

Irish People said Bradford deserved to die because of his
associations with loyalist paramilitaries and because he had
"prayed for typhoid in the H-Blocks so the prisoners would
suffer

more. " 39

Unionists

received

information

on

this

editorial and were immediately enraged. The remaining members
of the touring party became even more determined to make their
efforts

succeed.~

Much of the publicity and logistical organization of the
unionist tour was conducted by David Burnside of the o.U.P.
and Jim Allister of the D.U.P.

They christened the tour

"Operation U.S.A." and built it into the largest unionist
publicity drive ever devoted to America. Allister and Burnside
printed announcements of Operation U.S.A.

in the unionist

press and appealed for donations. They also organized a number
of fund-raising socials throughout Northern Ireland to support
what they described as "one of the most important unionist
missions in history. 11 ' 1
Al though unionists viewed the assassination of Robert
Bradford as a

serious setback to their American venture,

Burnside and Allister used it to benefit the cause.

They

persuaded Bradford's widow, Nora, to take her husband's place
on the tour. Both felt that she could convey the suffering
caused by her husband's death and therefore show the American
public the horror of I.R.A. murders.
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To complement the testimony of Nora Bradford and the
politicians, organizers of the tour produced 10,000 copies of
a glossy brochure entitled Ulster : The Facts. The book was an
elaborate defense of the unionist position,

aimed at the

American audience. It stressed Ulster's contribution to the
founding of the United States and emphasized the province's
"vital" role in World War II. The authors claimed that while
Ulster fought alongside America and provided an essential
staging ground for D-Day, the Republic of Ireland "helped the
Nazis by remaining neutral." To emphasize this point, the book
contained a photograph of Eamonn de Valera next to one of
Adolf Hitler, obviously offering readers a direct comparison
between the two men.
Ulster : The Facts also outlined the leftist connections
of the I.R.A. and emphasized that its objective was to create
Marxist revolution. There were photographs of secret weapons
allegedly confiscated from the Provisionals with captions
stating:
Money has come from the u. s. to provide arms and
support for the killing of British citizens in
Northern Ireland. Those who contribute such money
are either people of feeble intelligence who have
fallen naively for the lies of Irish republican
propaganda or else - and this is a grave possibility
- they are enemies of the American people, of the
American way of life and of the Western alliance,
who are working as the agents of these alien forces
which want to destroy the standards of civilization
we in the West have created and are prepared to
uphold. 42
The book was intended to capitalize on American anticommunism and aversion to international terrorism. In order to
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grip the reader, it also contained a number of horrific color
photographs of dismembered limbs and charred corpses. These
were alleged to be victims of I.R.A. attacks. The photographs
were so gruesome that they generated publicity in their own
right. At a press conference to launch the book in Belfast,
some

journalists were so sickened they had to leave the

room. 43
David Burnside and Jim Allister arranged for 8,000 copies
of Ulster

The Facts to be transported to America for

distribution by members of the Operation U.S.A. team. They
also

tried

to

prepare

for

the

expected

pro-I .R.A.

demonstrations. Members of the tour were booked into hotels
under assumed names. Unionist organizers also contacted the
American Consul in Belfast to express their concern that
Irish-American republicans might use violence against them.
The Consul General assured the group that they would get full
police protection in every city they visited.''
In order to maximize publicity in America, the unionist
organizing committee
Buttram,
Washington

owner

of

also
a

employed the

public

relations

services
firm

of Jack

working

in

o.c. The Buttram Agency specialized in publicizing

political causes to Congressmen and Senators on Capitol Hill.
Buttram began organizing television and radio appearances for
the Operation U.S.A. team, printed publicity materials, and
arranged public lectures and press conferences. Because of
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these activities, the Agency was forced to register under the
F.A.R.A., as agent of both the D.U.P. and o.U.P •• 45
The organization of Operation U.S.A.

was thus highly

professional and unionist leaders believed it would make a
considerable impact on American opinion. The Buttram Agency
arranged a schedule which would take tour members all over the
United

States

and

give

them

as

much

media

exposure

as

possible. Throughout late November 1981, David Burnside also
tried to contact Ronald Reagan and Alexander Haig to arrange
discussions with the Operation U.S.A. team.
The optimism of unionist organizers, however, was severely
shaken by a series of adverse developments which seriously
damaged their initiative. When Ulster-The Facts was released,
it was immediately attacked by nationalists in Ireland. They
took exception to its historical analysis which claimed the
Easter Rising was "essentially a pro-German rebellion" and its
association of Hitler with de Valera. Though unionists had
expected these criticisms, they were not prepared for the
'
equally
strong attacks in the British press. A number of

leading

newspapers

ridiculed

the

unionist

booklet

as

"simplistic" and "historically inaccurate." The Guardian, in
particular, condemned the book's allegation that the Irish
government was assisting the I .R.A •• The newspaper pointed out
the

long

series

of

Garda

raids

on

arms

dumps

and

the

continuous prosecutions under the Special Criminal Court in
Dublin. 46
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More

damaging

s.o.L.P.'s

than

discovery

these

that

one

attacks,
of

the

however,
book's

was

the

gruesome

photographs was not what it was claimed to be. The photograph
showed a mangled victim and was entitled, "The Decomposed Body
of an I.R.A. Victim Found by an R.U.C. Search Party." Michael
Canavan,

S.D.L.P. spokesman for Law and Order, disputed this

claim and pointed out that the photograph was of Sam Miller,
a victim of loyalist assassins. 47
Unionists originally disputed Canavan's allegation, but
after conducting research, David Burnside admitted that the
booklet was in error. This acknowledgement caused considerable
embarrassment to the Operation U.S.A. team.

Irish-American

republicans later used the mistake to denigrate the unionists
during press conferences in the United States. 48
The damage done to Operation U.S.A.

by this adverse

publicity was slight compared to the action taken by both
republican and constitutional nationalists in America. The
Irish National caucus had closely monitored the development of
the unionist initiative and received information on the tour
schedule organized by the Jack Buttram Agency.

Fr.

Sean

McManus fully realized that Ian Paisley was the key figure in
the publicity initiative and so he began investigating ways to
wreck the initiative. On December 2, 1981, he began a lobbying
campaign in Washington aimed at removing Paisley's American
visa. He wrote to Secretary of State Alexander Haig alleging
that Paisley would be a disruptive influence in the United
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states. Later, on December 14, McManus encouraged one hundred
members of the Ad Hoc Committee to send a telegram to Haig
endorsing this claim and requesting the State Department to
deny a visa to Paisley. 49
Members of the Friends of Ireland were also alarmed at the
prospect of Paisley leading a major unionist publicity tour.
They were particularly incensed by his strong opposition to
the Anglo-Irish Summits and by his formation of the Third
Force

a

new

loyalist

parliamentary organization whose

purpose was to defend Protestants from I.R.A. attacks. 50
On December 8, 1981, Daniel Moynihan, Tip O'Neill and Ted
Kennedy wrote to Alexander Haig and requested the removal of
Paisely's visa
religious

"in

hatred

in

light of his
Northern

appeals

Ireland,

his

to bigotry and
long standing

tactics of intimidation and oppression, and his thinly-veiled
exhortations to sectarian violence." on December 11, a group
of nineteen Senators, including Robert Dole, Joseph Biden and
even Jesse Helms, backed this request and informed Alexander
Haig that "Paisley has consistently expressed the gospel of
bloodshed in leading mob demonstrations through Roman Catholic
areas of Belfast."M
When Paisley heard of this campaign in Washington, he held
a

press

conference

in

which

he

casually

dismissed

the

possibility his critics might succeed. He told reporters that
he had traveled to the United States over fifty times in the
1970s without any trouble. Paisley further stated that there
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was no way the government could exclude both a Member of
parliament and a·Member of the European Parliament. He claimed
The Friends of Ireland were;
dead scared at the success of my campaign against
the Anglo-Irish Summit and the harm I'm doing their
united Ireland cause. Evidently, the united Ireland
men in the U.S. are afraid. They don't want the
Unionist case to be made. The truth is going to hurt
them too much ! 52
Paisley failed to appreciate the influence of The Friends
of Ireland and was shocked to learn that on December 13, the
state

Department

announced

it

was

reviewing

his

visa.

Government officials issued a rather unconvincing statement
which claimed their review had started before the pressure
from

Congress.

Following

this

re-assessment,

the

State

Department announced on December 21 that it would revoke
Paisley's visa because his presence "would be prejudicial to
the American public interest. 1153
The visa denial caused immediate controversy on both sides
of the Atlantic. Paisley violently denounced the decision and
claimed it was taken because of the "anti-Ulster bigotry" of
the

Reagan

administr~tion.

He

pointed

out

that

Deputy

Secretary of State William Clark was a member of the Ancient
Order of Hibernians,

and that Alexander Haig was a

Roman

Catholic. Paisley claimed that these facts naturally inclined
the two officials towards Irish nationalism. 54
Paisley also organized protest demonstrations outside the
U.S. Consulate in Belfast and its staff reported receiving a
series of threatening phone calls . 55 He also contacted his
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supporters in America and urged them to protest the visa
denial.

Bob

campaign to

Jones

began

Senators

orchestrating

and Congressmen

a

letter-writing

appealing

for

help.

Typical of these was a telegram from Rod Bell, President of
the

Fundamentalist

Baptist

Fellowship

of

America,

to

Congressman William Whitehurst. It stated:
His character is impeccable, the salt of the earth
in his country. Americans will not stand for people
like O'Neill and Kennedy to spread slanderous
attacks against a man like Dr. Paisley. It will
cause every Protestant and Baptist in the U.S. who
loves freedom to rise up in vigorous protest. Dr.
Paisley has hundreds of thousands of friends in the
U.S. who will not stand for such Roman catholic
bigotry. 56
In Britain, the press reaction was generally critical of
the

State

Department's

action.

A

number

of

newspapers

suggested the visa denial would make Paisley a martyr and
increase his support among militant unionists. 57 In America,
the press reaction against the state Department was much
stronger. Many newspapers viewed the denial of Paisley's visa
as an attack on the principle of free speech and freedom of
information. The Washington pgst described the government's
action

as

demanded

"shameful"
that,

while The Christian Science Monitor

"Ulster's

voice

should

be

heard! 1151

editorial in The r.os Angeles Times commented:
The American people would have been able to make up
their own minds about Paisley's extremism. Revoking
his visa is a form of extremism itself and not
worthy of our country •.. such actions by the State
Department tend to harm American traditions more
than they hurt objectionable characters ·like
Paisley. 59

An
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While the American press supported Ian Paisley's right to
visit the U. s. , almost every editorial also condemned his
political

views.

Any

benefit

Paisley

received

from

the

publicity surrounding the visa denial was far outweighed by
the attacks which were launched against him. He was described
as an "arch bigot" and one of the primary causes of sectarian
strife in Ulster. Political commentaries generally reflected
the opinion offered later by Mike Barnacle of The Boston
Globe:
Paisley is a howling bigot who gets his kicks out.of
hating Roman Catholics ••• He has done everything a man
could do to keep the fires of hate bright and burning
in Ulster. He is a cynical, ignorant, manipulative,
publicity seeking rabble rouser. 60
These severe denunciations had an adverse effect on Ulster
unionism.

They

failed

to

distinguish

between

Paisley's

extremist views and those of moderate unionists. Consequently,
Americans

were

given

the

impression

that

all

Ulster

Protestants were intransigent and narrow minded in their
refusal

to

contemplate

a

political

agreement

with

nationalists.
Among Irish-American activists there was considerable
divergence of opinion over the visa issue. Noraid adopted the
unlikely position of supporting Paisley. This was primarily
because the group wanted all restrictions lifted so that
prominent Irish republicans could come to America. Leading
Irish-American republicans, such as Frank Durkan, wrote to
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Alexander Haig appealing for a reinstatement of Paisley's visa
because;
Stifling discussion on such a topical matter as
Northern Ireland can only lead to frustration and
encourage violence. In a situation where dialogue
and expression of opinion are vital in order to
clear the air, the suppression of any viewpoint,
whether nationalist or Unionist, serves only to
exacerbate the situation."
In

Ireland,

John

Hume

opposed the

State Department's

decision but this did not change the strong opposition to
Paisley from The Friends of Ireland. The Irish National Caucus
and Ad Hoc Committee, while supporting visas for republicans,
were not prepared to acknowledge a similar right to Paisley.
The Irish Echo summarized the feelings of both groups in an
editorial which stated:
Paisley insults every American Roman Catholic
virtually every time he opens his mouth. . . Like
Kohmeini, Paisley uses religion as an object of hate
not love. The Irish-American community simply can
not tolerate this fascist bigot's easy access to our
beloved nation. 62
The organizers of Operation U.S.A.

realized Paisley's

absence from the tour would greatly diminish its impact. They
devised a plan to get permission for Paisley to at least visit
New York.

On January

6,

1982,

Paisley re-applied

for

an

American visa and stated that he wanted to address the United
Nations. He hoped that if he promised to stay within a four
mile radius of the U.N. building, the U.S. government would be
forced

to

grant

him

admittance.

This

is

how

"unwelcome"

political figures, such as Fidel Castro, are able to visit the
United States without a visa.
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The Reagan administration, however, refused to alter its
position.

Staff members at the U.S.

Consulate in Belfast

considered Paisley's renewed visa application but turned it
down. They pointed out that the D.U.P. leader was unable to
show that he had been invited to address the United Nations.
To enforce this decision, the U.S. Embassy in London sent a
telegram to all trans-Atlantic airlines informing them that
Paisely's visa was void. It warned the airlines that if they
carried him to America they would be subject to a hefty
fine. 63
When

unionists

realized

that

Paisley

would

not

be

permitted to enter the United States, they re-assessed their
planned itinerary and tried to make the best of the situation.
They contacted supporters in Toronto and arranged for Paisley
to visit Canada instead.

Eileen Paisley took the vacant

position on the American tour and brought tape recordings of
speeches her husband had intended to deliver.
On January 16, 1982, the Operation U.S.A. team flew out of
Belfast for their various destinations. Despite the group's
optimism,

the

tour

was

a

publicity

disaster

from

the

beginning. Nora Bradford, Eileen Paisley, John Taylor, and
Peter Robinson intended to begin their campaign with rousing
speeches at the National Press Club in Washington. Without the
presence of Ian Paisley, however, the media showed little
interest. Not one American television network

appeare~

at the

Press Club to record Eileen Paisley reading out her husband's
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speech.

The

few

journalists who did attend condemned the

unionist delegation for

spreading Paisley's

"bigotry"

and

"deep derangement. 1164
Following the press conference in Washington, the group
split up. Nora Bradford and Eileen Paisley went south to make
appearances in Birmingham and Atlanta. The climax of their
trip came at a rally in Greenville where the women played a
recorded

message

from

Paisley

to

a

group

in

Bob

Jones

University. Peter Robinson made a number of public appearances
in

California

while

John

Taylor

toured

the

Mid-West

and

Boston.
The scant publicity the four managed to attract was mostly
negative. While Peter Robinson was speaking in San Francisco,
someone telephoned a

bomb threat and the hall had to be

evacuated. 65 When the four met up again in New York,
signed

into the Empire Hotel under assumed names.

discovered

their

whereabouts,

however,

and

they

Noraid

groups

of

republicans picketed the hotel chanting pro-I .R.A. slogans and
derogatory remarks about Rev. Robert Bradford. After these
demonstrations, the F.B.I. arrested a man in Brooklyn who had
a sub-machine gun and was alleged to be a contract killer
hired to assassinate Peter Robinson. 66
The Operation U.S.A. tour also suffered negative publicity
because of its close association with Bob Jones. On January 9,
1982,

the

Reagan

administration

announced

that

it

would

reinstate the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University. Its
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tax-exempt

status

had

been

removed

in

1976

because

the

government declared the admission policy towards AfricanAmericans was discriminatory. Reagan's decision to lift the
ban received widespread condemnation in America and newspapers
carried articles attacking the "racism" practiced at B.J.U ••
As the unionists tour group had strong contacts with Bob
Jones,

their image was also depreciated in this wave of

negative publicity. 67
Jones created more bad publicity for Ulster Unionism with
his attacks on the State Department's refusal to grant Paisley
a visa. In March 1982, Paisley re-applied for permission to
attend the annual Bible conference at Bob Jones University.
The State Department again denied a visa. This prompted Jones
to launch a severe personal attack on Alexander Haig. Before
7,000 students at the Bible conference, Jones described the
Secretary of state as a "Roman Catholic bigot" and "a monster
in human flesh and a demon possessed instrument to destroy
America." He asked his students to pray that "the Lord will
smite him, hip and thigh, bone and marrow, heart and lungs,
and all there is to him, and he shall destroy him quickly and
utterly. 1168
Jones' attack caused a wave of publicity in the United
States and initiated a series of criticisms in the media. A
number of editorials described his views as "despicable" and
"ignorant."

Commentators

writing

on

the

statement

also
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attacked

Ian

Paisley

and

criticized

similar

unionist

"intolerance" towards Catholics in Northern Ireland. 69
Perhaps

the

worst

consequence

to

unionists

of

the

operation U.S.A. tour was that it actually enabled republicans
to stage their own publicity drive. When the D.U.P. and O.U.P.
first announced their American initiative, Sinn Fein said it
would send Danny Morrison and Owen Carron M.P. across the
Atlantic to disrupt the group. Carron and Morrison applied for
visas but,

like Paisley, they were refused. Undeterred by

this, both men promised they would ignore the visa denial and
enter the United States illegally.
On January 17, 1982 , Carron and Morrison flew to Canada
to

challenge

Ian

Paisley's

activities

in

Toronto.

They

obtained copies of his schedule and organized protests. The
two Sinn Fein leaders worked alongside members of Toronto's
Irish Prisoners of War Committee and effectively demonstrated
against every public appearance of the D.U.P. leader.
Danny Morrison addressed a crowd of republicans outside a
Free Presbyterian Church in which Paisley was preaching. They
chanted pro-I .R.A. slogans in an attempt to drown out the
sermon.

Morrison

and

Carron

also

disrupted

the official

launching of Ulster : The Facts at a press conference in the
Royal York Hotel, Toronto. Through such activities, the two
Sinn Fein leaders deflected attention away from Paisley,
challenged his

political

statements,

and attracted media

exposure for the republican perspective. Partly due to their
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efforts, The Toronto Star, Canada's largest daily newspaper,
refused to report on Paisley's tour. 70
After the campaign against Paisley, Carron and Morrison
decided to enter the United States to challenge the other four
Unionists and attend the annual Noraid dinner in New York. The
U. s. Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, had been
monitoring illegal crossings by republican from Canada for
months.

They were

alerted

about

Carron

and Morrison

and

arrested the two men when they presented false passports to
authorities in Buffalo.
The

two

Sinn

Fein

leaders

were

held

in

Erie

State

penitentiary. They immediately used the opportunity to exploit
the propaganda potential.

Both went on a blanket protest,

refusing to wear prison clothes,
strike

if

they

were

not

allowed

and threatened a
to

contact

hunger

republican

supporters in New York. Morrison and Carron also refused legal
assistance so they could deliver fiery republican speeches at
their

arraignment.

These

efforts

produced

the

intended

results, as the incident was reported on C.B.S. Evening News
and in the major American newspapers. One observer reported
that

in

Buffalo

the

affair

"was

played

as

the

biggest

international story since acid rain." 71
Initially,

U.S.

officials

filed

felony

charges

threatened to hold Carron and Morrison without bail.
infuriated

Irish-American

republicans

who

and
This

immediately

encouraged Mario Biaggi to pressure the I.N.S •• Eventually,
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federal prosecutors decided to indict the two men on criminal
charges. Noraid posted bail and the Sinn Fein leaders returned
to Ireland in late January, pending trial.
Their trial was initially set for March of 1982, but
because of a series of delays, was not held until October of
1983. Carron and Morrison again milked maximum publicity from

their situation. They claimed they did not have the finances
to attend the trial and so the U.S. government was obliged to
pay for their first class tickets to America. This was an
intense embarrassment for a government which had maintained a
strict ban on republicans entering the country from the early
1970s.

When Carron and Morrison arrived in New York they were
released pending jury selection. Both men immediately began a
circuit of public lectures and news conferences at which they
defended

the

I.R.A.'s

campaign

and

attacked

the

state

Department's visa policy. They were .handed yet another great
publicity opportunity when James

Prior,

Northern

Ireland

Secretary of state, arrived in America to conduct a British
information campaign in Washington and other major cities.
Carron

and

Morrison

followed

Prior

around

the

country,

appearing unexpectedly at his press conferences to directly
attack

British

policy.

Their

confrontations

were

widely

reported in Ireland. Prior later admitted the two Sinn Fein
leaders caused him extreme annoyance and embarrassment in
America. 72
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When Carron and Morrison were eventually brought to trial,
they used the event to issue an extensive defense of Irish
republicanism from the dock. They were ultimately convicted of
attempting to enter the United States illegally, though were
sentenced to a mere one year period of unsupervised probation.
The case concluded in controversy when Judge John Curtin
congratulated the two defendants for their dignified conduct
throughout the trial, praised their moving testimony about
events in Ireland, and implied that the American government's
visa policy was in error. Republicans in America rejoiced at
the court decision

and

sarcastically thanked the

Reagan

administration for allowing Carron and Morrison to win this
important publicity victory at U.S. government expense. 73
The

failure

of

Operation

U.S.A.

and

the

subsequent

publicity victory of Carron and Morrison enraged unionist
leaders. When the tour members returned to Northern Ireland,
they told reporters their trip was a great success. Privately,
however, they admitted the failure of their mission. John
Taylor,

in particular, was extremely discouraged over the

inability to get the unionist view across to the American
media. He complained about the "all pervasive influence" of
Irish nationalists and the inherent bias against unionists
among U.S. politicians and government officials. 7 '
Unionists were deeply frustrated, having devoted so much
effort to
nothing

the Operation U.S.A.

except

providing

initiative yet

republicans

with

a

achieving
propaganda
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victory.
issuing

Perhaps out of this frustration,
unusually

severe

condemnations

unionists began
of

the

American

dimension to the Ulster conflict. James Molyneaux, leader of
the O.U.P., presented the strongest of these in March of 1982.
He held a news conference at which he suggested the C.I.A.
were operating in Ulster, trying to achieve a united Ireland.
Molyneaux
involved

also
in

implied

the

that

the

assassinations

C.I.A.
of

might

Airey

have

Neave,

been

Robert

Bradford, and Lord Louis Mountbatten. 75
It seems Molyneaux was motivated more by disappointment
after the Operation U.S.A. tour than by conviction. He never
produced

evidence

to

support

his

allegations

and

was

criticized by the American Embassy in London, which described
his statement as "unworthy of comment." Even some members of
the O.U.P. criticized Molyneaux and The Belfast Telegraph told
him to stop "talking in riddles," to "produce hard evidence,"
or "withdraw the allegations! 1176
The final aspect of Operation U.S.A. which frustrated the
participants was their inability to strengthen the unionist
support network in America. One of the main objectives had
been to encourage greater effort from the various groups and
individuals promoting the unionist cause. While in California,
Peter · Robinson

claimed

that

his

public

appearances

were

extremely successful and that he was "deluged with calls and
messages of support from Ulster exiles telling me to keep up
the

good

work. "

Robinson

said

that

because

of

this
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enthusiastic response he was

forming new unionist support

organizations called "The Friends of

Ulster."~

Despite Robinson's lofty claims, only a handful of people
followed

up on

their

promise

and

formed

the

"Friends of

Northern Ireland" in San Francisco. The group consisted of
only ten to fifteen

Ulster exiles.

Its

initial publicity

materials focused on attacking the I.R.A. by exploiting the
American

fascination

with

the

English

Royal

Family.

One

publicity brochure stated:
There is no honest man in the English speaking world
who would speak ill of the Queen's integrity or her
conscientious attempts to maintain peace ••• It is
natural that the I.R.A. should oppose her because,
just as the Royal Family signifies the best in an
orderly and civilized society, the Provisionals
represent the ultimate in Marxist revolutionary
disorder. 78
The Friends of Northern

Ireland tried to monitor the

activities of Noraid in the Bay Area and sent information back
to Peter Robinson. They also worked unsuccessfully to present
the unionist case to local Congressmen. Their enthusiasm soon
waned, however, and by mid-1983 the group disintegrated and
ceased to function.
There were also some unionist groups that formed in the
early 1980s by their own initiative and not out of inspiration
from Operation U.S.A •• Again, however, they remained generally
ineffective

and

collapsed

from

lack

of

interest.

David

McCalden formed one such organization, the Ulster American
Heritage Foundation (U.A.H.F.) in 1981. McCalden was born in
Belfast in 1951 but moved to California in 1978.

He was
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indignant at the publicity success republicans had achieved in
America because of the hunger strikes and decided to establish
the

U.A.H.F.

to

counteract

I.R.A.

propaganda.

He

began

producing a quarterly newspaper called the Ulster American
Newsletter,

which

described

the

group's

activities

and

defended unionism. The group was very small consisting of only
about ten activists. All the organizational work was conducted
by McCalden and Peter Peel, a history teacher at Santa Monica

College. Peel had the distinction of being the great-great
grandson of the founder of the British police force,

Sir

Robert Peel • 79
McCalden
history

by

tried

to

organizing

encourage
exhibits

interest
at

his

in

Scotch-Irish

local

library

in

Manhattan Beach. These displays featured biographies of the
American Presidents of Ulster dissent, music by Van Morrison
and James Galway, and free samples of Bushmills whiskey. 80 He
also conducted a campaign against the flying of the Irish
tricolor

outside

the

Alamo

in

San

Antonio,

Texas.

He

unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Daughters of the Republic
of Texas,

who were in charge of raising national emblems

outside the mission, that because Davy Crockett and Jim Bowie
were Scotch-Irish, an Ulster flag should be raised in their
honor. 81
The

U.A.H.F.

republicans

at

tried
every

to

counteract

feasible

Irish-American

opportunity.

McCalden

participated in television and radio debates with Noraid' s
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Martin Galvin and wrote pro-unionist articles to the press. He
attended public debates on Northern Ireland organized by San
Francisco's

Irish

Forum,

and

later

lambasted

republican

"yahoos" for getting drunk and pelting his table with dinner
rolls. 82 When hundreds of Noraid supporters in Los Angeles
demonstrated against a visit by Queen Elizabeth in 1983,
McCalden and Peel organized their own two man counter protest.
They braved republican obscenities and hails of saliva to
parade outside the British Consulate carrying the Union Jack
and Ulster Flag. 83
McCalden valiantly continued his activities until 1987,
when he stopped publishing the Ulster-American Newsletter
because

the

organization could

not

afford the

quarterly

production costs of fifty dollars. The U.A.H.F. never built
formal links with any of the unionist parties in Northern
Ireland,

but did

assist

in

organizing the

itinerary of

politicians visiting the West Coast. Some unionists suspected
McCalden of having contacts with white supremacist groups.
They therefore tried to avoid him, heeding the warning of
Harold Mccusker that "our image in the United States is bad
enough without having to contend with charges of supporting
anti-Black and anti-Semitic racism.""
The only other unionist group which formed in this period
was the American Aid to Ulster (A.A.U.) in Philadelphia. The
A.A.U. was led by Annette Ravinsky, an Italian-American Jew.
She claimed she was motivated by the I.R.A. 's support o·f the
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P.L.O. and the similarities between Ulster Loyalists and Jews
in Israel. She regularly contributed articles to the U.D.A.
newspaper, Ulster, in which she warned Protestants to take up
arms against the I.R.A. or else they would be "butchered like
they were in 1641" and become "the Vietnamese boat people of
Western Europe. nss
In 1982 Ravinsky and some of her companions visited
Northern Ireland for the Twelfth of July parades. She met with
u.o.A. leaders and promised to help raise money for loyalist
prisoners and challenge republican supporters in Pennsylvania.
During the Philadelphia st. Patrick's Day Parade in 1983 I
which honored Bobby Sands, she plastered the route with antiI.R.A. stickers. When the Noraid delegation passed her group,
they

booed

Murders!

1186

and

hissed

and

chanted,

"Bloody

Communist

Ravinsky maintained her activities until 1985 but

again, like David McCalden, lost enthusiasm for her gargantuan
task and quit.
The ineffectiveness and quixotic nature of these groups
served only to increase unionist frustration and paranoia over
the failure of Operation U.S.A •• They faced a situation in
which the I.R.A. was getting important support in America.
Unionists could do nothing about this and were again. forced to
rely on the "incompetent" British Information Service to
counteract Irish-American republicanism.

Consequently,

the

American dimension to the Ulster conflict contributed to the
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unionist sense of being an embattled community and accentuated
their tendency towards political intransigence.
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Chapter 9
The Rejuvenation of Irish-American Republicanism Atter
the Hunger Strike. 1981-1985.

The failure of Operation U.S.A. greatly encouraged IrishAmerican

republicans.

Noraid

lampooned

the

"incompetent"

attempts of the unionist tour group to attract positive media
coverage. It claimed that republican demonstrations in New
York "hounded the Orangemen back to the North with their tails
between their legs." 1 Noraid also successfully exploited the
publicity generated by Danny Morrison and Owen Carron. The
group used the trial of the two Sinn Fein leaders to embarrass
the State Department over its visa denial policy.
The Carron/Morrison case and the collapse of Operation
U.S.A. were just some of the positive developments for IrishAmerican

republicanism

in the

post-hunger strike period.

Noraid and a variety of similar republican groups maintained
the high level of activism they achieved during the prison
protest. The sacrifice of ten hunger strikers in the H-Blocks
inspired these groups and contributed to a rejuvenation in
Irish-American republicanism.
The hunger strike produced a similar renaissance in the
republican movement in Ireland. When the fast was called off
on October 3, 1981, the British government responded with some
436
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conciliatory provisions allowing the prisoners to wear their
own clothes and restoring half of their lost remission. These
concessions fell well short of the hunger strikers' original
demands and seemed a meager reward for the lives of ten men.
Yet, the prison protests brought a dramatic improvement in the
fortunes of Sinn Fein and re-established the I.R.A.'s heroic
standing among segments of the nationalist community.

As

Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie point out;
It was an irony of the episode that it began with
the government attempting to impose on the
prisoners the status of criminals and ended with
the I.R.A. restoring their credentials among
sections of the catholic community as freedom
fighters. 2
The

most

visible

sign

of

the

renewed

support

for

republicanism came with the election victories of Bobby Sands
and Owen Carron in Fermanagh/South Tyrone. These successes
encouraged a movement within Sinn Fein to end the traditional
policy of political abstention. The shift culminated at the
1981 Ard Fheis when delegates overwhelmingly endorsed the
contesting of elections and embarked on the policy of uniting
Ireland "with a ballot paper in one hand and an armalite in
the other. tt3
The first opportunity to discover whether Sinn Fein's
support would decline without the sustaining emotional charge
provided by the hunger strikes occurred in October 1982 with
the elections to a new regional Assembly. British Secretary of
State, James Prior, launched this new political initiative,
designed to secure a measure of self government in Ulster.
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Sinn Fein contested the election but said its candidates would
refuse to take their seats if elected. The party orchestrated
a campaign based on traditional republicanism and on the
party's increased community work in the nationalist ghettos.
The results were a triumph for Gerry Adams and all those
who supported the new republican strategy. Sinn Fein won five
of the seventy-eight seats and took 10.1% (64,191) of the
first preference votes. This was an advance of 2.5% on the
anti-H-Block vote in the 1981 local elections.

Even more

satisfying, in view of Adam's ultimate desire to present Sinn
Fein as the voice of northern nationalists, their success was
achieved at the expense of the s.o.L.P ••
Sinn Fein' s

success was further consolidated in the

general elections for Westminster in 1983. The party's share
of the vote increased from 3.3% to 13.4% (102,601) while the
S.D.L.P. total dropped by one percent to 17 .9% (137 ,012).
Gerry Adams was elected M.P. for west Belfast, defeating a
S.D.L.P. candidate and Gerry Fitt, who ran as an independent.
Between 1983-85, a number of political analysts felt that Sinn
Fein was

destined to displace the

S.D.L.P.

as

the main

nationalist political party in Ulster.'
The electoral success of Sinn Fein complemented the
rejuvenation of Irish-American republicanism. Noraid used the
republican vote to support its contention that the I.R.A. was
not an isolated band of terrorists. It continually publicized
and exploited Sinn Fein victories to claim that the Provo
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campaign was a legitimate war of national liberation which had
the

support

of _ a

substantial

section

of

the

nationalist

community.
Noraid reacted to the rise of Sinn Fein by redoubling its
own publicity and fund-raising activities. The group continued
the high level of activism it achieved during the hunger
strikes and consolidated its increased levels of support.
Michael
prison

Flannery and Martin Galvin both claimed that the
protest

touched

a

nerve

of

ethnic

identity

among

previously uncommitted Irish-Americans. They alleged that many
young

Irish-Americans

were

inspired

by

the

prisoners'

sacrifice. Consequently, Galvin claimed that by the end of
1981 the number of American born members of Noraid exceeded
those of Irish origin. 5
Noraid further benefitted from the increase in Irish
immigration to the United States in the early 1980s.

The

weakness of the Irish economy forced larger numbers of young
people to enter America illegally in search of employment.
While most of these new immigrants were solely concerned with
surviving financially and did not get involved with IrishAmerican political groups, some were immediately attracted by
Noraid. 6 Their involvement arose from a variety of factors.
Some

were

bitter

at

the

Irish government's

inability

to

provide them with employment. They could readily identify with
Noraid's bitter attacks against the political leaders in the
twenty-six counties. Others got involved with Irish-American
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republicanism simply because the social events were "lively,
entertaining, and offered the opportunity of meeting fellow
Irish people. •17
A significant number of new Irish immigrants worked in
England before they came to America. Some claimed that this
experience led to their involvement with Noraid. They felt
that some English people regarded the

Irish as

"ignorant

navies." This attitude contrasted sharply to their experience
in America where being Irish was an asset. One immigrant from
Cork, now living in the Bronx, recalls;
I was in London for three years. After my first
month an I.R.A. bomb went off. I knew nothing about
it, I'd never been interested in politics, but at
my local newsagent, where I bought a paper every
morning, the owner asked me not to come into his
shop again. After that I felt everyone suspected me
just because I was Irish. 8
An

important

rejuvenation

of

element

in

Irish-American

the

post-hunger

republicanism

strike

was

the

radicalization of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. With around
80,000 members, the A.O.H. was the largest Irish organization
in the

United States. In the 1970s, it had adopted a strong

nationalist political perspective but its leadership generally
withheld

full

endorsement of

condemned I. R. A.
hunger

strikes,

condemnations
support

to

of
the

the

republican position and

actions on several occasions.
however,
the

British

prisoners.

the

A.O.H.

government
This

During the

issued
and

growing

gave

fierce
strong

militancy

was
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consolidated in 1982 with the election of Joseph Roche as
President of the organization.
Roche believed in the ideals of Irish republicanism and
used his Presidency to endorse Sinn Fein's political program.
He continually condemned the "brutality" of the British Army
in Ulster and supported the I.R.A's right of armed resistance.
Roche also encouraged a stronger republican editorial line in
the A.O.H. newspaper, National Hibernian Digest, and forged
closer ties between his organization and Noraid. 9
In January 1983, Roche attended as guest of honor at the
annual

Noraid

dinner

aqainst

the

appeal

of

the

Irish

government not to go. He warmly applauded speeches by Seamus
Gibney and Martha McClelland of Sinn Fein praising the I.R.A ••
When Roche spoke he congratulated Noraid for "all the works of
mercy that you perform for the prisoners and their families"
and told Michael Flannery he had attended the dinner because
"I believe that forty percent of A.O.H. members are members of
Irish Northern Aid and I am here to represent their views. 1110
Roche

also made

frequent

trips

to

Ireland

to

hold

consultations with Sinn Fein leaders. In February, 1984, he
led an A.O.H. delegation to meet with and honor the families
of the dead hunger strikers. While in Belfast, he invited
Gerry Adams to speak at the A.O.H. national convention in
Albany, New York. Adams accepted but was refused a visa to
enter the United States. Roche was furious at this denial and
became determined to out-maneuver the government. He organized
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an amplified telephone link-up between Belfast and Albany
through which Adams was able to address the A.O.H. delegates.
The

Sinn

Fein

President

gave

convention

delegates

the

following compliment:
We in Ireland are familiar with the great work of
the Ancient Order of Hibernians in support of Irish
national freedom.
We are grateful for your
financial contributions to An Cumman Carbrach and
Green Cross; for your close cooperation with Irish
Northern Aid; and for the invaluable efforts of
President Joseph Roche. 11
The efforts of Roche and the A.O.H. were complemented by
various other republican groups which had greatly expanded
their activities during the hunger strikes. These groups had
previously been overshadowed by Noraid, but raised their level
of activity to unprecedented heights during and after the HBlock campaign. The American Irish Congress, for example, had
worked for the republican cause in Long Island and New Jersey
from the beginning of the troubles. Its activities greatly
increased

in

chapters,

paid

the

early

for

eighties

anti-British

as

it

established

advertisements

on

new
local

television and radio, and published a monthly newsletter which
it distributed to all politicians in the New York area. 12
Previously dormant chapters of Clan na Gael reemerged and
conducted enthusiastic publicity campaigns. In Toledo, Ohio,
Dr.

Seamus

Mettress

revitalized

the

Clan

and

organized

demonstrations against British officials throughout the midwest. He also ran Irish cultural awareness forums, collected
funds for An Cumman Carbrach, and pressured the Toledo media
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to include the republican perspective in its reports on events
in Ireland. 13
One

of

the

most

colorful

organizations

to

achieve

prominence in this period was the American Irish Republican
Army (A.I.R.A.). The group was formed in 1946, and since then
had

worked

continuously

for

the

republican

cause.

Its

President, Colonel P. G. Duffy, claimed he participated in
r.R.A. raids during the Border Campaign between 1956-62. He
also took great pride in his inclusion in Ripley's Believe it
or Not because of the great number of occupations he had
pursued. These ranged from a shark fisherman to body guard for
Bing

Crosby.

conservatism,

Duffy
a

point

was

also

reflected

noted

for

by

A.I.R.A.

his

extreme

membership

applications which emphasized ·"All are welcome regardless of
race, sex or creed. No Communists!" 14
After the hunger strikes, the A.I.R.A. began a sustained
campaign to distribute its newspaper,

The Shillelagh,

to

Irish-Americans throughout the United States. The newspaper
ran militant editorials which warmly welcomed Provisional
I.R.A. bombing attacks on the English mainland and called for
a final violent uprising to drive the British out of Ireland.
The group raised funds for An cumman Carbrach by selling green
bomber jackets with the A.I.R.A. logo printed on the back and
auctioned oil paintings of Bobby Sands. 15
There were also a number of new republican groups which
formed specifically in response to the hunger strike. One of
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these

was

the

Irish-American

Fenian

Society

(I.A.F.S.),

founded in New Jersey in 1982. The I.A.F.S. soon established
chapters

in

New

York,

California,

Connecticut

and

Massachusetts. It hosted public lectures by members of Sinn
Fein who were able to bypass the State Department's visa
policy. The group also produced a weekly cable television news
program which gave the republican perspective on events in
Northern Ireland. 16
The "Fenian Society" introduced novel ways to raise cash
for Ireland.

It began promoting an Irish-American Book of

Freedom. For a donation of $300, patrons could have their
photographs mounted in the book accompanied by a nationalist
poem of

their choice.

The

I.A.F.S.

also

auctioned

Prisoner of War bracelets with the name of a
engraved

on

it.

The

bracelets

were

Irish

republican

accompanied

with

a

certificate which stated:
By promising to wear this bracelet until the
prisoner is released, you are pledging your support
not only to the prisoner, but to their family and
all those who are fighting for the freedom of
Ireland. 17
The rejuvenation of the republican support network in
America

alarmed

Diplomats

based

both
in

the

British

Washington

and

Irish

encouraged

governments.
the

Reagan

administration to intensify its actions against republican
activities. From the beginning of the hunger strikes and into
the mid-eighties,

U. s.

law enforcement agencies tightened

their pressure on Noraid and launched a

renewed campaign
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against I.R.A. gunrunning. The increased efforts of the U.S.
government did achieve a number of successes which hurt IrishAmerican

republicanism.

failures

which

had

There

the

were,

unintended

however,
effect

some

of

noted

inspiring

republicans and producing major publicity victories.
The

most

noted

republican

victory

over

the

U.S.

government came in November, 1982, after the trial of five men
who were caught red handed sending weapons to the I.R.A •• The
five men included Noraid leader Michael Flannery and top
I.R.A. gunrunner, George Harrison. The Justice Department felt
that their inevitable conviction would be a great blow to
Irish-American republicanism. Instead, Noraid and the other
support groups received a tremendous publicity victory when
the men were acquitted by a federal court in Brooklyn.
The case originated in April 1976 when a British Army
patrol discovered a Finnish made Valmet rifle in the Ardoyne
area of Belfast.

Chris Ryder claims that the weapon was

analyzed by R.U.C. forensic experts who determined it had been
shipped from America. They gave its serial number to agents of
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms who then
traced the weapon to George De Meo -- the key arms supplier in
George Harrison's network. 18
In June 1980, De Meo was tried in North Carolina and
convicted of illegal arms trafficking to Ireland. He received
ten years imprisonment and a fine of $9,000. De Meo,

~reading

such a jail term, began negotiating with the F.B.I •• He told
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agents he would help them smash the Harrison network in
exchange for a reduced sentence. Bureau officials promised De
Meo that if he participated in their undercover operation his
sentence would be reduced to two years. They also promised
that his

jail term would be served in Allenwood minimum

security prison . 19
With De Meo' s co-operation, Justice Department agents
began taping the telephones of George Harrison and Tom Falvey,
another key member of the gunrunning network. In early 1981,
De Meo, while free on bail, visited Harrison's apartment with
a F.B.I. wire taped to his body. He told Harrison he would
introduce him to a trusted arms dealer. De Meo promised that
this man would maintain the flow of arms during his stint in
prison.
On May 17, 1981, De Meo introduced John White to Harrison
and Falvey. White, in reality F.B.I. agent John Winslow, posed
as the arms dealer and began negotiating with the two I.R.A.
supporters. Winslow told the men he could supply a whole range
of weapons. He promised to deliver Uzi sub-machine guns, a
flamethrower, and a 20mm cannon to shoot down British Army
helicopters.
The

F.B.I.

trap,

code

named

"Operation

Bushmills,"

reached its climax on June 17, 1981. Agent Winslow originally
told Harrison and Falvey the cost of his first arms shipment
was $15,000. Later he telephoned Harrison and said the price
had to be raised to $16,000. F.B.I. agents listening to the
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wire tap then heard Harrison call Michael Flannery and ask for
more cash. The Noraid leader replied that the money would be
supplied immediately.
on June 18,

Harrison called at Flannery' s

house in

Jackson Heights, New York. Federal agents observed him leaving
with a white envelope,

which was later found to contain

$17,000. Harrison then went to Tom Falvey's house and waited
for Winslow to arrive with the weapons. The phoney arms dealer
soon drove up to the house in a van loaded with sub-machine
guns and AK-47 assault rifles. The men loaded these weapons
into Falvey's garage. Harrison then paid Winslow with the cash
he received from Flannery.
F. B. I.

agents

observed

and

recorded

the

whole

transaction. After Winslow left they saw Harrison and Falvey
leave the house with a bag containing a heavy object. The
agents feared it was one of the machine guns and decided to
spring

their

trap

prematurely.

Those

in

charge

of

the

operation did not want to let one weapon escape their grasp
with the possibility it might be used in Northern Ireland.
Harrison and Falvey were therefore stopped by agents wielding
hand guns and taken into custody. Their plastic bag contained
two cans of beer.
Federal

agents

then

raided

Harrison's

house

and

confiscated records detailing his years of gunrunning to the
I.R.A •• Shortly after this, they arrested Patrick

Mull~n

who

had stored thirteen of the weapons in his basement. It was not
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until October 1981 that Bureau officials apprehended Michael
Flannery and charged him with being the paymaster in the arms
conspiracy. Daniel Gormley, the final member of the group, was
arrested in April 1982 after investigations discovered he had
also supplied cash for the operation.
The five men were brought to trial in the autumn of 1982,
charged with conspiracy to ship weapons to the I.R.A •• Paul
O'Dwyer and a group of associates conducted the defense but
soon realized the amount of evidence against the men was
overwhelming. The lawyers devised a strategy which claimed
their clients believed that George De Meo was a C.I.A. agent.
The C.I.A. has a license to export weapons, therefore the men
claimed they were not only acting within the law but also had
the

endorsement

of

the u. S.

government.

George Harrison

testified that he suspected.the C.I.A. were involved in his
operations as a means of monitoring the flow of weapons to
Ireland and to remove the necessity of the I.R.A. turning to
communist countries for arms. 20
Throughout George De Meo's long career in arms sales, he
continually

boasted

to

George

Harrison

that

he

was

an

operative for the c. I .A •• The defense emphasized this boasting
to build credibility for their case. De Meo was subpoenaed
from prison and subjected to intense questioning about his
C.I.A. involvement. These questions seemed to unnerve De Meo
and he continually pleaded the Fifth Amendment.

He did,

however, categorically deny any association with the c.I.A ••
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Defense lawyers skillfully manipulated De Meo's denial to
raise the jury's suspicions of his credibility. They employed
former Attorney General Ramsay Clark as a key witness. He told
the jury how the F.B.I. always had a deep distrust of the
C.I.A. and never believed their denials of membership. Clark
gave the impression that the C.I.A.

consistently lied to

protect its operatives and were continually involved in covert
operations

similar

to

Harrison's.

These

statements

were

supported by Ralph McGehee, a retired c.I.A. official, who
further testified that it was perfectly logical for the
defendants

to believe

the

agency was

involved

in their

gunrunning scheme. 21 Attorneys for the five men therefore
succeeded in undermining De Meo's vehement denials of C.I.A.
connections.
The accused men also impressed the

jury with their

testimonies. They pointed out that none had criminal records
and had collectively served their country in World War II,
Korea,

and Vietnam.

As character witnesses,

the men used

people like Sam O'Reilly, an 86 year old I.R.A. veteran of the
Easter Rising, who told the jury of the men's great patriotism
for both America and Ireland. Bernadette Devlin described the
defendants as "the finest human beings I have ever known" and
there were reports that her emotional statement brought two
jurors to tears ! 22
The courthouse was packed daily with

Irish-American

republicans giving encouragement to the defendants. George

4~0

Harrison delighted them when his lawyer issued a statement
expressing insult that he was only charged with supplying
weapons for a six month period in 1980. Harrison proudly told
the judge he had been exporting guns to the I.R.A. for over
twenty five-years. 23 Michael Flannery, with equal audacity,
stated that the money he gave Harrison for the weapons was not
from Noraid. He claimed it was from a secret I.R.A. fund which
donors had specifically asked to be used for guns. 2 '
The trial ended on November 2, 1982, with a not guilty
verdict.

Several

jurors said they could not believe that

Harrison's arms supply network could have operated for over
twenty-five years without the knowledge of the C.I.A •• The
courtroom

fell

into

pandemonium

when

the

decision

was

announced. Groups of Irish-American republicans cheered and
waived tricolors as Harrison and Flannery shouted "Up the
I.R.A .• " The defendants were carried shoulder high from the
courtroom. 25
The

verdict

was

a

major

set-back

to

the

American

government's efforts against I.R.A. supporters in America. The
Justice

Department

had

hoped

the

involvement

of

Michael

Flannery would provide undisputed evidence Noraid was involved
in purchasing weapons. British government officials tried to
respond to the defeat positively by emphasizing that the
operation

did

smash

Harrison's

network.

They

could

not,

however, disguise their intense disappointment at the verdict.
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The British press reacted with horror at the court
decision. The. Sunday Express described the verdict as an
"obscene charade" and alleged British intelligence officers
had absolutely no confidence in the ability of American law
enforcement

agencies

to

"plug

the

arms

loophole. 1126

mg

London Times reported that Federal Judge Joseph McLoughlin had
saluted the not guilty verdict as a great victory for'justice
and further alleged some of the jurors took part in a victory
celebration after the trial. 27 The Daily Mirror told how one
rich Irish-American businessmen was so impressed by the court
victory that he gave Noraid a blank cheque to use as they
thought fit . 28
In Northern Ireland, the reaction from unionists was
predictably even stronger. The Belfast NewsLetter and

~

Belfast Telegraph both· described the trial as a farce and
demanded a greater commitment from U.S. authorities to smash
I.R.A. gunrunning. Some extremists telephoned death threats to
the American Consul in Belfast. Unionist M.P. Harold Mccusker
typified the anger when he stated:
I am appalled. I can't help but believe the jury
were totally prejudiced or intimidated, or feared
the consequences of making any other decision. rt
is a disgusting verdict when one thinks that seven
people have been murdered here in the past four
weeks -- and some were almost certainly killed by
guns smuggled from the United states. 29
The controversy created by the arms trial verdict caused
Secretary of State James Prior to fly to the U. s.
attempt

to

counter

the

positive

publicity

in an

Noraid

was
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receiving. As the U.S. government was equally alarmed at the
acquittal, it made every attempt to support Prior. Internal
memoranda within the state Department showed its embarrassment
with the verdict and its commitment to maintain good relations
with the British. On November 16, 1982, Prior met with Kenneth
Dam, Deputy Secretary of state. Policy coordinators instructed
Dam

to

assure

the

British

Secretary

that

the

U.S.

was

committed to prosecuting I.R.A. gunrunners. They advised Dam
that;
In view of public controversy over alleged C.I.A.
involvement with the I.R.A. following the acquittal
of five suspected I.R.A. gunrunners in New York and
the consequent death threat against our Consul
General in Belfast, public acknowledgement of our
continued assurances to the British would be
helpful
in dispelling any doubts about our
policy. 30
Despite
support,

this

Prier's

assurance
visit

of

failed

continued
to

U.S.

undermine

government

the

positive

publicity engendered for republicans by the Flannery trial.
His media appearances were canceled because of the prominence
given

to

the

death

of

Leonoid

Brezhnev

and

his

public

appearances were disrupted by Owen Carron and Danny Harrison.
Noraid actually contended that Prier's visit helped their
publicity efforts and encouraged republicans. The Irish People
commented:
For centuries the British have reserved their
loudest condemnations for those groups that are
most effective in opposing their rule. Attacks by
British officials thus become accolades signalling
Irish nationalists that their efforts are having an
impact. In coming to American to attack I .N .A.,
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Prior has paid the highest
republicans might aspire."

tribute

to

which

Republican groups in America rejoiced at the controversy
surrounding the arms trial and used their victory to attack
the British and American governments. They concentrated on
publicizing the information disclosed during the trial which
showed the continuous flow of information on Irish-American
republicans between the F.B.I. and R.U.C .• Noraid used these
revelations to allege there was a network of British agents
operating in America who were working against republican
sympathizers. The Irish Echo called for massive demonstrations
from all Irish-Americans "to make it known that they are
against

the

illegal

activities

of

British

intelligence

operatives as regarding American citizens and the cynical
activities of our own intelligence agents in this whole grey
area of dirty tricks.""
New York's Irish community received George Harrison and
his compatriots as great heroes and christened them the
"Freedom

Five."

The

five

made

guest

appearances

at

a

continuous round of banquets, socials and fund-raisers in
their honor. Michael Flannery received particular praise for
his conduct during the trial. Despite being in his eighties
and relying on a walking stick, Flannery delivered impassioned
republican statements and won considerable admiration outside
republican

circles.

He

even

became

the

subject

of

a

documentary produced by public television entitled, ·"The Old
Man and the Gun."
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Republican groups looked for ways to exploit Flannery's
new found celebrity status to win even more publicity.

A

movement began within New York's Irish Societies to forward
him as the Grand Marshal of the St. Patrick's Day parade.
Irish-American

republicans emphasized that

fitting tribute to a
energies

in

it would be a

man who had devoted so much of his

charitable

work

within

the

Irish-American

community.
Irish-American republicans were optimistic that their
campaign for Flannery could succeed. They had considerable
influence within the st. Patrick Day organizing committee. In
1982, they succeeded in naming Bobby Sands as Honorary Grand
Marshall

despite

strong

opposition

from

constitutional

nationalists. The most powerful group within the committee was
the Ancient Order of Hibernians. With Joseph Roche at its
head, they naturally supported Michael Flannery. At a vote
held in February 1983, the Noraid leader was overwhelmingly
endorsed as Grand Marshall. 33
The election of Flannery caused an immediate political
controversy
outrage.

as

constitutional

nationalists

vented

their

Taoiseach Garret Fi tzGerald and Ambassador Tadhg

O'Sullivan described the republican exploitation of Ireland's
patron

saint

as,

"bitterly

di verse

and

deplorable."

Aer

Lingus, the Irish national airline, withdrew its financial
sponsorship of the parade and the U.S.

Defense Department

prohibited the participation of military bands. 34
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As the controversy mounted, the Friends of Ireland joined
in the attacks on Flannery. senator Daniel Moynihan and former
Governor Hugh Carey, who had always been prominent guests at
the parade, announced they would not participate. Flannery
responded in his typically uncompromising manner and told
reporters, "everyone who comes to New York on March 17 is in
favor of Irish unity. Most are I.R.A. supporters in one way or
another. Its definitely going to be a pro-I.R.A. parade. 1135
The conflict over the St. Patrick's Day parade received
wide

coverage

in

the

American

media.

countless

articles

appeared describing the various aspects of the controversy,
while

Flannery

made

frequent

appearances

explaining his republican views.

on

television

Editorial comment in the

mainstream American press tended to be critical of Flannery
and

condemn

the

"shameless. 11315 The

New

York

Irish

Irish-American

as

press

"gullible"

held

the

and

opposite

opinion and fully endorsed Flannery for the years of work he
had devoted to working for Irish-American charities in New
York. John Thornton, editor of Tbe Irish Echo, reported his
newspaper

was

inundated

with

letters

of

support

for

Flannery. 37
Irish-American republicans claimed the parade itself was
a great propaganda coup. Mayor Edward Koch, Governor Mario
Cuomo, Senator Alphonse D'Amato and Representative Geraldine
Ferraro,

all

marched

despite

pressure

from

the

Irish

government and Friends of Ireland to boycott the parade. 3 •
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The parade attracted a record crowd. Flannery stole the center
of attention. He was cheered all along Fifth Avenue by groups
waiving pro-I.R.A. placards and flags. When the Noraid leader
approached St. Patrick's Cathedral, cardinal Terence Cooke
refused

to

give

his

traditional

blessing.

The

Cardinal

appeared twenty minutes after Flannery passed and was greeted
by a hostile crowd chanting "Up the Provos. " 39
The British media reaction to the parade controversy was
all Noraid and the other republican groups could have hoped
for.

The general

impression conveyed was that the whole

incident showed substantial support for the I .R.A. from IrishAmericans.

The Daily Express,

for example,

described the

parade as "the biggest anti-British demonstration ever held in
America. ""0

Television

news

reports

by

the

British

Broadcasting Corporation relayed pictures of Flannery being
cheered by the crowd and scenes of republican celebrations in
Irish pubs in the Bronx •
The publicity generated in 1983 encouraged Irish-American
republicans to exploit the New York City st. Patrick's Day
parade in subsequent years. In 1984, Teddy Gleason, President
of the Longshoremen's Union and noted for his strong attacks
on British policy in Ulster, was elected as Grand Marshall.
The 1985 Grand Marshal was Nassau county comptroller Peter
King, a strong supporter of Noraid who had recently met with
Sinn Fein officials in Belfast. Al though both these Grand
Marshals did not attract as much media attention as Flannery,
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their election continued the controversy and was exploited for
maximum publicity by republicans.• 1
The rejuvenation of republican groups in America and the
success in achieving publicity coups, led to calls for greater
cooperation and coordination of their activities. The leaders
of

Noraid

and

suggesting ways

other

Irish-American

organizations

to maximize their efforts

began

through

joint

political and publicity ventures. In 1982, a movement grew in
support of the formation of a central coordinating group to
synchronize the diverse activities of republican supporters.
This eventually calumniated in the creation of the Irish
American Unity Conference (I.A.U.C.) in 1983.
One of the principal figures in the formation of the
I.A.U.C.
developer

was

James

based

in

Delaney,
San

a

Antonio,

millionaire
Texas.

He

real

estate

was

deeply

interested in his Irish roots and rose to become a National
Director in the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Delaney's concern
over the Ulster conflict intensified during and after the
hunger strikes when the deaths of Bobby Sands and his comrades
led him to adopt a more militant republican perspective.
Delaney was also infuriated by the use of plastic bullets in
Ulster by the security forces. After the death of Carol Anne
Kelly from injuries received by one of these projectiles, he
told Tbe San Antonio EXJ>ress:
I don't support the I.R.A., but I have a twelve
year old daughter. If we lived in Ireland and they
carried my daughter home with a British plastic
bullet in her head and her only crime had been
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going to the store to get a carton of milk, I'd
sure join the I.R.A •. And if there wasn't one, I'd
start fine! 42
Delaney wanted to bring Irish-America influence to bear

in achieving an end to the conflict in Ulster.

He

was

frustrated, however, by the factionalism and infighting and
began to plead for greater co-ordination and unity of purpose.
At

a

series

of

A.O.H.

conventions

and

Irish-American

conferences in 1982, Delaney built support for the formation
of a

new organization.

Eventually,

the heads of the main

groups decided to discuss the details of Delaney's suggestion
at a conference in Chicago.
From July 15th-17th, 1983, over two-hundred delegates
representing 617 Irish-American groups convened at Chicago's
Hyatt Regency Hotel. They began discussing ways to increase
the

impact of their activities · and achieved a

remarkable

degree of consensus. They agreed to the creation of a new
coordinating group called the Irish American Unity .conference
which would work for an agreed list of political objectives.
The delegates divided into seven sub-committees which
produced a thirty-five point manifesto. Noraid leaders Martin
Galvin and Michael Flannery played an important role in these
proceedings

and,

consequently,

the

document

was

strongly

republican. It called on the British to leave Ulster within
three

years

and

demanded

that

the

American

government

"withhold all military and economic assistance from the U.K.
until

all

repressive measures that deny human rights and
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political

rights

to

Irish

people

are

eliminated. 1143

The

manifesto also demanded an end to the use of plastic bullets,
visas for all members of Sinn Fein to visit America, and an
end to U.S. governmental "harassment and entrapment of IrishAmerican nationalists.""
The conference voted that the I.A.U.C. should produce a
monthly

magazine,

The

Irish

Newsline,

to

publicize

its

activities and provide a republican perspective on Ulster. In
keeping with the theme of uniting all Irish-Americans, the
delegates agreed that the I.A.U.C. should work in Congress
with both the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee and also the
Friends of Ireland. Many still hoped that Tip O'Neill and his
supporters would yet be persuaded to return to the traditional
republican fold. one of the manifesto's final provisions was
to organize a senior citizens· branch of the I.A.U.C. under the
unlikely title of "The Green Panthers". Surveys constantly
showed high levels of political participation among the older
sections of American society. The aim of The Green Panthers
was

to

tap

this

activism

for

the

benefit

of

the

new

organization.
After the Chicago conference, the delegates began forming
I.A.U.C.

chapters throughout America.

They held regional

recruitment gatherings and the group soon claimed it had a
combined membership of 1 to 5 million individuals by 1984. 45
It established an off ice in Washington and began assisting the
lobbying

efforts

of

the

Irish

National

Caucus. 46

James
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Delaney

also

led

a

much

publicized

visit

to

Belfast

of

I.A.U.C. officials in the autumn of 1983. They met with Sinn
Fein

leaders

criticizing

and

issued

a

subsequent

every

aspect

of

British

report
rule

in

severely
Northern

Ireland. 47
The formation of the I. A. U. C. raised great enthusiasm and
expectations among the Irish-American republican groups. They
hoped the organization would encourage a

new unity among

Irish-Americans which would wield great influence in the U.S.
and in Ireland. In its first years of existence, the group
helped to coordinate activities and sustain the high level of
activism which had been maintained since the hunger strike.
The

emergence

of

the

I.A.U.C.

was

also

a

considerable

publicity victory for republicans and they presented it as a
sign of the determination of Irish-Americans to end British
rule in Ireland once and for all.
Despite the formation of the I.A.U.C. and the publicity
successes in the years following the hunger strike, it was the
Noraid tours of Northern Ireland, beginning in August 1983,
which

engendered

victories.

Noraid

the

greatest

organized

controversy
the

tours

and
as

a

propaganda
means

of

counteracting the U.S. government policy of denying visas to
top

republicans.

The

group

concluded

that

if

Sinn

Fein

officials were denied the opportunity to present their views
in the United States, then Irish-Americans could hear them
first hand by traveling to Ulster. Noraid also believed that
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such tours would inspire participants and motivate them to
increased support for the republican movement in America.
The first tour group arrived in Dublin on August 2, 1983,
consisting of eighty members from Noraid, the Ancient Order of
Hibernians, Clan na Gael, and the I.A.U.c. They were welcomed
by Joe Cahill and Fra Mccann of Sinn Fein and then taken on a
tour of republican areas in the North. The group visited
Crossmaglen, Carickmore, West Belfast and Derry. For the tour
fee

of

$200,

they

stayed

each

night

at

the

houses

of

republican families and were conducted on a hectic schedule of
political meetings,

film shows,

and successive rounds of

drinking and Irish dancing.
One of the highlights of the trip occurred in Cullyhanna,
South Armagh, when a group of I .R.A. volunteers in full combat
gear stopped the Noraid bus at a staged road block. One of the
men, carrying a M-60 machine gun, read a statement from the
Army Council praising the delegation and thanking them for
their tireless fund-rasing efforts. When he finished, the bus
erupted into cheers of support. 48
Some members

of

the

Noraid delegation got directly

involved in the conflict and joined riots against the security
forces.

On August 9,

arrested for

Stephen Lich

from Indianapolis was

riotous behavior in Belfast.

An R.U.C.

man

observed him lobbying rocks at a British Army land rover. On
August 11, he appeared at Belfast Magistrates Court, was fined
$100

and

told

to

leave

Northern

Ireland

imniediately.' 9
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Another American, James Hennesey from Pittsburgh, received a
similar sentence after his conviction for stoning a British
Army patrol in Derry. 50
Noraid Publicity Director Martin Galvin was the chief
spokesmen for the tour and from this time became the most
recognized figure in the republican movement in America. 51 He
exploited the media attention given to the Noraid delegation
and gave a continual round of press and television interviews
in which he strongly supported the I.R.A .. Galvin created a
hail of criticism from unionist leaders after an interview in
which he was asked how Noraid justified financing murder and
terrorism. He snapped back at the reporter, "We don't give any
of our money to the British Army. 1152
Other members of the tour party praised the I.R.A. during
the internment anniversary rally in west Belfast.

British

officials were particularly angered at a statement issued by
State

Representative

Charles

Doyle

of

Massachusetts

who

commented:
Every country that England has ever been in they
have exploited and persecuted the people. They
persecuted the brown race in India and, for 800
years, exploited and persecuted the Irish. On the
streets of Belfast, I have seen British soldiers
pointing guns at children. 53
Despite these statements, the Northern Ireland Minister
of

State,

Nicholas

Scott,

invited

the

delegation

to

discussions at Stormont. Scott gave a radio interview in which
he said he wanted the group to hear the British perspective
and show that they had "nothing to hide and Northern Ireland
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was a

just and fair society. 1154 Apparently,

Scott reacted

without specific instructions from James Prior or Margaret
Thatcher. When his superiors heard of the offer they felt it
was a bad idea. Prior believed that to invite Noraid to talks
would compromise the government's policy of not negotiating
with republicans and,

therefore,

confer legitimacy on the

group.
Consequently, when Galvin telephoned Stormont to organize
the meeting with Scott, he was told the invitation had been
canceled. British officials said their offer was rescinded
because of the

arrest of

Stephen Lich.

They claimed the

incident showed Noraid was not concerned with finding out the
facts

or

in

constructive

exploited

the

situation

dialogue.

by

giving

Galvin

immediately

interviews

on

B.B.C.

television in which he accused the British of refusing to talk
because

they

were

ashamed

of

the

"oppressive

policies

conducted against the nationalist community. 1155
There was wide coverage given to the Noraid tour in both
the

Irish

commentaries

and

British

tended

to

media
be

newspapers

characterized-

"ignorant,

sentimental

strongest condemnations,

but

critical.
the

group

most

editorials

Predictably,
as

however,

British

"buffoons"

Irish-Americans. 1156

Some

and

of

and
the

came from constitutional

nationalist newspapers in Ireland. They criticized Noraid for
listening only to Sinn Fein and not hearing the views of the
Irish government and S.D.L.P ..

An editorial

in The Irish
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Independent told readers "It is a matter of record that Noraid
collects money which is used to buy guns in America. These
guns then pass into the hands of men and women who are nothing
more than self-appointed killers." 57 The Irish Hews, Northern
Ireland's

largest

circulating

constitutional

nationalist

daily, commented:
Their so-called "fact-finding" mission was an
extremely curious one. Their failure to meet
constitutional nationalists, who still represent
most anti-Unionists, reveals the type of closed
mind that has bedeviled Ireland for too long.
Noraid appears to have been more interested in
confirming their prejudices than in finding out
anything new. 58
Despite these critical comments, Martin Galvin regarded
the tour as a great success. He felt the group had succeeded
in its objective of attracting large coverage in the media.
This

publicized

the

fact

that

the

I.R.A.

had

committed

supporters in America. Galvin was pleased with the opportunity
to infuriate Unionists by his statements and embarrass the
N.I.O. over its decision not to have talks. He also felt that
the presence of Irish-Americans in Northern Ireland had given
a great boost to the republican movement by showing solidarity
with

their

struggle

and

ensuring

continued

financial

assistance. 59
Noraid soon began preparations

for

a

second tour of

Northern Ireland in 1984. The group placed notices in the
Irish-American press calling for people to enroll in the trip
of a lifetime, to personally experience the great hospitality
of northern republicans and the reality of British oppression.
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Noraid

headquarters

in

the

Bronx

was

inundated

with

applications. The tour party ultimately had to be limited to
one-hundred and thirty for logistical reasons.
The British Information Service in New York monitored the
preparations

for

the

second

tour

and

kept

the

Thatcher

administration informed of its itinerary and objectives. News
of the intended visit caused di visions within the British
government.

James Prior had been alarmed at the publicity

Galvin attracted in 1983 and felt he should be prohibited from
entering

Northern

Ireland.

Ambassador in Washington,

Oliver

Wright,

the

British

felt that such action would be

counter-productive and impossible to enforce. The Ambassador
won support from Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, who believed
Galvin would exploit his exclusion for propaganda purposes.
Prior and Howe tried to persuade Home Secretary Leon
Brittan of

the merits

of

their

contrasting perspectives.

Correspondence, later leaked to The Guardian, show Brittan was
more impressed by Prier's arguments. He eventually signed an
exclusion order against Galvin on July 28,

1983. The Home

Secretary had been most persuaded by the argument that the
1983 Noraid visit had increase sectarian tensions and led to
increased levels of violence in Ulster. 60
In New York,

Galvin casually dismissed the exclusion

order and announced he would fulfil his plans to attend the
internment commemoration in Belfast. He led the Noraid group
to Dublin on July 31 and remained there while they travelled
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to Northern Ireland. British Army and R.U.C. patrols along the
border were increased to prevent any attempt by Galvin to
enter the province.
The presence of the Noraid delegation again attracted
continuous media coverage and controversy.
visited republican graves in Coalisland,

When the group

Co.

Tyrone,

Owen

Carron told them that the greatest need within the I.R.A. was
for

modern

America. 61

weapons
British

and
and

implied
unionist

they

could

politicians

be

sent

were

from

outraged

when one Noraid official said "I would not discourage people
from sending guns here .•• its probably the moral duty of every
Irish-American

to

get

them

democracy. 1162 Another member of

u. s.

weapons

to

ensure

the delegation when asked

about Noraid funds replied "If they want to buy weapons with
it, I say good 1 uck to them!

1163

Members of the delegation again joined republican riots.
On August 9, Brendan Judge from Gary, Indiana, was arrested
while wearing a ski-mask and carrying a petrol bomb during
disturbances

in the

Bogside

area

of

Derry.

At the

court

hearing he appeared wearing an I.R.A. T-shirt. Judge proudly
displayed the garment to press photographers outside after he
was sentenced to a fine and deportation. 64
In the meantime, Martin Galvin had successfully breached
border

security.

He

entered

Derry

on

August

9.

As

a

provocation to the British Army and R.u.c., he posed for press
photographers beside an I.R.A. commemorative plaque in the
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Bogside and gave an interview to The Derry Journal. He said it
had been easy to evade the security forces and again said he
would attend republican demonstrations in Belfast. 65
The cumulative effect of the Noraid tour and Galvin's
evasion of security forces was to heighten tensions during the
August 12, 1984, internment march in west Belfast. The R.U.C.,
intent not on being humiliated by Galvin, waited expectantly
for

his

appearance.

Police

officers

screened the

Noraid

delegation as it marched along the Falls Road but saw no sign
of their man. When the procession assembled outside Sinn Fein
headquarters to hear speeches, the R.U.C. began moving closer
to the podium. They were determined to grab Galvin if he dared
to appear.
A large crowd· assembled around the podium forming a
barrier between the R.U.C. and the speakers. As they listened
to Gerry Adams conclude his speech, the Sinn Fein President
called Martin Galvin to the microphone. The Noraid leader
emerged from republican headquarters but before he could utter
a word, the R.U.C. charged. A bloody riot developed in which
police officers battoned and fired plastic bullets into the
crowd. Ed Blanche of The Washington Post described to his
readers how "police in jeeps fired repeated volleys into the
crowd while club-wielding officers leapt from their vehicles
and charged, trampling screaming protestors. " 66
During the

confrontation many

people

were

hit

with

plastic bullets, including members of the Noraid group. One
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protester, Sean Downes, was hit in the chest by a bullet fired
at

point blank range.

He collapsed on the

despite successive attempts to revive him,

roadside

and,

died from the

injury. The whole incident was captured by photographers and
television camera crews. On the night of August 13, footage of
the dying Sean Downes was broadcast on news reports on both
sides of the Atlantic.
storm and generated

It immediately created a political

intense

controversy which

lasted

for

weeks.
Republicans

immediately

described

the

death

of

Sean

Downes as a savage act of murder. They were joined in strong
condemnations of the R.u.c. by the S.D.L.P. while the Irish
government called for an official investigation. Nationalist
reaction was epitomized by an editorial in Tbe Irish News
which stated:
Even the most moderate and genuinely peace loving
nationalists, as well as far minded members of the
unionist community, will have felt justifiably
outraged at the wild and fatally brutal attempts by
the R.U.C. to arrest Galvin. To be blunt, the
police action was an unmitigated disgrace as well
as being disastrously unproductive. In pursuit of
Mr.
Galvin
they
fired
plastic
bullets
indiscriminately into a peaceful crowd, killing one
man and injuring many others. They also wielded
their
batons
without
mercy
on
innocent
demonstrations, as well as press photographers. 67
The Downes affair was widely reported in America. The
main television networks carried footage of the incident. They
also

ran

castigated

interviews
the

with

R. U. c.,

Michael

described

Flannery
Galvin

as

in
a

which
"brave

he
and

courageous young man, " and said the incident showed why it was
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right

to

ship

American

weapons

to

the

I .R.A .• 68

In

the

massive editorial response to the incident, some newspapers
took the opportunity to condemn Noraid and blame Martin Galvin
for the death and injuries.

For example,

The Tulsa World

commented:
Galvin and others like him fuel delusions of
bravery by fermenting violence from the safety of
America. Galvin doesn't have to live in the mess he
helps create. And his actions are all the more
despicable for the fact he is an attorney, sworn to
uphold the rule of law. 69
The

more

typical

reaction

from

large

metropolitan

newspapers was to severely attack the actions of the R.U.C.,
while

de-emphasizing

Galvin's

role.

The

Chicago

Tribune

compared the incident to Bloody Sunday, while The Richmond
Times-Dispatch said the R.U.C.'s use of plastic bullets was
"abominable. 1170 Many newspapers reached similar conclusions
to the following editorial in The New York Daily News:
Ignoring the fact that the street was packed with
women and children, the cops waded into the crowd
indiscriminately swinging clubs and opening fire
with so called humane plastic bullets. The Thatcher
government has a lot to answer for in this
incident. It has made a bad situation worse. Those
responsible must be punished with the same kind of
vigor that is applied to the I .R.A.. Thatcher
cannot condemn the I .R.A. as a bunch of. vicious
killers with one voice and condone with another
voice brutal behavior by her own policemen who ran
roughshod over innocent people. 71
In Britain, the death of Sean Downes produced a flurry of
criticisms from politicians and the press. David Steel, leader
of the Liberal Party, called the incident "an unacceptable
police riot," while Clive Soley,

Labor Party spokesmen on
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Northern Ireland,

condemned James Prior's decision to ban

Galvin. Many ne.wspapers echoed Soley's comments and said the
ban was impossible to enforce and only offered republicans a
golden
Daily

opportunity
Mirror

to

even

secure

suggested

a

propaganda

the

victory. 72

incident

was

a

~

clear

indication that the British should make plans for withdrawal
from Ulster.
James Prior initially responded to the criticisms of his
handling of the affair by def ending the decision to place an
exclusion order on Galvin.

As condemnations of the policy

increased, however, Prior eventually admitted he had made a
"bad mistake." He described the death of Sean Downes as, "an
enormous setback for me personally in my efforts to try to
improve relations between the two communities. 1173
Prier's candid statement admitting responsibility for the
Downes affair produced a heated reaction from unionists. James
Molyneaux called his statement a great blow to the confidence
of the security forces, while Jim Allister said Prier's action
was "gutless" and "a demeaning and vain attempt to appease the
I.R.A.'s anger through groveling regret."n Unionists called
for an emergency debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly,
passed a vote of confidence in the R.U.C., and overwhelmingly
voted

against

an

Alliance

Party

proposal

calling

for

an

official inquiry.
Nora id

and

Sinn

Fein

exploited

the

controversy

surrounding Downes' death for maximum benefit. Galvin later

~
'
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re surf aced

in

Dublin

to

hold

a

press

conference

before

returning

to

Morrison,

the Noraid leader appeared with his hair dyed

America.

Flanked

by

Joe

Cahill

and

Danny

reddish brown. He said this was a disguise to get across the
border and related how during his escape an R.U.C. officer had
pointed a gun at him but failed to recognize his identify.
Galvin promised he would tell Americans about the brutality of
the R.U.C. when he returned and said that if he had a gun at
the time he would have shot the officers involved. 75
When Galvin returned to New York, he was greeted at
Kennedy

Airport

by

a

pipe

band

and

a

large

crowd

of

supporters. Within republican circles he was given a cult
status as tales circulated about his daring escapes from the
R.U.C .• Stories told how he was passed over peoples' heads to
freedom during the R.U.C. attack and how he wore a policeman's
uniform and used two look alikes to fool his pursuers. 76
Galvin exploited this image and used the lavish attention of
the American media to extol the republican cause.
British press reports lamented that the American reaction
to the Downes killing greatly benefitted republican groups.
The London Times said it had, "provided Nora id with a stunning
propaganda victory which would be successfully used to loosen
Irish-American purses from Los Angeles to Long Island. 1177 The
Economist complained that;
The attack has brought a flood of favorable
publicity for Nora id. It has also resulted i_n
celebrity status for Martin Galvin, who could not
have done more for the cause if he had planned
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things himself ••• He is now a hero to IrishAmericans for defying the ban and slipping into
Ulster undetected. 78
The political controversy caused in Northern Ireland by
Irish-Americans

did

not

end

with

Galvin's

departure.

On

September 1, 1984, twenty-four members of the New York city
Police Department pipe band led a hunger strike commemoration
parade in Bundoran, Co. Donegal. The officers belonged to the
Police Department Emerald Society and had been in Ireland for
the Rose of Tralee festival and G.A.A. centenary celebrations.
They marched in the hunger strike parade after requests from
Sinn Fein and Noraid.
The action of the New York policemen caused another
political storm. Garret FitzGerald said their participation in
the parade was "grossly insensitive." He was supported by
senior Irish policemen. Afterwards, when members of the pipe
band went to Dublin for a scheduled reception with Lord Mayor
Michael O'Halloran,
their

action

as

he refused to meet them and condemned

an

insult

to

the

Irish

people.

Ulster

unionists issued outraged condemnations of the policemen for
endorsing terrorism. Harold Mccusker said their action was as
insulting to unionists as the R.U.C. attending a function of
the Ku Klux Klan would be to Americans. 79
The American government was extremely embarrassed by this
fresh political controversy. It issued a statement pointing
out

that

the

organization

Emerald

and

did

Society
not

was

represent

a
the

private
New

fraternal

York

Police

473

Department. Robert Kane, the U.S. Ambassador in Dublin, also
wrote to New York police commissioner Benjamin Ward and Mayor
Koch strongly condemning the band members. 80 Pat Murphy,
spokesmen for the Emerald Society, dismissed these criticisms
and defended the band's right to participate. He claimed they
wanted to register their concern over brutalities committed by
the police force in Ulster.
Despite the republican publicity coup caused by the
Downes incident and the actions of the Emerald Society, the
British government decided to continue its exclusion order on
Martin Galvin. New Northern Ireland Secretary, Douglas Hurd,
maintained the ban after intense pressure from Unionists and
right-wing Conservative M.P.s. The decision gave the Noraid
leader yet another opportunity to embarrass the government and
win further publicity.
Galvin again defied his prohibition from Ulster and led
a Noraid delegation of one-hundred and twenty-five members to
Ireland in 1985. On August 9, he appeared in Derry to act as
pall bearer at the funeral of Charles English,

an LR.A.

volunteer who died in a premature grenade explosion. Galvin
was only 100 yards away from R.U.C. constables observing the
funeral and his photograph appeared on the front pages of most
British and Irish newspapers the following day.
Galvin said that he would not appear at the internment
rally in Belfast because he didn't want to give

th~

R.U.C. an

excuse to kill more innocent civilians. His mere presence

474

again attracted continued controversy.
Ireland,

R.T.E.

because

the

journalists held a

network

refused

to

In the Republic of

one day work stoppage
broadcast

interviews with the Noraid leader.

a· series

of

Those involved in the

protest alleged the R.T.E. action was a flagrant censorship of
information and claimed the ban was taken in response to
government pressure."
Following the 1985 Noraid tour, the Emerald Society pipe
band again marched in the hunger strike commemoration in
Bundoran,

despite

government and

intense

u. s.

pressure

from

State Department not

both
to

the

Irish

participate.

Martin Galvin and Joseph Roche praised the police officers for
their solidarity with the republican movement during speeches
after the parade. Officer Daniel Danaher characterized the
attitude of his comrades when he told reports;
We' re playing for the ten young men who died on
hunger strike. I've been told that they were
terrorists, that they were murderers, but so were
the leaders of 1916 until they were shot. I've been
dealing with murderers all my life. I've never seen
one of them who would put himself through that
agony, through that kind of death, for what he
believed in. 82
The Noraid tours between 1983-1985 were very successful
in achieving their desired objectives and in benefiting the
republican

movement

on

both

sides

of

the Atlantic.

They

attracted massive amounts of media coverage in Britain and
Ireland which tended to elevate the significance of IrishAmerican power and influence in aiding the I .R;A..

Noraid

capitalized on the American media attacks against the R.U.C.
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after the Downes affair and used the incident to bolster its
fund-raising appeals. The group brought Downes' wife over to
the United States for even more publicity and to describe
first hand the police brutality against the demonstrators.• 3
Republicans took further delight from the embarrassment
the Downes incident caused James Prior.

They relished the

severe criticisms leveled against the Secretary of State and
contend

the

affair

hastened

his

replacement

by

Douglas

Hurd. 84 Noraid and Sinn Fein also welcomed the damage caused
to the R.U.C.'s image. For some years, the Northern Ireland
Off ice had proudly claimed that there was a growing respect
for the police in the nationalist community. After the events
of

August

11,

1984,

British

officials

acknowledged

that

community relations had been seriously affected and confidence
in the force had been shattered.
Noraid continually emphasized that its visits gave a
great

morale

boost

to

the

I.R.A.

and

Sinn

Fein.

Most

republicans in the North welcomed Noraid and acknowledged the
positive results of its efforts. Members of the delegation
always got loud cheers of support when they marched in the
annual internment rally and were usually well received at the
social

functions

held

for

their

benefit

in

republican

areas. 85
There are some republicans, however, who remain ambiguous
about the annual

Irish-American visitors.

They cl_aim that

Noraid's presence forces the I.R.A. into ill prepared attacks
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on

the

security

volunteers,

forces.

lives are

There

is

a

feeling

that

Provo

jeopardized byn attacks designed to

impress the Americans. In one such instance, volunteer Kevin
Watters died when a nail bomb exploded prematurely during the
1983 Noraid tour. Charles English died in a similarly botched
attack during the 1985 visit.
There were some residents of West Belfast who condemned
Martin Galvin's actions in 1984. They felt that if he had kept
away from the internment rally, Sean Downes would still be
alive. 86 Others resented members of the Noraid group spouting
support for the armed struggle, yet not having to live with
its consequences.

Some also lampooned the Irish-Americans'

political naivete after incidents in which they wandered into
Belfast city center clad in T-shirts and baseball caps with
pro-republican slogans on the front. 87
These resentments were not extensive and participants on
the

Noraid

received

tours

in

universally

republican

praised

areas.

Noraid

the

way

claims

they

were

that

the

experiences their group had in the North served to strengthen
commitment to the republican movement in America. Sinn Fein
organized the itinerary of the tours to ensure participants
would be presented with the republican political perspective.
The results of this were predictable.

Lillian Roche

from

Baltimore, who went on the 1985 tour, told The Washington Post
on her return that "the things I've read didn't tell nearly
the

whole

story

I've

seen how the

catholic community

is
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totally oppressed and suffers constant harassment from the
British. 1188

Another

member

of

the

tour,

Jeanne

Clarizio

from Connecticut, told The Hartford Courant, "Before I went I
almost had to apologize for the I.R.A •• After this I'm not
going to do that anymore. 1189
Many of those who went on the Noraid tours redoubled
their republican activities when they returned to America.
They spoke before Irish-American audiences to describe their
experiences,

wrote

anti-British

articles

in

the

press,

organized new fund-raising ventures for Noraid, and pressured
their political representatives to support republican causes
in Washington. The feelings expressed by Seamus Metress seem
typical

of

those who

travelled

to

Northern

Ireland with

Noraid:
After staying in the six counties, my colleagues
have a greater sense of the social and political
obscenity that is British occupied Ireland. Many,
including myself, have drawn a new sense of
strength and dedication from the nationalist people
they have come to know. Further, they have come
away resolved to continue to work for the movement
they now know more intimately. The revolution that
continues daily in the six counties will not be
forgotten by those who experienced it. 90
The Noraid tours brought many benefits to the republican
network

in America and

provided

Sinn

Fein with

positive

publicity for its political campaigns. These successes were
matched

by

a

number

of

important

publicity victories

in

America. The Harrison/Flannery trial and the subsequent St.
Patrick's Day controversies sustained a republican revival
which

was

inspired

by

the

success

of

the

hunger

strike
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campaign. Older republican groups were revitalized while new
ones emerged to conduct fresh publicity efforts. 91
Despite all the positive developments for Irish-American
republicanism in this period,

its opponents also achieved

significant successes. The U.S. Justice Department continued
to

pressure

Noraid

and

secured

a

number

of

important

convictions for gunrunning. Constitutional nationalists also
achieved a new political initiative in Ireland, which received
financial

support

from

the

Reagan

administration

eventually blocked the political advances of Sinn Fein.

and
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CHAPTER 10

The Activities of tbe Friends of Ireland and U.S. Law
Enforcement Agencies, 1981-1985.
Irish-American republicans achieved a number of important
successes in the years following the hunger strike. The U.S.
government was particularly alarmed at the verdict in the
Flannery /Harrison trial while the Friends of Ireland were
dismayed by Noraid's publicity victories. Despite these noted
set-backs, the forces working against the republican network
did achieve their own successes. American law enforcement
agencies continually harassed republican groups and eventually
smashed a number of ·important gunrunning conspiracies. The
Friends of Ireland continued to play an important role in
Ulster politics and made a significant contribution to the
Anglo-Irish
From

Ag~eement

1981,

the

in 1985.
Reagan

administration

increased

its

activities against Irish-American republicanism. The Justice
Department, in particular, intensified the F.A.R.A. court case
against Noraid. Federal attorneys worked relentlessly to force
the group to acknowledge the Provisional I.R.A. as its foreign
principal. This legal action also had the objective of forcing
Noraid to provide greater details about its fund-raising
activities. The government hoped that success in the case
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would bolster

its

contention that

Noraid was

bankrolling

J.R.A. violence in Northern Ireland.
Paul

O'Dwyer

and

Frank

Durkan

provided

free

legal

assistance to Noraid and fought the Justice Department for
four years.

But on May 1,

1981, Judge Charles Haight Jr.

finally agreed with the government and declared the I.N.A.C.
must register as an agent of the Provos. O'Dwyer immediately
challenged this decision but again lost when a Federal Court
of Appeals upheld the Haight verdict in January 1982.
Noraid continued the legal controversy by refusing to
file its returns under the F.A.R.A. The act stipulates that
financial

statements

are

made

under

penalty

of

perjury.

Defense lawyers claimed that the I.N.A.C. was not an agent of
the I.R.A. and if it filed as such it would be committing a
criminal offense. The Justice Department then sued Noraid for
contempt of court. In early 1984, the group was given ninety
days to comply with the Haight ruling or risk a hefty fine.
In

this

situation,

Noraid

lawyers

began

working

a

compromise. They agreed to register as an agent of the I.R.A.
on

condition that

financial

reports

carried a

disclaimer

stating that the link to the Proves was forced by court order.
Federal attorneys agreed to this and Noraid resumed filing its
financial returns in July 1984. Michael Flannery included the
following statement accompanying the report:
Pursuant to a court ruling in 1981, made without
plenary trial or evidentiary hearing, it has been
judicially determined that the I.R.A. is a foreign
principal of I.N.A.c •. Consequently, the I.R.A. is
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listed here as a foreign principal of I.N.A.C. only
as a matter of legal compulsion and pursuant to
court order. Its listing here does not reflect the
views or beliefs of I.N.A.C. or its members, who do
not subscribe to, believe in, or affirm the
correctness
of
this
judicially
compelled
declaration. 1
With the enforcement of the Haight ruling, the Justice
Department could show that Noraid was officially registered as
an agent of the I.R.A •. This was useful in adding emphasis to
U.S. government claims that the I.N.A.C. supported violence.
There

is

little evidence to

show that

this

formal

legal

connection had any detrimental effects on the group. 2
In conjunction with the F.A.R.A. case, the U.S. State
Department also tried to weaken the republican network by
tightening its visa denial policy. The most noted example of
this was the continued refusal to permit Gerry Adams to enter
the

United

States,

despite

his

election

to

the

British

Parliament in 1983. Adams received numerous invitations to
speak in America but each visa application was refused on the
basis of his support of violence. His case became a cause
celebre for Irish-American republicans. A Committee for Free
Speech in Northern Ireland formed specifically to win a visa
for Adams, while members of the Ad Hoc Committee continually
appealed to the State Department to lift their ban. One of the
most

noted

supporters

of

Adams'

right

to

be

heard

was

Geraldine Ferraro, the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate
in 1984. 3
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The visa denial policy undermined republican publicity
because

it

blocked

prominent

members

of

presenting their views and raising funds

Sinn

Fein

in America.

from
Yet

republicans did reap some benefits from the fact that many
prominent newspapers, especially The New York Times, strongly
attacked the visa denials for "damaging America's reputation
as an open society of intelligent, free citizens, capable of
deciding for th ems elves whether to hear or ignore a speaker. 114
American

republican

groups

also

exploited

the

British

government's role in visa denials. Noraid won support for its
contention that the State Department was denying freedom of
information to the American public because of pressure from
Whitehall.
Numerous republicans chose to ignore the visa denial
policy and entered the United States illegally. Republican
sympathizers in Canada organized an elaborate system through
which members of Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. would be provided
with forged documents and escorted across the American border.
Once

in the U.S. ,

they participated in clandestine fund-

raising and weapons procurement ventures. Immigration officers
began

investigating

surveillance

of

this

Canadian

republican

pipeline

suspects

and

under

conducted
"Operation

Shamrock." Information received during this investigation that
enabled the I.N.S. to apprehend Owen Carron and Danny Morrison
in January of 1982. Shortly afterwards, agents also arrested
Edward Howell and Desmond Ellis. The authorities.described
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both men as top I.R.A. explosives experts. They were taken
into custody while trying to enter the United states illegally
at the Whirlpool Bridge near Niagara Falls. 5
These arrests temporarily blocked the Canadian route for
illegal entry but did not stop republicans from getting to
America. For example, Joe Cahill and Jimmy Drumm were caught
in New York City in May 1984 after using false immigration
documents. The two men were suspected of organizing an arms
shipment for the I.R.A .. While they were not formally charged
with this conspiracy, they were quickly deported back to
Ireland. 6
Legal actions against Noraid and a tightening of the visa
denial

policy

increased

pressure

on

the

Irish-American

republican network. The most effective measures taken by U.S.
law enforcement agencies

were against

I .R.A.

gunrunning.

Despite the failure and embarrassment of the Harrison/Flannery
case, F.B.I. agents continued their undercover operations.
These eventually brought important successes for the F.B.I.
and significantly impaired I. R. A. arms procurement in America.
One of the first successful convictions in the period was the
"Barney McKeown case."
In 1979 George Harrison acquired a large consignment of
arms, including two M-60 machine guns, stolen from Camp Le
Jeune, North Carolina. Before shipment to Ireland, the weapons
were stored in a garage belonging to Barney McKeown -- an
American citizen originally from Northern Ireland whom British

492
newspapers alleged that he was very active in Noraid. Before
the arms shipment left New York, one of the conspirators
telephoned I.R.A. contacts in Dublin and gave details of its
arrival. Irish detectives recorded the call from a wire tap
and immediately informed their counterparts in America of the
gunrunning scheme. 7
The weapons arrived in Dublin in late October 1979. Irish
authorities then laid a

trap for the

I .R.A..

The Provos

learned of the trap and no one appeared to collect the
weapons. The Garda were forced to seize the arms on November
2, 1979. Some of the weapons had serial numbers which were
still intact. They were later traced back to George De Meo.
Police also found a shipping document with the weapons linked
to

Barney McKeown •. Because of

this

inadvertent mistake,

McKeown was convicted on June 24, 1983, of arms smuggling for
the I .R.A •. He received three years imprisonment and a fine of
$10,000. 8

Although McKeown was jailed and the arms supply broken,
the court case produced a huge controversy which greatly
embarrassed American law enforcement agencies.

During the

first trial in December 1982, Stephen Rogers, a senior U.S.
Customs official who had supervised gunrunning investigations
in New York, testified on behalf of McKeown. Rogers said he
did this because of illegal actions taken by the prosecuting
agencies. He testified that Joe King, a U.S. Customs official,
had perjured himself by telling the court he did not know of
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the Garda telephone tap in Dublin. Rogers claimed that King's
testimony was a lie and that in fact he was informed. 9
This first trial ended because the jury was unable to
reach a unanimous verdict. The second trial was aborted after
prosecuting lawyers called for a lengthy adjournment. This was
to contest the defense's request for confidential British and
Irish government documents. The documents were to be used as
evidence that Joe King perjured himself in the first trial.
The

prosecution

eventually

succeeded

in

convicting

McKeown in the third trial but the conflict over Rogers'
testimony

continued.

British

infuriated by Rogers'

and

revelations.

Irish

officials

were

They were particularly

incensed because he revealed the identity of a M.I.5 agent in
open court. Newspaper reports claimed that both the British
and Irish authorities began withholding information because
they lacked confidence

in the U.S.

Customs Service.

They

believed the agency was riddled with I.R.A. informers.
In
officials

light

of

the

recommended

breakdown
that

in

Rogers

trust,
be

U.S.

Customs

prosecuted

for

obstruction of justice. They only backed down from this action
because some officers felt a court case would disclose too
much about British and American intelligence operations. There
was also an internal investigation of the customs service in
New

York

to

uncover

alleged

I .R.A.

sympathizers.

Later,

William von Raab, U.S. Commissioner for Customs, traveled to
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London and Dublin to reassure both governments that there were
no republican informers within his service. 10
On November 1984,

Stephen Rogers was fired from the

customs service because of his conduct at the McKeown trial.
He

immediately

dismissal

contested

proceedings

the

before

action
the

and

brought

unfair

Merit

Systems

Federal

Protection Board. British newspapers alleged the case created
sharp divisions within the New York Customs Office with an
anti-Rogers

faction

investigations

accusing

while

a

Rogers

pro-Rogers

of

sabotaging

group

claimed

I.R.A.
he

was

defending the integrity of the service. Many of the officers
were

of

Irish

ancestry

and

began

calling

each

other

denigrating nicknames used during the Irish Civil War. 11
The Federal Merit Systems Protection Board met in May
1985. Rogers demanded that secret documents outlining the role
of British and Irish agents

in the McKeown case be made

available

Reports

for

his

defense.

allege

that

British

intelligence made it clear to the U.S. authorities it did not
want

any

more

confidential

information

disclosed

to

the

public. Without this information, which Rogers claimed was
essential, the Board reinstated him with back pay. It also
concluded Rogers' naming of the M.I.5 agent was "inadvertent
rather than a result of I. R. A. sympathy. 1112
Some

U.S.

law

enforcement

officials

felt

that

the

conviction of Barney McKeown was in some ways off set by the
adverse consequences of the Rogers case. Government agents,
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however,

were conducting investigations of

numerous other

gunrunning operations to the I.R.A. which brought much more
conclusive victories. One of these was the conviction of an
arms conspiracy scheme led by Gabriel Megahey and involving up
to eleven other republican sympathizers.
Gabriel Megahey was born in Belfast and had a

long

connection with the republican movement. He worked in England
for many years at the Southampton docks. In the mid-seventies
he was expelled from the country because of his involvement in
a scheme to import explosives and weapons from New York.
Megahey then went to America and worked as a bartender in
Queens.

He maintained his

republican connections

alleged to be leader of the I.R.A.

and was

in the United States.

Megahey was also involved in gunrunning and soon became the
focus of F.B.I. surveillance. 13
When
crossing

Desmond
the

Ellis

Canadian

and

Edward

border

in

Howell

February

were

arrested

1982,

Gabriel

Megahey's name was found on their shopping list for weapons.
Following this, the F.B.I. put a tap on Megahey's phone. They
recorded his alarm at the arrest of the two men but were
unable to get hard evidence linking him to I.R.A. gunrunning.
The F.B.I. investigation of Megahey took an unexpected
turn when Michael Hanratty approached government agents and
offered

to

electronics

help

smash the

surveillance

Duggan in June

1981

for

arms

expert,
help

conspiracy.
was

Hanratty,

contacted

by

an

Andrew

in purchasing sophfsticated
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technical devices for remote control bombs. Duggan, an IrishAmerican active in Noraid, was a main figure in the Megahey
network.

He

told

Hanratty

they

wanted

to

send

a

large

consignment of military material to the I.R.A.
Hanratty

claimed

he

turned

informer

for

"patriotic

reasons" and immediately began cooperating in an F.B.I. sting
operation

called

Enrique Ghimenti,

"Hit

and

Miss."

He

and

who posed as an arms dealer,

meeting with Duggan in New York.

The F. B. I.

agent

arranged a

had the room

bugged and also installed a video camera. The operation was
only partly successful because Duggan sat down in the wrong
place so only his voice was recorded.
Duggan was interested in the arms sale Enrique proposed
and they arranged a second meeting in New Orleans. The F.B.I.
successfully recorded this meeting. Agents filmed Duggan and
two I.R.A. fugitives agreeing to buy five Redeye missiles at
$10,000 each. The I.R.A. men also asked for a whole range of
automatic rifles, machine guns, and even a mini-submarine. 14
Throughout these negotiations, the F.B.I. was frustrated
because it could not get direct evidence against Megahey. At
a

third

meeting

he

did

incriminating material.

appear

and

the

agents

got

the

They filmed Megahey affirming the

order for Redeyes and proposing mutual hostage taking until
the arms deal was complete. 15
The F.B.I. operation reached a climax in June 1982 when
Megahey and his co-conspirators tried to send a consignment of
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fifty-one rifles and remote control devices to Ireland. The
weapons were packed into a container labeled, "roller skates
and comforters." United States agents began working in close
cooperation with their British and Irish counterparts. They
seized the arms at Port Newark but allowed a small consignment
to travel on to Limerick on board a cargo ship. When the
weapons arrived in Ireland, Garda agents engaged in a brief
gun battle with two I.R.A. men sent to pick up the container.
The men, Patrick Mcveigh and John Moloney, were later jailed
for seven and three years respectively for possession of
Armalite rifles and I.R.A. membership. 16
On June 21, 1982, the F.B.I. arrested Megahey and Duggan
at a construction site in Manhattan. They also apprehended two
brothers from Northern Ireland, Colm and Eamonn Meehan, who
were also involved in the conspiracy. The four immediately
received legal aid from the Irish-American republican groups
and a panel of lawyers began investigating ways to thwart the
prosecution.
Lawyers for the Meehans based their defense on the fact
the brothers had been held as internees in Long Kesh. They
claimed that

the

two

suffered

from

post-trauma

distress

disorder because of their experience in prison, and entered a
plea of not guilty because of insanity. The Meehans were then
examined by a

psychiatrist who concluded their claim to

insanity was "only a diagnostic possibility." Following this
diagnosis, Judge Charles Sifton denied their

defense.~ 7
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When this line of defense collapsed, the lawyers for the
four men copied the tactic used in the Flannery trial. They
claimed the defendants thought Michael Hanratty was a C.I.A.
agent and therefore that their gunrunning scheme had U.S.
government

approval.

Assistant

U. s.

Attorney

Carol

Amon

counteracted this move by producing C.I.A. affidavits stating
that

Hanratty was

no.t

one

of

their

operatives • 18 Defense

lawyers then tried to break the prosecution by focusing on the
involvement of British intelligence in the case and forcing
F.B.I. witnesses to divulge classified information.
The trial lasted for nine weeks. On May 13, 1983, after
five days of deliberation, the jury found the men guilty on
most charges. As Gabriel Megahey was the leader of the arms
conspiracy,

he

received

seven

years

imprisonment.

Andrew

Duggan and Eamonn Meehan both got three. Colm Meehan received
two,

following

his

acquittal

on

some

of

the

conspiracy

charges.
The F.B.I. was delighted at the verdict. Many American
newspapers also hailed the conviction and claimed it was a
shattering blow for I.R.A. gunrunners. The Chicago Tribune
typified the general

reaction

in the

following editorial

praising the jury:
The
courtroom
was
packed
with
friends
and
sympathizers of the accused. They interrupted
proceedings with tearful outbursts and shouted
I.R.A. slogans and anti-British propaganda. But the
jury ignored these spurious distractions and
concentrated on the basic issue .•• The burned _and
mutilated bodies of scores of innocent Irish
victims of the I.R.A. over the years - many women
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and children among them - provide more eloquent
testimony than do shouted slogans . 19
Just two weeks after the Megahey conviction, the F.B.I.
won a second victory when a Federal Court in Brooklyn found
Vincent Toner and Colm Murphy guilty of gunrunning. The two
men were both from South Armagh and were involved in a scheme
to

send

armalite

rifles

to

the

I.N.L.A ••

Federal

agents

infiltrated the operation by posing as mafia arms dealers.
They arrested the two men after the weapons were exchanged
outside a White Castle hamburger shop in Queens, New York.
Colm Murphy, the mastermind of the conspiracy, received a five
year sentence and a fine of $10,000. Vincent Toner, who was
involved in transporting the weapons, got eighteen months and
was fined

$7,500.~

Following their victory in the Murphy /Toner case, federal
agents continued to investigate others who were suspected of
involvement
secure

in

the Megahey conspiracy.

further

convictions

had

mixed

Their attempts to
results.

Patrick

McFarland, an associate of Megahey, fled to Ireland when he
heard of the F.B.I. sting. After months on the run he decided
to

give

himself

up

at

the

U.S.

Embassy

in

Dublin

and

voluntarily return for trial. McFarland's lawyers successfully
argued that although he had transported boxes of weapons for
the

Meehan brothers,

he

did not

know their contents.

In

November 1983, he was acquitted on all charges. 21
In April 1985, the F.B.I. arrested Liam Ryan and charged
him with using false documents to purchase three armali te
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rifles which were part of the Megahey consignment. Ryan was a
naturalized American citizen originally from County Tyrone. He
had associations with Irish-American republican groups and was
a close personal friend of Martin Galvin.

Agents matched

Ryan's fingerprints with those found on the armalites and
obtained purchase certificates in which he used the name of
Robert Power as an alias. In September 1985, he pled guilty to
making

fraudulent

statements

in

buying

the

weapons

and

received a suspended sentence. 22
By

far

the

largest

and

most

intriguing

gunrunning

operation to be uncovered in this period was organized by John
Crawley in Boston. Crawley was born in New York in 1957 but
later moved to Dublin with his family as a teenager. In 1975,
he returned to the United States to join the Marines. After
four years of service, Crawley went back to Dublin and became
involved with the I.R.A •• In 1984, he traveled to Boston and
began assembling a huge arms cache for the Proves which
consisted of one-hundred and thirty-six heavy Browning machine
guns, grenades, night sights, and flack jackets.
On September 23, 1984, Crawley loaded the arsenal on
board a fishing vessel called the Valhalla and sailed out of
Boston bound for Ireland. Unknown to him and his associates,
an informer had alerted the authorities about the conspiracy.
This initiated a surveillance operation involving full-scale
cooperation between American, British and Irish authorities.
As the Valhalla sailed across the Atlantic, it was tracked by
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an

American

progress.

satellite

Some

followed by a

reports

which

closely

allege

that

monitored
the

the

ships

trawler was

also

British submarine. 23 A crack force of Garda

detectives joined to monitor the Irish end of the operation.
TWO Irish navy corvettes, the Emfil: and Aisling, followed a
rendezvous ship, the Marita Anne, as it left port in Kerry. As
the arms were transferred between the two trawlers in midAtlantic,

a

Royal

Navy

Nimrod

aircraft

photographed

the

operation with special magnified cameras. 24
Irish authorities

intercepted the Marita Anne

as

it

sailed back to its home port laden with weapons. on board,
they found five crew members including Crawley and Martin
Ferris, a prominent Kerry republican and suspected member of
the I.R.A. Army Council. The men were tried and convicted in
the Special Criminal Court on December 11,

1984. Crawley,

Ferris, and Nick Browne, the ship's captain, were each given
ten-years imprisonment. John McCarthy and Gavin Mortimer, who
testified they were only crew members and didn't know about
the operation, received five-year suspended sentences. 25
The entrapment operation was a great success due to the
high level of cooperation between authorities on both sides of
the Atlantic. Patrick Noonan, Irish Minister for Justice, took
the opportunity to attack Noraid by claiming its money was
used to purchase the arms. He also said the interception of
weapons was a massive blow to the I.R.A. which intended to use
them in a new offensive designed to undermine Anglo-Irish
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negotiations.

In

America,

government

officials

similarly

claimed a significant victory over the gunrunning network and
many major newspapers used the

incident to attack Irish-

American republicans. The Baltimore News-American commented:
The I.R.A., which is in league with such scum as
the P.L.O. and the killers employed by Libya's
nutty Colonel Khadafy, are terrorists pure and
simple - and some factions are hot to replace the
British with a Marxist government. How long will it
take for all this to sink in to those Americans
whose dollars helped buy the North Korean hand
grenades stashed aboard the Marita Anne ? 26
The

Valhalla

slipped

past

U.S.

authorities

on

its

homeward voyage and docked in Boston. The trawler was in port
for three days before its discovery by Customs officers on
October 16, 1984. Federal agents began an investigation which
eventually linked the gunrunning operation to organized crime
in Boston and to drug trafficking.
1986, however,

that a grand

It was not until April

jury indicted a group of men

accused of involvement in the conspiracy.
The leading figure in the indictment was Joseph Murray,
an Irish-American from Charleston M.A., who had worked for
years as a compositor with The Boston Globe. Murray had strong
links with organized crime and was associated with a group of
Irish mobsters called the Winter Hill Gang. 27 When police
raided Murray's home, they found a consignment of weapons and
over

10,000

rounds

of

ammunition.

He

was

charged

with

conspiracy to supply guns to the I.R.A. and with smuggling
thirty-six tons of marijuana into Boston to pay for them. 28
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Among others indicted were Patrick Nee, who was accused
of playing a major role in acquiring the weapons. Nee was born
in Ireland and, like Murray, had strong links to organized
crime in Boston. 29 Robert Anderson, captain of the Valhalla,
was

also

charged with gunrunning and was

allegedly

paid

$10,000 by Murray for undertaking the voyage. Anderson was
noted for his swashbuckling lifestyle and heavy drinking and
had used the Valhalla for a number of illegal ventures. 30
During the trial
guilty to gunrunning.

in May 1987,

the three men pleaded

This confession was part of a

plea

bargain with prosecutors who dropped the drug charges and
recommended sentences

for

lower than the twenty-two year

maximum. Murray was sentenced to ten years while Patrick Nee
and Robert Anderson got four years each.
The

trial

was widely reported on both sides

Atlantic because of

its exposure of

of the

links between I .R.A.

gunrunning and organized crime in Boston. It also uncovered
links between Murray and Dr. William Herbert, an Ambassador to
the United Nations for the Caribbean islands of st. Kitts and
Nevis. The trial revealed that Murray used Herbert to launder
money he made from drug deals. The Ambassador resigned in
April 1987 when the F.B.I.

produced documents showing his

connections with Murray. 31
A controversy
Mcintyre,

one

of

also developed
the

crewmen

on

over
the

the

case

Valhalla.

of
He

John
was

questioned by police after the ship's seizure in Boston.
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Mcintyre disappeared soon afterwards and has never been found.
At the beginning of the grand jury investigation, John Loftus,
the Mcintyre family lawyer, implied the man had cooperated
with authorities and that he was the one who informed the
F.B.I. of the gunrunning scheme. Loftus claimed Mcintyre was
murdered by the I.R.A. because of his actions. 32
John Loftus later wrote a book entitled, Valhalla's Wake
in which he reversed his earlier allegation against the I.R.A.
and claimed Mcintyre was assassinated by the Special Air
Service of the British Army.

He says that they murdered

Mcintyre because he was about to discover the real informer
within the gunrunning network. Loftus also claimed members of
the U.S. Coast Guard passed information to the gunrunners on
how to avoid coastal patrols. The British Embassy and U.S.
Coast Guard both say these charges are completely false. 33
A controversy also developed surrounding the involvement
of Boston police officers in the Marita Anne affair. When the
ship was seized, Garda detectives discovered eleven bulletproof vests. Ten of these vest were subsequently traced to
Charles Tourkantonis and Michael Hanley, both officers with
the

Boston

Police

Department.

An

internal

investigation

revealed that the two officers had bought the vests for John
Crowley.

No disciplinary proceedings were taken,

however,

because the officers claimed they did not know the flack
jackets were to be used illegally. One jacket was also traced
to officer Michael Flemmi, a member of the bomb squad. He
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claimed the vest was stolen from his car and that he didn't
know how it ended up on the Marita Anne. Flemmi was similarly
cleared of any charges of misconduct. 34
The series of successes achieved by U.S. law enforcement
agencies against the gunrunning network in the mid-1980s
represented a serious problem for the I.R.A •. Patrick Bishop
and Eamonn Mallie contend that after the seizure of the Marita
Anne, the Provos began to concentrate their arms procurement
ventures on Europe. Al though the I. R. A. continued to ship
weapons from America, U.S. authorities successfully reduced
the trans-Atlantic arms pipeline. The continued conviction of
Noraid members for gunrunning further diluted the credibility
of the group's claim to be solely involved with humanitarian
aid. 35
In

addition

to

these

problems,

Irish-American

republicanism continued to suffer from the adverse publicity
generated by I.R.A. bomb attacks. One of the worst of these
explosions occurred in July of 1982. The I.R.A. detonated two
remote control devices in London's Hyde Park and Regents Park,
killing eight bandsmen from the Royal Green Jackets Regiment.
The military musicians were giving an open air concert and
many civilians were injured by flying nails which had been
packed around the bombs.
In December 1982, the I.N.L.A. exploded a bomb in the
Droppin' Well Inn near Ballykelly, Co. Derry. Eleven British
soldiers and six civilians were killed. In October of 1984, an
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I .R.A.

bomb killed five people at the Conservative Party

Conference at Brighton. The explosion only narrowly missed
killing Prime Minister Thatcher.
All these attacks were given prominent coverage in the
United States and initiated a wave of criticism against the
I.R.A •• The strongest reaction against the Provos, however,
came after the bombing of Harrods department store in London
on December 19, 1983. An I.R.A. unit drove two cars packed
with explosives and parked them outside the store. They phoned
a warning which was hopelessly late for police to clear the
streets. The bombs ripped through Christmas shoppers, killing
eight and severely injuring many others. Kenneth Salvesen, a
businessman from Chicago, was among the dead and three other
Americans were injured.
The bombing caused outraged reactions in Britain and
Ireland while the death of Salvesen brought some of the
strongest attacks on Noraid ever launched in the American
press. Numerous editorials alleged Noraid money had directly
financed the bombs, and, therefore, brought death and injury
to Americans. Martin Galvin, recognizing the disastrous effect
the bomb had in America, issued statements that the action was
taken without the Army Council's authority and that a warning
beforehand "showed a principled morality that divides the
freedom fighter from the terrorist. 1136
Galvin's defense of the

I.R.A.

only led to greater

condemnations of Noraid in the American press. The shallowness
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of his statement was exposed later when evidence showed that
the I.R.A. team were on an official mission which had indeed
been approved by the Army Council. 37 The American Ambassador
in London attacked the I.R.A.'s "savage bestiality" while the
Friends

of

deranged."

Ireland

called

the

attack

"despicable

and

The Chicago Tribune's reaction to the Regent's

Park attack was representative of most American editorial
opinion on I.R.A. bombings:
Americans who, out of sentiment or ignorance, give
money
to
Noraid
and
other
I.R.A.
front
organizations should take a good look at what their
contributions can do .•. Look at the blood spattered
young bandsmen in Regents Park, look at the
carcasses of horses strewn in bloody heaps across a
London road. And they should read the eyewitness
accounts of arms and legs and musical instruments
flying through the air; of horses' screams and the
pop of pistols putting them out of their misery; of
the young soldier with the bottom half of his body
blown away,
reaching out in a futile dying
gesture •.. That is where the I.R.A. and its front
groups spend their money. They claim that they are
raising funds for the families of slain or
imprisoned I.R.A. men. They lie. The money goes for
arms, ammunition, and bombs. It buys the high
explosives and the remote control detonators that
blew up in London. The money bank rolls the sort of
sub-humans who can pack six inch nails around a
bomb and put it in a place where women and children
and tourists will gather. 1138
Constitutional nationalists used every I .R.A. atrocity to
convince Irish-Americans of the futility of violence.

The

Friends of Ireland also fought hard to contain the publicity
successes achieved by republicans after the hunger strike.
They

continued

to

use

their

influence

on

Capitol

Hill.

Eventually, through close cooperation with the S.D.L.P. and
Irish government, the Friends played an important role in the
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Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Pressure and influence from
these Irish-American political leaders was, at certain stages,
vital in bringing the Agreement to fruition. It marks the most
significant achievement of the Friends of Ireland.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement was very much a consequence of
the political changes in Ulster after the hunger strike. Sinn
Fein electoral victories, during and after the prison dispute,
created intense pressure on the S.D.L.P •• John Hume realized
that his party needed to achieve some political success if it
was to resist the challenge from republicanism. He hoped to
secure political concessions

from the British government

through direct Anglo-Irish negotiations. Yet the likelihood of
this objective seemed extremely remote. In 1982, the British
were intent in pursuing an internal solution by devolved
government
Assembly.

through

the

establishment

of

James

Prier's

They were consequently ignoring the Anglo-Irish

dimension.
Hume's hope of achieving a political breakthrough was
further eroded by the serious deterioration in Anglo-Irish
relations. This diplomatic chill began after Charles Haughey's
electoral victory in March 1982. The new Taoiseach antagonized
Margaret Thatcher with his nationalistic rhetoric and strong
attacks against the Prior Assembly.
Anglo-Irish relations reached their lowest ebb during the
Falklands War.

Haughey gave the Thatcher government only

limited and grudging support to economic sanctions enforced by
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the E.E.C. on Argentina. After a British submarine sank the
Argentinean

battleship

Patrick Powers,

Belgrano,

Irish

Defense

Minister,

said that "Obviously the British are the

aggressors now." In Maggie ; An Intimate Portrait of a Woman
in Power, Chris Ogden claims that the British Prime Minister
considered Irish actions as an "unforgivable betrayal." He
says it reinforced her, "natural antipathy towards the Irish,
whom she considered, in large part, shiftless, sniveling, and
spineless. 1139
These
Friends

of

Anglo-Irish
Ireland.

antagonisms

The

group

republican publicity over the

greatly

was

concerned

alarmed

Fl~nery

trial

at

the

positive

and the st.

Patrick's Day parade controversy. Senator Edward Kennedy and
Tip O'Neill were frustrated that they could not counteract
Irish-American republicanism by pointing to some political
advances by constitutional nationalists in Ireland.

Their

frustration was compounded by the deterioration in relations
between

London

and

Dublin

which

seemed

to

block

fresh

political initiatives in Ulster.' 0
In this unpromising situation, the Friends of Ireland
worked

for

a

political

breakthrough.

In

their

1982

st.

Patrick's Day statement they appealed for greater dialogue
between the Haughey and Thatcher administrations. In May, the
Friends sent a delegation to Ireland led by Congressman Tom
Foley and Senator Chris Dodd. They helped form a counterpart
to the Friends of Ireland in the Dail called the Irish-u.s.
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Parliamentary

Group.

strengthening

This

new

trans-Atlantic

aimed

organization
communications

at

between

constitutional nationalists in order to coordinate political
action on Capitol Hill. 41
The

Friends

of

Ireland

delegation

also

traveled

to

Belfast and met Lord Gowrie of the Northern Ireland Office.
Tom Foley and Chris Dodd told him they were concerned about
the lack of political progress in Ulster and endorsed the
Anglo-Irish approach as the best way foreward.

In order to

show the British their commitment, key members of the Friends
tabled joint-congressional resolutions calling for a ban on
the use of plastic bullets and the outlawing of the Ulster
Defense Association. 42
Despite

the

efforts

of

the

Friends

of

Ireland,

constitutional nationalism suffered a major blow following
Sinn Fein's success in the October 1982 Assembly elections.
The results confirmed John Hume's view that a new initiative
was imperative to consolidate the S.D.L.P. 's position and
counteract the rising republican threat. He began to press
Garret FitzGerald, elected Taoiseach in December of 1982, to
embark

on

objectives

a
of

new

political

constitutional

drive

aimed

nationalists.

at

defining

the

Fi tzGerald was

intensely aware of the threat posed by Sinn Fein and quickly
announced the formation of a New Ireland Forum.
The New Ireland Forum began discussions in May 1983. All
constitutional nationalist parties submitted proposals on how
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to

unify

Ireland

while

Protestant/unionist identity.
participate because of

Sinn

the

protecting

still

Fein was

not asked to

its support of violence while all

Unionist parties rejected the exercise as "obviously biased"
against

their

interests.

Despite

frequent

disagreements

between the parties involved, the Forum continued to take
testimony and discuss political alternatives throughout the
year.
John

Hume

and

the

FitzGerald

administration

were

committed to getting support for the Forum from the Friends of
Ireland. Before the discussions began, Hume contacted all his
associates on Capitol Hill and asked for a firm endorsement of
the

new

initiative.

Ireland"

resolution

Senators

and

Together
which

fifty-three

they

was

formulated

sponsored

Congressmen.

by

The

a

"United

twenty-eight

resolution

was

issued on st. Patrick's Day 1983 and gave strong support to
the New Ireland Forum, describing it as a great sign of hope
for

the peaceful unification of

Ireland.

The Friends re-

emphasized their attack on James Prier's "unworkable" Assembly
and maintained that a real solution would require," the bold
cooperation of both the British and Irish governments jointly
pursuing,

at

the

highest

levels,

a

new

strategy

of

reconciliation."u
The Irish Times described the resolution as, "the most
important

Irish

initiative

to

be

put

to

Congress

since

1920. 1144 John Hume and Irish Foreign Minister, Peter Barry,
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traveled to Washington to support the resolution. Barry also
held extensive discussions with Ronald Reagan and asked for
support for the New Ireland Forum. The President was impressed
by the new initiative. Although he emphasized that the United
States would not chart a course for Ulster, he acknowledged
that "we do have an obligation to urge our long-time friends
in that part of the world to seek reconciliation. 1145
As the New Ireland Forum discussions progressed, the
Friends

of

Ireland

were

kept

informed

of

the

latest

developments. On July 27, 1983, a delegation from Dail Eireann
traveled

to

Washington

and

met

with

their

American

counterparts. Members of the Friends considered the visit so
important
Volcker,

they
as

suspended

confirmation

Federal. Reserve

Chairman,

hearings

for

to meet the

Paul
Irish

politicians.
The discussions concentrated on a growing conflict within
the Forum between Charles Haughey and Garret FitzGerald. Press
reports in Ireland and America suggested Haughey was using the
Forum as a means to embarrass the Taoiseach. This political
maneuvering alarmed the Friends. Journalist Michael Kilian
contends that they asked the Dail delegation to advise Haughey
not to disrupt the discussions. Tip O'Neill emphasized that
the Forum needed to present a united front in order to win the
support

of

the

United

States

government

and

to

constitutional nationalist efforts on Capitol Hill. 46

enhance
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The

Friends

of

Ireland

tried

to

aid

the

Forum

by

continuing to encourage meaningful dialogue between the Irish
and British governments.

In October 1983 they sponsored a

resolution calling on President Reagan to appoint a special
U.S. envoy to Northern Ireland. In an accompanying statement,
Senator Edward Kennedy said an American envoy could play an
important role in encouraging Anglo-Irish talks. Although the
proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration, it did
give the British yet another indication of Irish-American
concern in seeing a new political move in Ulster. 47
Following the special envoy resolution, the Friends were
greatly encouraged by the resumption of Anglo-Irish summits.
In November 1983, Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald met
in London. These were the first major discussions since the
dispute with Haughey over the Falklands War. FitzGerald was
optimistic that the proposals being formulated in the New
Ireland Forum would lay the basis for a bold new political
initiative in Ulster. 48
The Forum Report was finally released in May 1984 and
offered three political options as possible solutions to the
Ulster conflict. After strong pressure from Charles Haughey,
it proposed that "the most favored solution" was a united
Ireland,
suggested

safeguarding
a

unionist

highly complicated

rights.

The

report

federal-confederal

also

system.

Under this formula, both parts of Ireland would have their own
assembly, presided over by a national government. The final
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option proposed that Northern Ireland could be ruled jointly
by both the Dublin and Westminster governments. 49
The Friends of Ireland immediately supported the Forum
Report and began working for the endorsement of the Reagan
administration. To enhance this effort, Peter Barry flew to
Washington on May 4, 1984, and held top level discussions with
State Department officials. The talks proved successful and
the U.S. government later issued a statement praising" the
Irish statesmen for their courageous and forthright efforts
embodied in the New Ireland Forum. 1150
The American press also welcomed the Forum Report •

.'.1'..b.§

Christian Science Monitor described it as a "measured step
forward in eff arts to end the political deadlock." The New
York Times and The Washington Post similarly praised the
Report and urged the British government to make a positive
response. 51
The British Parliament debated the Forum Report on July
2, 1984. There was considerable praise for its attempt to
accommodate Unionist aspirations and its strong condemnation
of terrorism.

The Thatcher government refused to give an

official reaction until the next scheduled Anglo-Irish summit
in November. There was wide scale anticipation on both sides
of the Atlantic that the British Prime Minister would make a
magnanimous gesture towards constitutional nationalism.
The Anglo-Irish summit was held at Thatcher's retreat,
Chequers, on November 15, 1984. Since the release of the Forum
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Report,

both governments had conducted private discussions

which achieved considerable progress.

At Chequers,

Garret

FitzGerald tried to move these talks to a higher level. He
suggested a political formula under which his government would
amend articles two and three of the Irish constitution -which claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach
hoped

that

in

exchange

Britain would

agree

to

a

formal

political role for Dublin in Ulster affairs. 52
Douglas Hurd, the recently appointed Secretary of State,
opposed

FitzGerald's

offer.

He

felt

the

constitutional

amendment was too much of a gamble and would be extremely
counter-productive if it failed.

Consequently,

the British

delegation tried to retard the pace of discussions. Although
both governments

continued to work toward an Anglo-Irish

agreement, FitzGerald recalled that "The British were tending
to pull back from what had been discussed already. It was a
somewhat disappointing meeting because the negotiations were
moved to a lower and subtractive level. 1153
Following the meeting at Chequers, Margaret Thatcher held
a press conference. For the first forty-five minutes she gave
a very positive appraisal of Anglo-Irish negotiations. When
she was asked about the three political options advanced in
the Forum Report, however, she dismissed them all in her now
infamous "Out, out, out" remarks.
Thatcher's seemingly insensitive dismissal of the efforts
of constitutional nationalists caused an immediate .political
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storm in Ireland. The normally restrained Irish Times said the
Prime Minister was "as off-hand and patronizing as she is
callous and imperious."

The Irish Press said Thatcher's

vehement delivery had an element of rudeness usually reserved
for bitter enemies and that she made "Out" sound like a fourletter word.

The newspaper concluded her statement was

a

devastating rejection of all the hopes and efforts that went
into the Forum.
Thatcher
American

also

press.

received

There

were

strong
over

condemnation

fifty

editorials

in

the

on

her

remarks which generally reaffirmed support for the Forum and
attacked the British government's failure to make political
progress in Ulster. The Boston Globe said Thatcher had "a mind
choked with prejudice," while commentaries in The Washington
Post attacked her "stone cold intransigence" and "graceless
self-indulgence."~

Relations

between

the

London

and

Dublin

governments

entered a period of confusion and misunderstanding following
Thatcher's press conference. Many Irish politicians believed
the

British

Prime

Minister

was

deliberately

trying

to

humiliate Garret FitzGerald and scuttle Anglo-Irish talks.
They persuaded the Taoiseach to issue a counter statement
describing Thatcher's reaction as "gratuitously offensive."
Constitutional nationalists were greatly concerned that
the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations would destroy the
prospects for a new political move in Ulster. The S.D.L.P. was
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particularly alarmed at this development because they would
have no political breakthrough with which to counteract Sinn
Fein.

Faced

with

this

aituation,

John

Hume

and

Irish

government officials began to enlist the services of their
Irish-American

supporters.

They

contacted the

Friends

of

Ireland and urged them to get Ronald Reagan's assistance.
Constitutional nationalists hoped they could persuade the
President

to

pressure

Thatcher

into

a

more

conciliatory

position. 55
Among the key figures in this attempt to get Reagan's
support was William Clark, U.S. Secretary of the Interior.
Clark was a long-time friend and confidant of the President.
He also had a close relationship with the Irish diplomatic
corps in Washington, especially Sean Donlon. Clark became very
supportive of the constitutional nationalist position. While
he was Deputy Secretary of state in 1981, Clark conducted a
tour of Ireland. He caused a political storm among Unionists
when he

admitted his

membership of the Ancient Order of

Hibernians and told a reporter that "it is the hope and prayer
of all Americans" that Ireland will be united. " 56
Irish government officials
Thatcher's

"Out,

Out,

Out"

contacted Clark

remarks.

following

He agreed to use his

influence with Reagan to assist the constitutional nationalist
cause. The President was scheduled to meet the British Prime
Minister at Camp David on

December

22,

1984.

Before the

meeting, Clark asked Reagan to discuss Anglo-Irish relations
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with the Prime Minister and express his desire for political
progress. The Friends of Ireland backed Clark in a telegram to
the President on December 21. They also told Reagan of their
"disappointment at Mrs. Thatcher's public peremptory dismissal
of the reasonable alternatives put foreword in the Forum
Report. 1157
American press reports which appeared after the Camp
David meeting said the two leaders only discussed Western
European reaction to the Star Wars Defense Initiative. It was
not until January 17, 1985, that the Reagan administration
officially acknowledged that Anglo-Irish affairs was one of
the topics on the agenda. In a letter to Mario Biaggi, the
White House stated the President and Mrs. Thatcher "exchanged
views on Northern Ireland" during which he "stressed the need
for progress and the need for all parties concerned to take
steps which will contribute to a peaceful resolution. 1158
Garret FitzGerald believes William Clark's intervention
was the crucial factor in persuading Reagan to discuss Irish
affairs.

The President raised the issue against specific

advice from the State Department. During the meeting, it seems
that Reagan expressed a desire to see progress in the AngloIrish talks. He also said he would like to discuss the issue
further with Thatcher when she was due back in the U.S. in
February 1985. 59
Reagan's concern with Anglo-Irish relations,

and his

desire for further discussions, put Thatcher under a certain
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amount of

pressure.

proposals

to

the

She was

Irish

encouraged to make

government

before

her

some

new

return

to

Washington in February. Garret FitzGerald believes that it was
partly due to this American pressure that Thatcher offered a
new Anglo-Irish package on January 21, 1985. This new deal was
a significant advance on what had been discussed at Chequers
and

opened

the

way

for

the

Anglo-Irish

Agreement

in

November. 60
Although American pressure was a significant factor in
Thatcher's more positive proposal of January 21, she was also
influenced by her political colleagues in Britain. Members of
her cabinet and staff emphasized that her "Out, Out, Out"
remarks had damaged Garret FitzGerald's political position in
Ireland

and

would give

encouragement

to

Sinn

Fein.

They

advised Thatcher to compromise and offer more significant
concessions to the Irish. 61
Despite

Thatcher's

new

proposal,

the

FitzGerald

administration continued to use its influence in America. Sean
Donlon and John Hume contacted Tip O'Neill before the British
Prime Minister was due to address a joint session of Congress
on February 20, 1985.

They asked the House Speaker to ensure

that Thatcher discuss the Northern Ireland problem in her
speech. O'Neill conveyed this request to Sir Oliver Wright,
the British Ambassador. To emphasize his concern, O'Neill also
met Thatcher when she arrived in Washington and again asked
her to include the Ulster conflict in her address. 62
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O'Neill's

pressure

produced

results.

When

Thatcher

addressed Congress, she not only discussed Northern Ireland,
but

was

also

extremely

conciliatory

towards

the

Irish

government. She said that relations between her and Garett
FitzGerald were "excellent" and that she would cooperate with
his administration to find a political solution in Ulster. She
also expressed hope that joint efforts to launch new political
dialogue would receive full support from America. 63
As a complement to using its influence with Tip O'Neill,
the Irish government also tried to get support from the State
Department. On February 15, 1985, Garret FitzGerald and Sean
Donlon met with Rick Burke, Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs. They asked the State Department to include the Ulster
problem in talks with Thatcher following her Congressional
address.
Burke

agreed

to

the

Irish

request

and

succeeded

in

reversing the State Department's traditional avoidance of the
Northern Ireland conflict.

He met with Secretary of state

George Shultz and convinced him to raise the question with
Thatcher. At a meeting in California, Shultz and Reagan told
the Prime Minister of their desire to see progress in AngloIrish discussions and offered American financial support in
the event of an agreed political initiative. 64
There was considerable speculation over the nature of
American governmental involvement in the Anglo-Irish process.
Some

unionists

alleged

it

was

all

part

of

a

sinister
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conspiracy

under

Northern Ireland.

which

the

British

Enoch Powell M.P.

would

withdraw

from

believed the U.S.

was

encouraging an Anglo-'Irish agreement in order to establish a
united Ireland. This new state would end its neutrality, enter
the

N.A.T.O.

alliance,

and

permit

the

establishment

of

American military bases. Powell claimed this would greatly
enhance the strategic defense of Western Europe. 65
Enoch Powell never produced any solid evidence for this
conspiracy

theory

yet

it

was

supported

by

a

number

of

prominent Unionists. The fact that the Republic of Ireland
still remains neutral seems to confirm that the theory was a
misinterpretation

of

U.S.

intentions

and

was

based

on

incorrect assumptions.
Perhaps a more plausible explanation of U.S. involvement
was Ronald Reagan's personal interest in Irish affairs. The
President continually emphasized his

Irish

roots

and was

informed of the latest political developments by William Clark
and

other

Irish-Americans

in

his

administration.

These

included Robert McFarlane in the National Security Council,
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Secretary of Labor
Donovan, and C.I.A. Director William Casey.
Irish government ministers took every opportunity to
convince the Reagan administration of the threat posed by the
rise of Sinn Fein. When Vice-President George Bush stopped in
Dublin for talks with Garett FitzGerald in July 1983, the
Taoiseach warned him that Sinn Fein political success could

522
destroy democracy in Ireland. 66 Irish officials reemphasized
this point when Reagan himself visited Ireland in June 1984.
They tried to convince the President that the only way to stop
Sinn Fein was through a new political agreement achieved
through Anglo-Irish discussions.
Reagan,

as

a

self-proclaimed champion against world

terrorism, sympathized with 'the Irish government and strongly
opposed the I.R.A .. Each St. Patrick's Day he issued vehement
attacks against the organization and urged Irish-Americans not
to fund violence in Ulster. He therefore had a concrete reason
for supporting an agreement which offered the prospect of
stifling the republican movement.
From these various influences, Reagan encouraged AngloIrish talks. His contribution was considerable. Following the
February 20 meeting with Thatcher, the British government
intensified negotiations with the FitzGerald administration.
Chris Ogden implies that Reagan offered to increase activities
against the Irish-American republican network if the British
were

more

conciliatory

towards

the

Irish.

He

says

that

Thatcher partly accepted the Anglo-Irish Agreement because "If
she did not, she knew she would get precious little help
stopping the flow of guns and money from America to the I.R.A.
or in getting I .R.A. suspects extradited from the U. s .. 1167
Throughout the final stages of the Anglo-Irish Agreement,
the Irish continued to enlist the assistance of their American
supporters. In early March 1985, Tip O'Neill led a delegation
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of the "Friends" to Dublin.

The held discussions with Garett

FitzGerald and Peter Barry on the progress of Anglo-Irish
talks.

O'Neill

also

went

to

London

and

assured

British

officials he would use all his influence to secure American
financial support for a political agreement. He convinced them
that, as Speaker of the House, he was in a unique position to
guide a financial assistance bill through Congress. 68
On March 25,

Northern

Ireland Secretary Douglas Hurd

traveled to America to discuss the financial aid package in
greater detail. He met Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State,
and held extensive discussions with Tip O'Neill and Edward
Kennedy.

Hurd

discussions

gave

and

them

full

received

details

further

of

the

assurance

Anglo-Irish

of

America's

commitment to back a political agreement in Ulster. 69
In

early

May

1985,

Garret

FitzGerald

traveled

to

Washington for further talks about the United States aid to
Ireland. He discussed the practicalities of getting the bill
through

Congress

with

Tip

O'Neill

Fi tzGerald also went to Ottawa for

and
a

Edward

Kennedy.

meeting with Prime

Minister Brian Mulroney. The Taoiseach told him the AngloIrish agreement was near completion. Mulroney was so delighted
he promised Canadian financial assistance. 70
On May 17, 1985, Anglo-Irish discussions were given an
added sense of urgency. Sinn Fein consolidated its political
success

by

taking

twelve

percent

of

the

vote

in

local

government elections. The vote showed British officials. that
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the S.D.L.P. needed some sign of political success to resist
the challenge from Sinn Fein. Consequently, talks between both
governments were intensified in the summer of 1985 in an
attempt to achieve an early agreement.
As

the

Anglo-Irish

discussions

reached

their

final

stages, there was a flurry of activity to arrange the American
financial contribution. On August 9, Tip O'Neill again met
with Peter Barry and Garret FitzGerald in Dublin. He attempted
to smooth out final issues of contention between the Irish and
British governments. In September, William Clark also traveled
to Ireland. He learned that the agreement was near completion.
When Clark returned to Washington he began to work with Robert
McFarlane to finalize details of the American aid package. 71
The final hurdle to the Agreement came in late October
1985. Charles Haughey was dissatisfied with the Anglo-Irish
discussions, believing that they were a "sell-out" to British
interests. He dispatched Brian Lenihan to Washington in an
attempt to convince the Friends to oppose the Agreement. Tip
O'Neill and Edward Kennedy immediately rejected Haughey's
contentions. The Irish-American political leaders, therefore,
saved the Agreement from a potentially serious challenge and
muted Haughey's opposition. 72
The contacts between American politicians

and those

involved in the Anglo-Irish talks were widely reported in the
media.

There was intense speculation over the extent of

Reagan's financial contribution. The Sunday Times reported the
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AJllerican

aid

package

would

be

$1

billion. 73

Unionist

newspapers ran reports that the Republic of Ireland had agreed
to enter N.A.T.O. and that U.S. missile bases would soon be
established.
All the press speculation finally ended on November 15,
1985, when Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald met in
Hillsborough
Agreement.

Castle

The

key

establishment of an

and

finally

element

of

signed
the

new

Intergovernmental

the

Anglo-Irish

accord

was

the

Conference at which

British and Irish officials would meet regularly to discuss
matters relating to the government of Northern Ireland. An
Anglo-Irish secretariat was also established at Maryf ield, in
Belfast,

to

Conference.

support
These

the

work

provisions

of

meant

the
that

Intergovernmental
the

Republic

of

Ireland was given a formal role in Ulster for the first time
since the formation of the state in 1921. 74
Under the Agreement,

Dublin formally acknowledged the

right of the unionist community to remain within the United
Kingdom. This was affirmed under Article One which stated,
"any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come
about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland." Other provisions expressed a desire "to protect
human rights and to prevent discrimination." The Accord also
promised

much

greater

levels

of

cross-border

security

cooperation. This would be coordinated by the Chief Constable
of the R. U .c. and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana .•
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The unionist reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement was
immediate

and

hostile.

No

unionist

politician

had

been

consulted during the negotiations and they saw it as an
attempt by the British to sell them out. The leaders of the
Official Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party embarked
on a series of mass rallies and days of protest. All unionist
M.P.s withdrew from their seats at Westminster and eventually
forced an election over the Hillsborough accord.
The
positive.

American
The

reaction,

Agreement

in

received

contrast,
massive

was

extremely

political

and

editorial support. All the major newspapers characterized it
as a major step towards reconciliation in Ulster and praised
Thatcher and FitzGerald for their political courage. The New
York Times described the Accord as "creative and ingenious"
and warned unionists that the only group which would benefit
from their opposition was the I.R.A .• 75 The Washington Post
suggested that the strong American support for the Agreement
would lead to a significant erosion of Irish-American support
for the Provisionals. 76
The major Irish-American newspapers were more reserved in
their reaction. All welcomed the fact that Dublin was given a
formal role in Northern Ireland but questioned the unionist
right to remain in the United Kingdom. 77 Mario Biaggi and the
Ad Hoc Committee were also ambivalent. While their statements
seemed to support the Agreement, they were phrased in such a
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way

as

to

open

the

possibility of

disagreement

in

the

future. 78
There was no such indecision in Noraid's reaction. The
group followed Sinn Fein's lead in describing the Agreement as
a sham and a betrayal of Irish national sovereignty. Martin
Galvin emphasized that the only way peace would be achieved
was through British withdrawal.n
On the day the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, Ronald
Reagan and Tip O'Neill held a press reception in the Oval
Office. They praised the new initiative and gave a concrete
assurance that the United states would provide financial aid.
Reagan also condemned

I.R.A.

supporters

in America. 80 On

December 9, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting the Agreement by a vote of 380 to 1. The resolution
received a similar endorsement in the Senate one day later. 81
Following these votes, the Reagan administration began working
on a

"Northern Ireland and Ireland Assistance Bill."

It

promised to provide $250 million over five years for economic
development in the form of loans and guarantees.
In January 1986, Sean Donlon and Ken Bloomfield, head of
the Northern Ireland Civil Service, held intense discussions
with Rozanne Ridgeway, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs. The talks involved details of how United
States financial aid would be used. Press reports said the
meeting was "highly successful" and that U.S. Ambassador to
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Ireland, Margaret Heckler, would be traveling to Ulster to
assess the best way to spend the cash contribution.
Despite

the

early

optimism,

the

aid

package

became

embroiled in a series of internal political disputes within
Congress.

Senator Richard Lugar,

Chairman of the

Foreign

Relations Committee, began to use the aid bill as a lever to
pass an updated extradition treaty between the United States
and Britain. The Reagan administration also threatened that
the

Irish

assistance

Bill

would

program

politicians

also

to

suffer
aid

if

the

questioned the

Congress
Nicaraguan
logic

of

resisted

a

Contras. 82

new
Some

sending aid

to

Ireland at a time when the United States deficit was reaching
astronomical

proportions.

Newspapers

also

suggested

U.S.

foreign aid would be better spent in the Third World. The Los
Angeles Times, for example, commented:
Even as Reagan speaks of a five year Irish aid
program at $50 million per year, he has proposed
cutting the worldwide contribution to the immensely
effective United Nations Children's Program from
$46 million to $34 million per year. Reagan's
priorities of need are as skewed as his Third World
geography! 83
In response to this deadlock,

the Friends of Ireland

drafted their own Bill. It proposed the United States should
give $50 million to boost the Ulster economy, in consecutive
payments over five years. There was overwhelming support for
the measure in the House. Yet it was not until August 1986
that a bill was finally passed with the approval of the Reagan
administration. The final measure approved $120 million in aid
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over a three-year period. It granted $50 million for 1986 and
two payments of $35 million for each subsequent year.a•
The Canadian government joined America and donated $10
million to the Agreement. New Zealand later sent $300,000. The
British

and

Irish

governments

quickly

established

an

International Fund to administer and distribute this cash.
Both governments appointed a seven member Board of managers
while

the

donor

countries

were

represented

by

observers

nominated by their respective governments.
In 1987 the International Fund began supporting a wide
range of economic and social programs. In accordance with the
wishes of donor countries, the Fund spent three-quarters of
its cash in Northern Ireland and the remainder in border
countries

of

International

the

Irish

Republic.

Fund claim that

Supporters

its efforts

of

the

have generated

significant economic growth and provided thousands of new
jobs. as
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement brought great
hope to constitutional nationalists. The political benefits
promised by Dublin's role in Ulster affairs seemed to suggest
a new era in which Sinn Fein's influence would be minimized.
The Agreement could be used by the s.D.L.P. to win support and
reestablish
Furthermore,

its
the

leadership

of

provisions

the
for

nationalist
extensive

community.

cross-border

security cooperation seemed to imply a new commitment which
would severely hamper I.R.A. operations.

530

In

America,

the

Friends

of

Ireland

considered

the

Agreement as their most significant intervention in Irish
politics. Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy firmly believe their
efforts played an extremely important role in securing the
Accord. Without their sustained pressure and influence the
British government would have been much less inclined to
engage in serious discussions.
Most significantly, the Friends and the Irish government
persuaded

President

Reagan

to

add

his

support

to

the

Agreement. The U.S. contribution to the Ireland Fund marked
the

first

time the American government became

officially

involved in the Ulster conflict. Reagan also used his "special
relationship" with Margaret Thatcher to further the process of
Anglo-Irish discussions. Journalist Alex Brummer therefore
concludes:
Without the encouragement and prodding of the
Reagan administration and the sustained pressure
for political reform from the United states
Congress, Mrs. Thatcher and Garett FitzGerald may
never have made it to Hillsborough. 86
The

Friends

of

Ireland

emphasized

that

all

the

breakthroughs of the Agreement were achieved through political
discussion. They hoped that this example would persuade IrishAmericans of the futility of supporting violence and that
constitutional action was the only way to bring change in
Ireland. The Friends were filled with optimism that, as the
benefits of the Anglo-Irish Agreement became increasingly
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apparent, the republican network in America would decline into
insignificance.
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CONCLUSION

In the nineteenth century Irish-Americans played a key
role in providing political and material support for both
constitutional and physical force nationalists in Ireland.
They also made a significant contribution to the 1916 Easter
Rising and the War of Independence from 1919 to 1921. Despite
this long history, Irish-American nationalism diminished after
the establishment of the Irish Free State. The degree of
independence achieved by the twenty-six counties satisfied
most of the diaspora. Others were sickened by the bloodletting
and fratricide during the Irish Civil War.
The

decline

of

Irish-American

accelerated after World War II.

nationalism

further

Increasing socio-economic

success produced a flight to the suburbs and an erosion of
ethnic solidarity. Most Irish-Americans became more concerned
with their position in the United States than with political
events in Ireland. The election of President John F. Kennedy
in 1961 symbolized their assimilation into mainstream American
society.

Consequently,

when

the

current

Ulster

troubles

erupted in 1968, the vast majority of Irish-Americans remained
passive and uninvolved. 1
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In The Irish in America, William Griff in claims that
despite the movement towards assimilation, a small minority of
Irish-Americans
heritage.

retained

an

interest

They contributed to the

in

their

cultural

growing popularity of

college courses in Irish literature and history in the 1970s.
Groups of these Irish-Americans also encouraged a revival of
interest in traditional music and the Gaelic language. 2
For some Irish-Americans, concern with their ethnic roots
stimulated an interest in the Ulster conflict. Most supported
Irish unification and the goals of constitutional nationalism.
In the mid to late seventies their views were represented by
the "Four Horsemen" of Irish-American politics -- Senators
Edward Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan,

Speaker of the House

Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, and Governor Hugh Carey of New York.
During the initial stages of the Ulster crisis these
leading
militant

Irish-American
nationalist

politicians

perspective.

inclined
In

1971,

towards
for

the

example,

Senator Kennedy caused considerable political controversy by
demanding the immediate withdrawal of British troops. Such
statements concerned not only the British government, but also
constitutional nationalists in Ireland who felt Irish-American
political leaders were giving encouragement to the. I.R.A ..
John Hume of the S.D.L.P. and high ranking Irish government
officials contacted Kennedy and convinced him to adopt a more
moderate approach. Eventually, the Four Horsemen became an
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important source of support for constitutional nationalism on
Capitol Hill.
On St. Patrick's Day in 1977, the Four Horsemen issued
their first joint annual statement. They endorsed political
dialogue as the only way to achieve a solution to the Northern
Ireland problem and strongly condemned Americans who supported
the I.R.A •• Many political analysts contend that this action
contributed

to

a

general

decline

in

Irish-American

Republicanism during the late seventies. The "Big Four" also
showed the extent of their political influence by persuading
President Jimmy Carter to promise U.S. financial and economic
support in the event of a political agreement in Ulster. 3
In subsequent St.

Patrick's Day statements the Four

Horsemen combined their denunciations of violence with strong
attacks

on

British

government

policy.

They

used

their

influence in Washington to increase pressure on the British to
launch a new political initiative in Ulster. Edward Kennedy
and Tip O'Neill specifically called for a movement towards
power-sharing under which the s.D.L.P. would have considerable
leverage. Analysts such as Adrian Guelke maintain that this
American political pressure was the main reason for the Atkins
Conference in early 1980. Although this initiative produced no
agreement between the S.D.L.P. and unionists, it was the first
major example of Irish-American political pressure effecting
British policy in Northern Ireland.'
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In

March

1981

the

Four

Horsemen

consolidated

their

position on Capitol Hill by forming the Friends of Ireland.
This

Congressional

group

contained

some

of

the

most

influential politicians in America. They greatly overshadowed
the activities of Mario Biaggi's Ad-Hoc Committee on Irish
Affairs,

which

was

more

inclined

towards

the

militant

nationalist position.
The Friends of Ireland soon had an opportunity to test
the extent of their political influence. In May 1981, after
the death of Bobby Sands, they sent a telegram to Margaret
Thatcher urging a compromise with the hunger strikers. While
the British Prime Minister tried not to offend the IrishAmerican politicians, she rejected their appeal and blamed the
continuing death of prisoners on I.R.A. leaders outside the HBlocks.
Following

this

failure

with

Margaret

Thatcher,

the

Friends of Ireland tried to secure the involvement of Ronald
Reagan.

In July 1981 they backed an appeal from the Irish

government to the President which asked for American support
in pressuring Britain.

Taoiseach Garret Fi tzGerald wanted

Reagan to persuade Thatcher to negotiate directly with the
hunger strikers. Al though the President did discuss t.he prison
protest at the Ottawa Economic Summit on July 20, he flatly
refused to get involved.
The failure to get Reagan's intervention in the hunger
strike was a blow to the prestige of the Friends of Ireland.
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Yet despite

this

setback,

they

continued

to

support

the

initiatives of constitutional nationalism in Ireland.

The

"Friends" gave strong encouragement to the New Ireland Forum
and appealed to the British government to make a positive
response. Their efforts achieved their greatest success with
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
The

contribution

of

the

Friends

of

Ireland

to

the

Agreement was most influential following the summit between
Margaret Thatcher and Garett FitzGerald in November 1984. The
British Prime Minister's blunt rejection of the Forum Report
seemed to signal a deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations.
Faced

with

this

possibility,

the

FitzGerald

government

appealed to the Friends for assistance. On this occasion the
Irish-American

politicians

succeeded

in

getting

Ronald

Reagan's support.
During a December 1984 meeting at Camp David, Reagan
discussed Anglo-Irish relations with Margaret Thatcher. He
took

this

initiative

on

Interior William Clark,

the

advice

against

the

of

Secretary of

wishes

of

the

the

State

Department. Clark, in turn, had been influenced by the Friends
of Ireland and the Irish government.
Garret FitzGerald, although acknowledging the influence
of

other

factors,

believes

that

this

American

pressure

encouraged Thatcher to be more conciliatory. She therefore
presented the Irish government with a comprehensive political
proposal in January 1985. When Thatcher came to the United
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States in February to address a joint session of Congress, Tip
O'Neill insisted that she discuss Northern Ireland.

In her

speech the British Prime Minister described her relationship
with Garret FitzGerald as excellent and implied there would be
renewed

Anglo-Irish

efforts

aimed

at

solving

the

Ulster

conflict. 5
After January 1985 the pace of Anglo-Irish discussions
greatly intensified. During these talks leaders of the Friends
of

Ireland

traveled

to

Dublin

and

gave

assurances

of

substantial U.S. financial support for a political settlement.
They also blocked a

potentially serious challenge to the

provisions of the Agreement from Fianna Fail leader Charles
Haughey. When the accord was finally signed at Hillsborough
Castle on November 15, 1985, it represented not only a major
achievement for Garret FitzGerald and the S.D.L.P. but also
for the Friends of Ireland. The role played by these IrishAmerican

political

leaders

in the

agreement

enhanced the

prestige of constitutional nationalism in the United States.
It marks their most significant intervention in the Northern
Ireland problem to date.
Most Irish-Americans who were interested in the Ulster
conflict supported the Friends of Ireland. Some gave financial
donations

to reconciliation groups

such

as

the

American-

Ireland Fund and co-Operation North. Others organized summer
holiday programs in America for children from Belfast and
Derry. There was, however, a small minority of Irish-Americans
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who supported violence as a means to achieve political change.
They formed organizations to assist the Provisional I.R.A.'s
armed struggle and developed an extremely militant strain of
Irish nationalism.
Since its formation
Committee

(Nora id)

has

in 1970,
been

the

the

Irish Northern Aid

most

prominent

and

controversial group in the Irish-American republican network.
One of its principal objectives was to win positive publicity
for the republican cause and highlight British injustice in
Ulster.

This Nor aid campaign constantly suffered from the

negative American public reaction to I .R.A.

atrocities in

Ireland. The group's publicity efforts were further impaired
by the State Department's denial of U.S. visas to Sinn Fein
leaders. Noraid also claimed there was a pro-British bias in
the American media.
Despite the various factors working against the IrishAmerican republican network, Noraid did achieve a number of
important publicity victories.
American

revulsion

demonstrators

at

during

the

In 1972

killing

Bloody

of

Sunday.

it capitalized on
thirteen
Noraid

Catholic

membership

increased and financial receipts rose to their highest level
of the entire 1970s.
The greatest breakthrough for Noraid's publicity efforts
came during the hunger strikes of 1980-81.

Irish-American

republican activists organized large public demonstrations
after

the

death

of

Bobby

Sands.

Influential

American
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newspapers

characterized

Margaret

Thatcher's

attitude

as

intransigent and called for concessions on the prisoners' five
demands. Noraid fund-raising reached unprecedented heights and
it formed twelve new chapters nationwide.
Noraid's rejuvenation during the hunger strikes convinced
its leaders to organize annual tours of Northern Ireland.
Beginning in 1983, Irish-American activists traveled to the
province

to

oppression."
participated

directly
They
in

experience

stayed

pro-I.R.A.

with

life

under

republican

demonstrations,

"British
families,

listened

to

political speeches from Sinn Fein leaders, and some even took
part in riots against the British security forces.
These annual Noraid tours became important publicity
events for the Republican Movement in Ireland.

Sinn Fein

claimed they showed widespread Irish-American support for the
I.R.A.

and exposed British oppression.

Martin Galvin,

the

leader of the tours, caused considerable embarrassment to the
British government by his continual evasion of the exclusion
order against him. When Northern Ireland authorities tried to
arrest him in 1984, a police officer killed Sean Downes. This
incident brought extensive international condemnations of the
R.U.C. and further undermined its image within the nationalist
community.
Although

Noraid

has

achieved

some

notable

publicity

successes, its principal function is fund-raising. From 1971
to

1981,

Justice

Department

records

indicate

that

the
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organization sent $1,889,607 to the Republican Movement in
Ireland. This figure does not include Noraid's disbursements
between

July

1981

and

1984.

The

group

refused

to

file

financial records in this period because of a legal dispute
over its relationship to the I.R.A •• 6
Nora id

has

continually claimed

its

funds

go to

the

families of imprisoned I.R.A. members for welfare purposes.
British,

Irish,

and American authorities dispute this and

allege that most donations are used to buy weapons.

All three

governments further claim that Noraid financial reports under
the

Foreign

Agents

Registration

Act

are

significantly

understated.
American law enforcement officials have never uncovered
a

direct

link

between

Noraid

funds

and

the

purchase

of

weapons. The group's disbursements are almost impossible to
trace because they are delivered to Ireland in cash amounts by
trusted couriers.

There is, however,

strong circumstantial

evidence supporting the claims of U.S. authorities. In 1982
the F. B. I.

foiled a major gunrunning conspiracy which was

partly funded by Michael Flannery. The Noraid leader, rather
unconvincingly, claimed that his organization had not provided
the money but that it was part of a separate I.R.A. fund.
In The American Connection Jack Holland correctly points
out that the dispute over the use of funds is purely academic.
The money Noraid sends is extremely important to the I.R.A.
"simply because it frees other funds which are in turn used in
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the purchase of arms. 117 It is also true that even if all
Noraid cash· does go to republican families, it still performs
a vital role in sustaining morale. I.N.A.C.

leader Matthew

Higgins once remarked "We have to take care of the needs of
the

dependents.

If

that

fails,

everything

fails.

If

the

dependents become dissatisfied then the whole thing collapses
like a house of cards. 118 Michael Flannery put this more simply
when he commented,

"An I .R.A. soldier freed from financial

worries for his family is a much better fighter!" 9
The most direct way in which Irish-American republicans
have helped the I.R.A. is through trans-Atlantic gunrunning.
In the early 1970s, George Harrison was one of the principal
arms suppliers.

He sent the first consignment of American

rifles to Ireland in

1~68.

They arrived in Belfast in the

summer of 1969 and proved vital to the I.R.A.'s defense of
republican areas during the bloody sectarian riots of that
year.
In 1969 the Provisionals sent Sean Keenan to America to
co-ordinate the gunrunning network. He contacted a group of
Irish-Americans in Philadelphia who supplied the first batch
of Armalite rifles. This weapon was ideal for the I.R.A.'s
guerilla

campaign.

Continual

supplies

of

the

Armalite

modernized the Provo's firepower and provided the means to
conduct their military operations throughout the seventies.
By 1977, the British government claimed that 80% of the
I .R.A. 's weapons came from the United States. The Royal· Ulster
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Constabulary released figures showing that American guns were
used in 70% of Provo killings.
acknowledged the importance of

American authorities also

trans-Atlantic gunrunning but

denied it was as extensive as British estimates.
In the 1980s the I.R.A. extended its arms procurement
ventures in Europe and also received military supplies from
Libya. Despite this trend, Irish-American gunrunners continued
to play an important role. They supplied the Provisionals with
more sophisticated weapons including remote control bombs and
heavy M-60 machine guns.
Irish-American republicans also tried to provide the
I.R.A. with surface to air missiles to shoot down British Army
helicopters. Since 1981 the F.B.I. has uncovered four of these
conspiracies. Federal agents infiltrated the latest scheme in
Florida. In 1989 three I.R.A. weapons experts were arrested
while trying to ship a consignment of Stinger missiles to
Ireland. The men were convicted by a federal court in Fort
Lauderdale and their sentencing hearing is currently pending.
Although

the

F.B.I.

has

broken

a

large

number

of

gunrunning conspiracies, most analysts agree that the I.R.A.
only

needs

a

small

supply

of

weapons

to

continue

its

operations. Irish-American republicans still claim that more
guns get through to the Provos than are detected. It therefore
seems certain that the trans-Atlantic arms pipeline will
continue to be significant for the foreseeable future. Michael
Flannery once made the prophetic remark,

"It will _go on
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forever. As long as the Brits are in Belfast, there will be
someone like me in America! 1110
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